Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA1350
2003-03-03 11:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: WHY THE VOTE WENT SOUTH

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001350 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: WHY THE VOTE WENT SOUTH

REF: A. ANKARA 1345

B. ANKARA 418

C. ANKARA 808

D. ANKARA 1325

E. ANKARA 1266

F. ANKARA 1346

G. ANKARA 1341

H. ANKARA 618

I. ANKARA 1303


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reason:
1.5(b)(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001350

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: WHY THE VOTE WENT SOUTH

REF: A. ANKARA 1345

B. ANKARA 418

C. ANKARA 808

D. ANKARA 1325

E. ANKARA 1266

F. ANKARA 1346

G. ANKARA 1341

H. ANKARA 618

I. ANKARA 1303


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson. Reason:
1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: Ref A reported the March 1 defeat in
Parliament of the AK Government's petition to permit
deployment of U.S. troops to Turkey. A number of factors
contributed to the outcome, primarily: 1) the secular Turkish
State's fears about USG intention in Iraq; 2) a strong desire
to bring the Islam-oriented AK to its knees (ref B); and 3)
the internal political dynamics, rivalries, and ineptitude
within AK itself. The AK Government is now badly shaken, AK
leader Erdogan and P.M. Gul humiliated, and US-Turkish
relations under severe strain. Erdogan signaled publicly
March 2 that the defeated proposal will not be revived, but
that the Government is considering other unspecified
alternatives. Most likely, these will have to wait until at
least March 11; Erdogan is running for Parliament in the
March 9 special election in Siirt province, a prelude to his
eventual assumption of the prime ministership. End summary.


--------------
"The Enemy"
--------------



2. (C) AK and Public Opinion: strong anti-war sentiments
dominated the Turkish public, media, and held sway in the
legislature on both sides of the aisle (including AK),
proving to be too much for an inexperienced AK
Government/Party to manage. AK leader Erdogan showed little
of the decisive leadership on which he prides himself; he did
too little, too late to sway the voters and his parliamentary
group. P.M. Gul's high-profile regional diplomatic efforts
to find a "peaceful solution" to the crisis won AK kudos from
the voters but also hardened the resolve of anti-war voices
in the public, the Turkish State, and AK itself. A number of
intellectuals across the spectrum had argued that Turkey
could spike the US war effort with a no vote. In the
aftermath, they trumpeted the outcome as a victory for
democracy.



3. (C) Erdogan, Gul and the "AK Parliament": ref C reported
on the rise of Parliament as an semi-independent foreign

policy decision making node under the leadership of Speaker
Bulent Arinc, an AK heavyweight and rival to Erdogan and Gul.
Arinc's outspoken cooperation with both President Sezer and
the opposition CHP -- which voted en masse to reject --
undermined AK party discipline and emboldened fence sitters
to side against their party leadership. Minutes after the
vote, a senior AK member and a well-connected former NSC
staffer separately observed to us privately that a
rejectionist appeal by former Islamist P.M. Erbakan to his
many one-time followers and sympathizers in the AK cadre also
helped spook some AK members.


-- On behalf of the Party of Ataturk, senior CHP official
Onder Sav -- who Arinc pointedly granted procedurally dubious
leeway to speak on substantive issues -- charged that the USG
in engaging in a "disgusting and shameful war" and declared
that U.S. ships off Iskenderun belong to "the enemy."


-- A well-connected former M.P. who had visited the floor
shortly before the vote related to us afterwards that Erdogan
and Gul, acutely aware of public and AK intramural
sensitivities and hoping to outflank parliamentary and
Turkish State rivals, had tried to engineer a close but
successful vote by allowing a number of their colleagues to
side with the opposition. "They miscalculated," he said.


-- Contacts in AK and elsewhere note that the AK group is now
wracked with tension and divided, at least for now, between
Erdogan-Gul and Arinc. While observers say that this may not
ultimately lead to the break-up of AK, it poses a serious
management problem for Erdogan in particular.


--------------
Killing Two Birds with One Stone
--------------



4. (C) Turkish NSC issued a noncommittal statement after its
Feb. 28 meeting designed, our contacts say, to keep the heat
on the AK Government and Parliament by depriving them the
cover of an ecumenical "State" commitment to support the USG
(ref D). Moreover, as reported ref E, Turkey's powerful
generals in recent days allowed the impression to build of
their "concern" that the AK Government was "rushing"
Parliament to a vote; although they issued a denial, this
came hard on the heels of months of military criticism of AK
for foot-dragging on a "political" decision the General Staff
(TGS) claimed it needed to act. In fact, the military had
simultaneously encouraged the Government to make maximal
demands on the U.S. while intentionally aggravating the
implementation of the site preparations process, adding
further tension and pressure to the mix (ref E). President
Sezer, who chairs the NSC, reiterated at the 11th hour his
public challenge to the constitutionality of the AK
Government's petition, teaming up with the ambitious Arinc
and CHP to press the case in the legislature.


-- In post-vote conversations, contacts echoed what we had
been picking up before the debate: that Sezer and the
generals were trying to create the impression that they were
preventing AK from dragging Turkey into an unpopular war --
thereby inducing further hesitation on the part of some AK
elements. (Our General Officer contacts at the TGS have been
telling us for months now that the military clearly sees the
imperative of total support for the U.S., but that the
government must step up to its responsibility. TGS appears
to have miscalculated. Our contacts expected a yes vote on
March 1 and must have been suprised at the outcome.)


-- A senior journalist, the former NSC staffer, and an AK
M.P. close to Erdogan noted that, in the run-up to the vote,
the military was focused primarily on undermining Erdogan and
AK. The journalist asserted that the military's intent was
"to kill two birds with one stone" -- AK and USG policy in
Iraq.



5. (C) The Kurdish issue was of abiding importance in the
calculations and the surreptitious political effort led by
senior elements of the military, the MFA, and its
bureaucratic allies (refs F-G). This suspicion about U.S.
policy toward the Kurds -- regardless of our cooperation and
statements -- colors the military and bureaucracy views of
our efforts; they allowed a public campaign (ref H and
previous) to suggest the USG is working against Turkey with
the PKK. The resurgence of tensions between Turkish
security forces and ethnic Kurds in southeastern Turkey is,
according to numerous Kurdish and other contacts -- including
iconoclastic CHP deputies -- a direct result of the Turkish
military's fears of separatism in the region (ref I and
previous). There is an element of the self-fulfilling
prophecy here; several Turkish Kurdish figures with ties to
both Islamic (AK) and Kurdish nationalist circles had
privately criticized USG policy for siding with "Kemalist
Turkey." They expressed happiness that the petition failed,
thereby paving the way for greater USG cooperation with Iraqi
Kurds -- instead of the Turks.


--------------
What's Next?
--------------



6. (C) Erdogan signaled publicly March 2 that the Government
will not revive the defeated proposal, but is considering
other unspecified alternatives. Most likely, any
reconsideration of U.S. deployments to Turkey will have to
wait until at least March 11. On March 9, Erdogan is running
for Parliament in the special election in Siirt province, a
prelude to his eventual assumption of the prime ministership.


--------------
Our Turkish Friends
--------------



7. (C) The defeat in Parliament is widely understood in
Ankara as tantamount to de facto vote of no confidence
against a Government that has been left badly shaken.
Though victim of their own leadership shortcomings and
tactical ineptitude, Erdogan and Gul ultimately stepped up to
the plate and at considerable risk pushed to support the USG
-- only to succumb to the pressure of traditional State and
political rivals and to be publicly humiliated in the
process. Many of those rivals are found in the military
leadership and other official circles that have long
professed to be the USG's best friends in Turkey. The
anti-war nexus has scored a tactical political victory while
risking harm to the bilateral relationship. Whether that
damage and drift can be limited or forestalled depends upon
whether all elements of the corporate Turkish entity --
elected Government and unelected State alike -- pull together
rather than seeking partisan advantage at a watershed moment
in Turkish history.
PEARSON