Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA1546
2003-03-12 03:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT: WHAT WILL ERDOGAN'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON EFIN PINS TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001546 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN PINS TU
SUBJECT: NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT: WHAT WILL ERDOGAN'S
CABINET LOOK LIKE?

REF: ANKARA 1364


(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5
(b,d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001546

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN PINS TU
SUBJECT: NEW TURKISH GOVERNMENT: WHAT WILL ERDOGAN'S
CABINET LOOK LIKE?

REF: ANKARA 1364


(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5
(b,d).



1. (C) Summary: AK Party chairman Erdogan has the mandate to
form a new Turkish government. We expect him to shuffle the
outgoing cabinet, although timing of the shuffle is not yet
certain. While the Erdogan government might assume office
quickly, contacts across the spectrum advise us Erdogan is
not in a hurry to re-submit a U.S. deployment resolution to
parliament. End summary.



2. (U) AK Party chairman Tayyip Erdogan has taken the oath as
an M.P., current P.M. Abdullah Gul has submitted his
resignation, and President Sezer has given Erdogan the
mandate to form a new government.



3. (U) We expect Erdogan to submit his cabinet list to Sezer
quickly, perhaps as early as March 12. Reftel gives the
sequence and timing of steps for the new government to assume
power, present its program, and then be confirmed in a vote
of confidence. In any event the Erdogan government will take
office from the moment Sezer approves a cabinet list and
sends it to parliament, which could be as early as March 12.



4. (C) Korkut Ozal, a brother of late P.M./President Turgut
Ozal and a Godfather to the reformist wing of the National
View (Milli Gorus) Islamist movement ("the Movement") which
Erdogan grew up in, told us March 11 he has urged Erdogan to
focus first on passing a U.S. deployment resolution and only
then shuffle the cabinet. Otherwise, Ozal thinks, the
resentments provoked by changes in the cabinet will further
distract Erdogan and compound the fate of any new draft
resolution. Ozal acknowledged, however, that Erdogan's
temper may get the better of him and lead him to shuffle the
cabinet at the beginning of his tenure.



5. (C) Faruk Demir -- the executive director of the Advanced
Strategy Center (YSM),which has close links to the TGS, NSC,
and National Intelligence Organization -- told us March 10
that he has heard Erdogan's cabinet shuffle may affect a

sizeable slice of the cabinet. Demir's analysis of why
Erdogan may replace some or all of the following:


--Deputy P.M. Ertugrul Yalcinbayir (known as a "liberalist";
he reportedly voted against the draft resolution to permit
deployment of U.S. troops because he already knew he would
not be included in the Erdogan cabinet);
--Deputy P.M. Mehmet Ali Sahin (seen by Erdogan's circle as
too close to Gul);
--State Minister in charge of finance Ali Babacan (nervous,
pushy, and lacking the sense of deference Erdogan demands);
--State Minister in charge of foreign trade Kursad Tuzmen
(not deferential enough);
--State Minister in charge of religious affairs Mehmet Aydin
(reportedly close to Islamist philosopher Fethullah Gulen,
and thus not considered inside the National View Islamist
circle among Erdogan's close advisors;
--Fonmin Yasar Yakis (Erdogan had not wanted Yakis as Fonmin
in the Gul government, but was forced to put him in the
position in a rearrangement resulting from Sezer's rejection
of another cabinet designate; in any event, Yakis has been a
hack-handed embarrassment to Erdogan);
--Culture Minister Huseyin Celik (similarly to Yalcinbayir,
voted against the deployment resolution because he had heard
he would not be in Erdogan's cabinet; in any event
controversial as minister);
--Tourism Minister Aksit (ineffective);
--Education Minister Erkan Mumcu (not from the Movement and
too openly ambitious for Erdogan's taste; might be shifted to
a lower-profile ministry).



6. (C) Demir said his sources tell him that, as part of a
move to reduce the number of ministries, Erdogan may combine
the Babacan and Tuzmen portfolios under a single
finance/foreign trade state ministership; figures rumored to
be under consideration are AK Party deputy chairman for
research and development Reha Denemec (excellent English; MBA
from the U.S.) or Nazim Ekrem.



7. (C) In addition a visibly nervous Justice Minister Cemil
Cicek, one of the most experienced members of Gul's cabinet
but not a member of the Movement, told us March 11 he is not
certain he will be kept on, a reflection of how close to the
chest Erdogan is keeping his choices.



8. (C) Mehmet Ali Bayar, a former Turkish diplomat with wide
political contacts and now senior foreign policy advisor to
right-of-center DYP chairman Agar, warned us March 11 that
Erdogan will stall submission of a new draft deployment
resolution as long as possible. Bayar opines that Erdogan
and his advisors are wrapped up in narrowly-focused
calculations of how to ensure personal position and power.
In making a similar assessment to us March 10, YSM executive
director Demir stated that Erdogan is scared for his
political future and therefore paralyzed in his
decision-making on the deployment question.

9. (C) Founding member of Ozal's ANAP and former close Ozal
advisor Vehbi Dincerler affirmed to us as well March 11 that
Erdogan will not tangle with the resolution unless the U.S.
gives him something he can portray to the Turkish public as
an additional U.S. commitment, e.g., a concrete clarification
of Turkey's role in post-Saddam Iraq, a U.S. commitment on
the role of the Turkmen in N. Iraq, a stronger U.S.
commitment to prevent formation of an independent Kurdish
state. In discussing timing, Korkut Ozal told us that the
lack of an absolute drop-dead date from the U.S. for the
beginning of hostilities is also making it hard for Erdogan
to feel a sense of urgency.
PEARSON