IRAQ: CODEL WEXLER PRESSES RULING AK PARTY LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001485

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: CODEL WEXLER PRESSES RULING AK PARTY LEADER
ERDOGAN FOR ACCELERATED RE-VOTE ON U.S. TROOP DEPLOYMENT

(U) Classified by Ambassador W.R. Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: AK Party leader Erdogan initially told Codel
Wexler March 8 he may need several weeks (until end March) to
create the right conditions for parliamentary passage of a
resolution permitting deployment of U.S. troops through
Turkey. When Codel and Ambassador pushed back that Turkey
must take the decision the week of March 10, Erdogan
countered that he will need "ten days" (until March 17 or
18). Ambassador asked to meet with Erdogan quickly to clear
up directly all of Erdogan's misunderstandings. End summary.



2. (C) In an extended meeting with ruling AK Party chairman
Erdogan evening March 8, Codel Wexler (Turkey Caucus
co-chairmen Wexler (D-FL) and Winfield (R-KY) and Caucus
member Rogers (R-MI)):


--underscored that they had come to Turkey to express their
concern at the potential damage to a six-decade friendship
and alliance from the Turkish parliament's March 2 vote
against U.S. troop deployment;


--pointed out that the American people would be mindful of
the reason for higher losses of U.S. troops if Turkey were
not a part of the coalition;


--emphasized that it would be inconceivable for the House of
Representatives to turn down the mooted economic assistance
package for Turkey if Turkey were in the coalition before an
operation began;


--noted that time is very short and pressed for a
parliamentary re-vote the week of March 10.



3. (C) Acknowledging he is focused on his campaign for
election to parliament March 9 and subsequent assumption of
the prime ministership sometime in late March, Erdogan said
he does not want to risk a second, and fatal negative vote by
rushing the re-submission of the deployment resolution. He
will need sufficient time to create the right atmosphere and
then to plan next steps. Some members of the current AK
government cabinet voted against the resolution, a situation
he does not want to re-occur. One cannot trust the current
government, which in any event will only be interim once P.M.
Gul resigns after the election, to pass the resolution.
Therefore it may be necessary to await formation of the new
government. Timing depends not only on unavoidable
constitutional procedures but also on the willingness of
President Sezer quickly to give Erdogan the mandate to form a
new government. The re-vote would thus come in about three
weeks, i.e., at the end of March.



4. (C) Erdogan amplified his views with assertions that his
task is compounded by problems in U.S.-Turkish communications
and on political, military, and economic questions.



5. (C) U.S.-Turkish communications: At the moment when he and
the GOT leadership were exposing themselves to great
political risk by pushing the resolution in the face of
opposition from political parties, NGOs, and the public,
"ugly anti-Erdogan, anti-AK, and anti-Turkish cartoons"
appeared in the U.S. press, Erdogan stated. These cartoons
became convenient material for the opposition CHP to use to
humiliate AK M.P.s and change votes. The USG has the power
and influence to inform the U.S. media in the way it wants to
(a remark which provoked disbelieving laughter from the
Codel).



6. (C) Political dimension: AK M.P.s were taken aback by the
news which swept the assembly chamber before the vote that no
Turkmen rep had been included in the six-man opposition
leadership council announced by the opposition conference in
Salahadeen, Erdogan said. It is unacceptable for Turks to
see the Turkmen not given equal status with the Arabs and
Kurds as principal ethnic groups in Iraq. In addition, AK
M.P.s were embittered by the news of the burning of a Turkish
flag by Kurdish demonstrators in N. Iraq. They were angered
by provocative statements by KDP leader Barzani, who has
benefited from Turkish protection, and has traveled on a
Turkish diplomatic passport, for more than a decade. Rumors
are now rampant that the U.S. is behind such anti-Turkish
displays by the Kurds. The U.S. must above all prevent
Barzani from making such statements. Then there was the
March 8 statement by UK P.M. Blair that the coalition will
block the occupation of N. Iraq by Turkish troops. You want
Turkey in the coalition but then use a stick to threaten us.
We have a very weighty State tradition and we regret these
kinds of statements. We are watching carefully. We will
wait until the situation settles down to bring the resolution
to the floor again, he asserted.



7. (C) Military dimension: The citizens of Turkey had been
under the impression that the 42,000 U.S. logistics troops
would be based in N. Iraq. When the news suddenly broke that
they would be based in S.E. Turkey, there was a negative
public reaction, and the opposition CHP and media immediately
allied against such a deployment. The negative campaign was
compounded by U.S. demands to use airfields far from the
front. The negotiations thus did not create confidence,
Erdogan averred.



8. (C) Economic dimension: The U.S. side pushed the most
important issues to a later date and refused to de-link the
aid package from IMF conditionality. How could the U.S.
insist on maintaining such linkage on the eve of a war with
all the risks that entails, Erdogan asked. Then the U.S.
objected to paying $100,000 (sic) in taxes. The package's
credit line will depend on Congressional approval. But
Congress won't approve the package -- if at all -- until two
months after the operation begins, an operation that will
last only a week. Turkey will face immediate needs but will
have to await the by-no-means certain outcome of Congress's
deliberations. What if Turkey takes advantage of the offer
of an $8.5 billion bridge loan but then Congress fails to
pass the package? How will Turkey repay this loan?



9. (C) Codel and Ambassador Pearson rejoined that:


--The bridge loan will be available the day the operation
starts.


--Speaker of the House Hastert gave Fonmin Yakis and State
Minister for the Economy Babacan a commitment --
unprecedented in the Ambassador's memory -- that if President
Bush wants the package, it will pass the House.


--The USG has persuasive answers for all the questions
Erdogan raised, and it is clear the two sides need to sit
down so that the U.S. can clear up any misunderstandings on
the Turkish side. Ambassador told Erdogan he would meet him
at any time the weekend of March 8-9 if necessary to clear up
all the remaining misunderstandings.



10. (C) In a subsequent pull-aside between Erdogan and the
Ambassador and Codel, Ambassador said that, according to the
extended timetable Erdogan laid out, the coalition may be in
Baghdad before the Turkish parliament reconsiders the
deployment resolution. Time is of the essence. Turkey needs
to take the decision soonest. Erdogan replied that he will
need "ten days" (until March 17 or 18).
PEARSON