Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA1631
2003-03-14 11:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH KURDS: "WHY DO YOU NEED TURKEY?"

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001631 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH KURDS: "WHY DO YOU NEED TURKEY?"

REF: A. ANKARA 1624

B. ANKARA 1470

C. ANKARA 1341


(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 (b)
and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001631

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH KURDS: "WHY DO YOU NEED TURKEY?"

REF: A. ANKARA 1624

B. ANKARA 1470

C. ANKARA 1341


(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) In March 13 conversation with poloffs, a close Embassy
contact and opposition CHP M.P. discussed Kurdish
perspectives of a possible operation in Iraq. The M.P., a
leader of the Kurdish Dostki tribe with extensive political
ties in Turkey's southeast, tribal ties in Iraq, and previous
service in Parliament, lamented U.S. reliance on Turkey for
any operation in Iraq.



2. (C) He explained to us that none of his constituents or
family members wants Turkish troops to deploy to Iraq. They
fear an intensifying crackdown on Kurds on both sides of the
border, a consequence of "the Turkish State's racist
underpinnings."



3. (C) On the other hand, Kurds, he emphasized, will welcome
U.S. troops: "we realize that the U.S. is our only friend in
the world." Numerous protesters are out on the street
chanting "Savasa Hayir" -- no to war, he noted. "I say,
'Savasa Evet'" (Yes to War).



4. (C) When poloffs tested him by noting their respect for
Turkey in general and shared USG-GOT interests, our contact's
face froze in a way we have seen countless times in
discussing Turkey with Turkish Kurds. "Why do you need
Turkey?" he asked. The Turkish State has a woeful reputation
among Kurds everywhere, he noted. Turkish support for an
operation would, therefore, actually harm rather than enhance
USG equities in Iraq and elsewhere.



5. (C) Our contact is concerned that an operation in Iraq
will provide an excuse for the Turkish State to re-impose
OHAL (State of Emergency) or some other quasi-martial law
regime in Turkey's Southeast. A legal expert on State
Security Courts and member of Parliament's Justice Committee,
he explained that, given well established Turkish practice:
1) the NSC (read: the military) will set the emergency rule
policy; 2) the military by itself will produce the actual
draft law, relying primarily on military lawyers working
directly for TGS; 3) the completed draft will then be passed
to the relevant Parliamentary committees, which will present
the draft as their own work.


--------------
Comment
--------------



6. (C) These comments are particularly striking coming from a
representative of the Party of Ataturk -- which is rabidly
opposed to USG intervention in Iraq. On earlier occasions,
our contact told us of his concern lest he be branded a
"traitor" to Turkey for his support of a possible US-led war
against Saddam. More important, his comments reflect what we
are hearing privately from numerous other Kurdish contacts
across the political spectrum (reftels and previous).
Despite their different party and other affiliations, our
Kurdish contacts are largely united in their conviction that
the Turkish State's policy in N. Iraq and toward its own
ethnically Kurdish citizens is deeply flawed and risks
promoting regional instability. In this regard, they fear
that the palpably pro-war sentiment of many leading Kurds
will fuel Kemalist neuralgia in Ankara power centers (septel).
PEARSON