SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S DEWEY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001496

SIPDIS


NICOSIA FOR DRENZ/A/S DEWEY
DEPT FOR PRM
DEPT PASS AID FOR DHCA/OFDA - WGARVELINK
EUCOM FOR J3, J5, SOJ7 AND POLAD
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2013
TAGS: EAID IZ PREF PREL MOPS TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S DEWEY AND
HUMANITARIAN DELEGATION


REF: ANKARA 1335


(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch for
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


Summary:
--------------



1. (C) The Turkish Parliament,s March 1 vote rejecting
deployment of U.S. troops, along with a worsening in
Turkish-Kurdish tensions, has shaken the GOT and has
increased the uncertainty surrounding Turkey,s ultimate
choices on Iraq. Whether or not there will be a Northern
Option, your visit on humanitarian assistance planning
provides the USG with a good opportunity to craft a
cooperative approach to assistance and to maintain our
dialogue with Turkey. Key issues for your discussions
include: explaining our humanitarian strategy in Iraq as it
affects Turkey; encouraging cooperation with NGOs and
international organizations; establishing a framework for
coordination with the GOT and others in this area. End
Summary.


Aftermath of the March 1 Parliamentary Vote
--------------



2. (C) Parliament March 1 rejected the AK (Justice and
Development) Party Government's petition to permit deployment
of U.S. troops to Turkey. A number of factors contributed to
the outcome, particularly: 1) strong anti-war sentiment in
the public, media, in Parliament on both sides of the aisle,
and other organs of the Turkish state; 2) the secular Turkish
State's fears about USG intentions in Iraq; 3) a desire by
the traditional State to undercut the Islamist-oriented AK;
and 4) AK's own internal political dynamics, rivalries, and
ineptitude. The AK Government is now badly shaken. AK
leader R. Tayyip Erdogan and P.M. Abdullah Gul were weakened,
and U.S.-Turkish relations have come under strain despite
affirmations on both sides. Erdogan and Gul have hinted that
the defeated proposal could resurface in another form. Many
observers believe it is not likely to emerge until after
Erdogan, who was elected to Parliament in a special March 9
election, becomes the Prime Minister.



3. (SBU) Turkish relations with the Kurdish entities in
northern Iraq have been particularly strained in recent days.
The population and leadership of northern Iraq is solidly
opposed to Turkish intervention on humanitarian or other
grounds. On March 3, tens of thousands (some reports place
the figure at 300,000 or more) demonstrators in Irbil marched
in protest and several burned Turkish flags. The Iraqi
opposition in its conference final statement February 28
rejected the prospect of Turkish military intervention. The
Iraqi Kurds have not given their agreement to have Turkish
camps set up in the areas the KDP and PUK control, to have
the Turkish Red Crescent operate there, nor to have
additional Turkish troops stationed there. The Turks are
reacting harshly to these statements and to the
demonstrations. In a recent media interview, U/S Grossman
cautioned against unilateral Turkish intervention in Iraq.


GOT Contingency Planning
--------------



4. (C) Turkey has done contingency planning for a
humanitarian crisis both on an internal, interagency basis
and with international organizations. It has designated
airports (Gaziantep, Van and Erzurum) for humanitarian use.
MFA told us on March 6 that it may open the port of Mersin,
which is currently reserved for military use, to humanitarian
needs. The GOT plans to establish 18 &humanitarian aid
collection zones8, to be run by the Turkish Red Crescent
(TRC),in northern Iraq and Turkey which could handle up to
276,000 refugees/displaced persons, but the GOT has said it
will try to serve populations in need on the Iraqi side of
their common border. Turkey plans to repatriate displaced
persons as soon as the security situation would permit this.
Turkey has not attempted to coordinate its aid plan with the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK),on whose territory the GOT intends to
provide relief. As we understand, the Department has taken a
decision not to press Turkey to admit asylum seekers, and
Embassy recommends that we not/not press the Turks to do so
during your visit.



5. (SBU) TRC has pre-positioned some resources, but there are
gaps (principally tents) in its ability to respond in the
event the full 276,000 persons need relief, in part because
TRC is not supposed to dedicate more than 60 percent of its
capacity to
any single crisis.


NGOs
--------------



6. (SBU) The GOT has been wary of NGOs, and few have been
able to officially register. Since 1996, the Turkish-Iraqi
border has been closed to NGOs with very few exceptions. MFA
told the Humanitarian Planning Team (HPT) that NGOs seeking
to provide assistance to displaced persons in Turkey or in
the border zone on Iraqi territory would have to register
with the GOT, sign an MOU defining the scope of their
activities, and coordinate with the TRC and/or UN agencies.
MFA told us the GOT would be more flexible with respect to
NGOs seeking to transit Turkey to deliver relief beyond the
border zone in Iraq. The GOT is willing in principle to
approve applications on an ad hoc basis for NGOs focused on
humanitarian relief, rather than human rights or political
activism. The International Rescue Committee has sent a
representative to Turkey to make application, and other NGOs
are expected to follow soon.


Coordinating Assistance
--------------



7. (C) The GOT plans to establish crisis/coordination centers
in the Prime Ministry, MFA, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep and Van,
among others, in the event of a conflict in Iraq. MFA has
also identified 42 diplomats to staff these centers.
However, the GOT has been reluctant to activate any of them
far in advance of a crisis. In January, the HPT raised the
importance of coordination between civilian and military
planners in both our governments, as well as between them and
international organizations and NGOs, pointing to the
positive example of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)
in Kuwait. Embassy has urged the Turks to act on this
recommendation.



8. (C) Meanwhile, EUCOM/Military Coordination Liaison Command
(MCLC) are developing plans for a Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Center (HACC) or Humanitarian Operations Center
(HOC) in Diyarbakir. However, some USG agencies have raised
concerns that this configuration may not be as open to
international humanitarian organizations and NGOs as other
possible structures. MCLC Commanding General Peter Osman
will be in Ankara during your visit, providing an opportunity
to consult internally on this issue. Maj. General Osman
would like to participate in your meetings with the GOT.



9. (C) MFA has asked for a specific proposal, and has said it
would like to establish guidelines or even an MOU on the
coordination mechanism. The GOT will expect to discuss this
further with you during your meetings on March 12.


Program and Recommendations
--------------



10. (SBU) Embassy is arranging the following appointments for
March 12: mini-country team; an interagency meeting
including MFA, Prime Ministry, Turkish General Staff (TGS),
and Interior Ministry representatives, led by MFA
Undersecretary for Multilateral Political Affairs; lunch with
UN agencies; separate meeting with TGS; meeting with Turkish
Red Crescent President; reception hosted by the Ambassador.
As noted above, MCLC Commanding General Osman would like to
join the delegation for meetings with the GOT.

11. (C) Embassy recommends focusing on the following issues
during your meetings with GOT officials:
-- Overview of U.S. Strategy: Emphasize our intention to
minimize displacement and damage to humanitarian
infrastructure in the event of a conflict, and that this will
in turn work in Turkey,s interest by keeping the number of
potential asylum seekers as low as possible.


-- Role of International Organizations/NGOs: Note that USG
assistance will be channeled mainly through UN agencies and
other humanitarian organizations. Applaud Turkish
cooperation with UN agencies and positive signals on NGO
access to Iraq. Encourage the GOT to give expeditious and
favorable consideration to NGO applications, to the World
Food Program,s registration in Turkey, and to the MOU
governing UN activities when presented by the UN. Note that
we and other organizations will naturally seek to procure
relief supplies locally once it is clear that aid can transit
through Turkey.


-- Coordination: Encourage the GOT to activate a crisis
center and establish a coordinating mechanism for
humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. We should seek,
if at all possible, to present as much detail on our thinking
for this mechanism (HACC, HOC or other). This will help
deflect the Turkish inclination to define it by means of an
MOU or other written guidelines.


-- Turkish Role in Northern Iraq: The GOT foresees a large
role for its Society in Northern Iraq, but the ICRC will have
the mandate for coordinating relief in conflict zones and the
KDP and PUK have their own contingency plans. Urge the Turks
to coordinate humanitarian assistance.
PEARSON