FEB 26 SESSION: US/TU TEAMS AGREE ON TEXT FOR OPS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001357

SIPDIS


STATE FOR P, NEA/NGA, EUR/SE, PMAT, AND L; OSD FOR ISA, ISP
AND LEGAL; JCS FOR J3, J5 AND LEGAL; EUCOM FOR J3, J4, J5,
POLAD AND LEGAL; CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD;


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: FEB 26 SESSION: US/TU TEAMS AGREE ON TEXT FOR OPS
MOU

REF: A) STATE 50934 B) ANKARA 1246 C) ANKARA 1270
D)ANKARA 1345


(u) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch.
Reasons: 1.5 (B and D)


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SUMMARY
--------------



1. (S) The US and TU negotiating teams reached agreement on
all of the remaining outstanding issues in the operations
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Feb 26. After seven hours
of talks during the morning 2/26, the two sides agreed to
language on all issues but one: fuel services-related costs.
The Turks agreed to the USG position on taxation (no taxes)
and agreed to operate under command and control arrangements
worked out in advance between US and Turkish forces if
Turkish forces engage in activities south of the Green Line
in response to a request from the US. At approximately 1530
that same day, the MFA informed the Embassy that the GOT side
had accepted the US team's counter-proposed language on fuel
services-related costs that Ambassador Pearson had presented
to U/S Ziyal at 1430 that same day (ref c). The US continues
to hold off in responding to the TU acceptance of this
language until the remaining issues in the other two MOUs are
worked out, and until the situation becomes more clear
following Parliament's March 1 rejection of a motion that
would have allowed the US to deploy troops for operations
against Iraq (ref d). The US/TU teams have nearly completed
scrubbing the more than 60-page text, and it has been
e-mailed to appropriate Washington agencies, CENTCOM and
EUCOM. Para 10 contains the agreed upon text for the
section of the MOU (Annex C - Operations - para 7(b)) that
pertains to activities in northern Iraq. End summary.


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2/26 SESSION: BREAKTHROUGH ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES
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2. (S) During seven hours of talks 2/26, the US and TU
negotiating teams reached agreement on all but one (fuel
services-related costs) of the outstanding issues in the
operations MOU identified in ref b. Following is an
issue-by-issue summary of the agreements reached by the
parties:


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TAXES
--------------



3. (S) The Turks agreed to the USG position on taxes.
Despite numerous unsuccessful attempts to insert the "and as
applied" language in Article IV(h) of the cover MOU, the US
side agreed to the tax relief language that is based on that
agreed to in the Site Prep MOU. The Turks agreed to the USG
position that we not pay taxes on official expenditures.
Below is the agreed upon text for the section of the MOU
pertaining to taxes (cover MOU, Article IV, (h):


"For the sole purposes of the present MOU, defense
expenditures by or on behalf of the U.S. for the services
rendered and commodities provided to the forces of the
Sending Party in Turkey as covered by Turkish Tax Law No.
6426 dated 1954, as amended in 1992, shall be exempted from
taxes, duties, fees and charges as stipulated therein.
Regarding personal expenditures of the members of the Sending
Party forces provisionally deployed in Turkey for the
purposes of this MOU, application of other taxes, duties, and
fees in force shall not be affected, and such expenditures
shall be subject to the taxes, duties and fees relating to
purchases and services chargeable under Turkish laws and
fiscal regulations."


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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
--------------



4. (S) While the US team conceded on this point and agreed to
delete the language in the scope on this subject, Ambassador
Lino laid down the marker that she was accepting deletion of
this phrase (and deflecting a GOT threat to revive and
present, at the last minute, a draft humanitarian assistance
annex) with the mutual understanding that combat troops have
an inherent duty to provide for assistance to civilian
populations in combat zones, insofar as it is possible.
Bolukbasi replied by stating that the subject of humanitarian
assistance had been discussed on a military-to-military basis
and whatever arrangements would be made would fall under the
aegis of Turkish legislation and regulation on the subject
(i.e., taxation). Lino countered that she understood an
implementing arrangement would be devised to regulate the
understandings between our militaries on this question.


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NBC EQUIPMENT
--------------



5. (S) The US delegation pressed hard to include "as
available" in the text and sought clarification that "in
Turkish territory" did not exclude northern Iraq (ref a).
The Turkish side stressed the importance they attached to
receiving NBC assets to protect the Turkish population
against a WMD attack. The Turks wanted to try to work in
language in the MOU that would have committed us ("to the
maximum extent possible" was their wording) to provide NBC
equipment and assets to the Turkish population to protect
them against a possible attack. The team stressed that the
US was committed to doing everything possible to defend
Turkey against a WMD attack and to helping the Turkish
population in the event of an attack, but noted that US only
had a limited supply of NBC equipment and the equipment that
would be brought into Turkey would be tied to the US forces.
In the end, the Turkish side said it understood and agreed to
accept the US language. Following is the agreed upon text
for para 2(b) of the Operations Annex:


"The Sending Party may deploy Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical (NBC) assets (detection, bio-chemical),protection
(personal, collective) and decontamination into Turkey to
mitigate NBC risk in case of an Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) attack in Turkish territory. The Sending
Party will also provide NBC support, to the maximum extent
feasible, for Turkish personnel exposed to NBC contamination.
Any personnel exposed to NBC contamination should be
decontaminated at the location of the incident or at a
facility with decontamination capability."


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FUEL-SERVICES RELATED COSTS
--------------



6. (S) The Turks held firm in insisting that the US pay a
price the same as the actual cost (unspecified and "top
secret") paid by Turkish forces. The US remained equally

SIPDIS
firm on its position that we were prepared to pay the same
price for similar fuel-related services minus any taxes. The
two sides adjourned at 1300 without having resolved the
issue. In a follow-on meeting with U/S Ziyal, Ambassador
Pearson suggested that they agree to a concept that would
ensure that the US paid a fair and reasonable base price
(minus taxes) for fuel-related services, and provided Ziyal
compromise language that met both parties needs (ref c).
Ziyal said he would have to ask the Prime Minister, given the
large sum of money involved. Just after the Ambassador
arrived back at the Embassy, the MFA called to say that the
GOT side had accepted our language but asked for US
confirmation that we could seal the deal on this basis. As
of the writing of this cable (3/3),the US continues to hold
off in responding to the TU acceptance of this language until
the remaining issues in the other two MOUs are worked out,
and until the situation becomes more clear following
Parliament's March 1 rejection of a motion that would have
allowed the US to deploy troops for operations against Iraq
(ref d).


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ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ
--------------



7. (S) Principles: The US team continued to argue that we
needed language before the beginning of para 7(b) in the
operations annex (the part that discussed activities in
northern Iraq) that maintained reference to northern Iraq and
allowed us to maintain flexibility in light of the situation
on the ground (ref a). The Turks agreed to accept some
language to this effect, but insisted that it be placed as
the second sentence at the beginning of the annex (vice
before para seven, subsection b - the US preference). Given
the flexibility of the US position on location, the US team
agreed, but insisted that the words "in Turkey" also be
included to note that the activities discussed in the annex
were to take place in both Turkey and in northern Iraq.
Following is the agreed upon text that appears at the
beginning of Annex C of the MOU:


"This Annex covers the Receiving Party and the Sending Party
relations in Turkey and in the Northern Front and sets forth
principles for activities in Turkey and in northern Iraq in
the event of operations under this MOU."



8. (S) Tick 3: Ambassador Lino deployed the compromise
language provided in ref a. After reviewing the text,
Ambassador Bolukbasi erupted, accusing the US of trying to
limit Turkey's ability to fight terrorism. He added that
fighting terrorists -- particularly PKK/KADEK -- was one of
Turkey's national priorities, and questioned what he
perceived to be an attempt by the US to limited Turkey's
ability in this area. Lino noted that our intention was not
to limit Turkey's ability to combat terrorism, but rather to
clarify the language that the two sides had agreed upon ad
ref the previous night. Bolukbasi said that if that was the
US position, there was no need to continue discussions and
started to leave. Lino responded that it would be more
useful for the parties to continue in order to reach an
agreement as soon as possible. Bolukbasi declined and said
he had to consult with his authorities on this matter of
national importance. After approximately 45 minutes, during
a private meeting with Bolukbasi which she requested, Lino
reiterated that the USG appreciated the importance that
Turkey attaches to combating terrorism. She told Bolukbasi
that in light of the importance of the issue, the USG could
agree to text that the parties had agreed to ad ref the other
evening, with a minor change. Bolukbasi concurred.



9. (s) Tick 4: This was by far the most sensitive issue in
the negotiations on activities in northern Iraq and the most
difficult to resolve. During the 2/26 morning session, the
Turkish side rejected both of the alternatives presented by
the US (ref a) as being too restrictive. The Turkish side
then presented the US side with two sets of proposed language
-- neither of which were acceptable to the US. After
considerable back and forth in which both sides agreed in
principle that the aim was to devise language that met both
of our needs while respecting each others' red-lines, the
Turkish side left the room and came back nearly 30 minutes
later with language that came closer to meeting USG needs.
After some editing and refining and a small group meeting,
the US side said it could agree to the text ad ref, but said
it would have to clear it with senior US military authorities
before it could be inserted into in the MOU. After clearing
the language with CENTCOM DCOM Gen Abazaid and JCS DJS LTG
Casey, the US team notified the Turkish team that the text
was acceptable.


-------------- --
AGREED UPON TEXT FOR ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ
-------------- --



10. (S) Below is the agreed upon text for para 7(b) of the
Annex C (Operations):


Activities in Northern Iraq:


(1) The Parties will be responsible for providing logistic
support along national lines.


(2) All units will remain under their national command, and
all their plans, activities and objectives will be
coordinated and de-conflicted.


(3) Receiving Party SOF will not be involved with any armed
engagement against Iraqi forces or any Iraqi opposition group
except in situations requiring combating terrorists,
including PKK/KADEK, or the exercise of the right of
self-defense or in circumstances enshrined in paragraph (4)
below.


(4) Armed conflict between Iraqi opposition groups or
attempts by them to cross the Green Line (de facto line as
depicted in Appendix-4) shall be closely monitored by Sending
Party forces and the Parties will exchange necessary
information on opposition group activity across the Green
Line in a timely manner. Close coordination shall be
maintained for any follow up action when required in such
emergency situations involving hostile activities contrary to
the principles in this section of the MOU that should be
repelled in accordance with mutual commitments enshrined in
paragraph (5) below. In such cases where either Party
believes a violation of these principles is occurring or is
about to occur, that Party shall promptly notify the other
Party. In cases where the Sending Party concludes that it may
not be able to prevent such hostile activities in a timely
manner, it may approach the Receiving Party authorities for
assistance as required under these circumstances. Receiving
Party authorities shall evaluate the situation and any
follow-up action that may be required under the circumstances
shall be considered and decided jointly by the Sending Party
and the Receiving Party, including the necessary arrangements
that shall establish tactical and operational requirements in
the area for the security of the respective units. Execution
of any follow-up action will be based upon the agreed
arrangements.


(5) Operations to ensure security and safety of all Iraqi
opposition groups would be a Sending Party responsibility,
but the Sending Party shall coordinate this mission with the
Receiving Party, as it does in other areas. None of the
groups shall be allowed to use force or engage in hostile
activities against each other. When JSOTF-N needs to make
coordination or contact with the Turkoman, they will approach
Receiving Party SOF to make that coordination and contact.


(6) Representatives of the Receiving Party will be allowed to
be present at planning meetings of the Sending Party with the
PUK and KDP groups concerning training, organization and
provision of weapons and equipment by the Sending Party.
Support to these groups (training, organization and
distribution of weapons and equipment) will be coordinated in
a timely manner with the Receiving Party authorities.


(7) Provision of weapons and equipment shall be commensurate
with the needs of self-defense and execution of the missions
to be assigned to these groups. No heavy weapons shall be
provided and all weapons distributed for these purposes shall
be registered with a view to ensure their return at the end
of the operations. Receiving Party LNOs may observe the
entire process from registration to distribution and be
provided copies of the registration forms.


(8) The PUK and KDP settled north of the Green Line will be
trained and organized with a purpose of defeating Iraqi
forces when serving with Sending Party SOF. All such
training and organizing by the Sending Party SOF with PUK,
KDP and other groups may be observed upon request by assigned
Receiving Party SOF LNOs. Receiving Party SOF LNOs will
request to observe training to the respective Sending Party
Operational Detachment Bravo (ODB) commanding officer. All
military operations south of the Green Line by Sending Party
trained and organized Kurdish elements will be under Sending
Party command and control. The Sending Party undertakes to
provide timely information in advance to the Receiving Party
in this respect for the purpose of coordination with the
Receiving Party SOF.


(9) The officers assigned to the JCC (Diyarbakr) and, if
requested, Silopi, shall carry their own pistols.
Accommodations and messing for these officers shall be met by
their respective commands.


(10) During an emergency (casualty evacuation, medical
evacuation, or WMD attack),either Party,s communications
systems can be used to assist in resolving the emergency and
saving lives.


(11) Receiving Party and Sending Party SOF units in northern
Iraq deployed to the same areas will have separate HQ
locations, but may provide 2-5 liaison officers at the
battalion and company level.


(12) The Sending Party will provide timely information on
Turkish citizens in the custody of Sending Party forces in
northern Iraq. The Sending Party will make those Turkish
citizens available to Turkish authorities and, when requested
by the latter, necessary arrangements will be made
expeditiously for their joint interrogation and debriefing.



11. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Lino and
EUCOM J5 Maj. Gen Kohler.
PEARSON