Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ANKARA1325
2003-02-28 11:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

IRAQ: TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AWAIT NSC

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001325 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AWAIT NSC
MEETING BEFORE DECISION ON U.S. DEPLOYMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 1207

B. ANKARA 1153


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001325

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AWAIT NSC
MEETING BEFORE DECISION ON U.S. DEPLOYMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 1207

B. ANKARA 1153


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: Turkish Parliament has rescheduled for March
1 -- one day after the powerful National Security Council
(NSC) meets -- its debate and possible vote on AK Party
Government's draft decision to permit U.S. troop deployment
through Turkey and deployment of Turkish troops in N. Iraq.
A decisive NSC recommendation could change the dynamics of
the deployment decision, but the NSC last month left formal
responsibility in the Government's hands. End summary.


--------------
"International Legitimacy": Who Decides?
--------------



2. (C) As the NSC meets and Parliament prepares to debate
Iraq policy on March 1, the Government is now facing an open
challenge by President Sezer and Parliament Speaker Arinc,
who are cooperating on the issue of the constitution's art.
92 international legitimacy clause. The odd-fellows alliance
between the Kemalist Sezer and the Islam-oriented Arinc is
fueling the already pronounced 11th-hour uncertainty and
promoting further delay in the run-up to the floor debate.


-- Sezer has repeatedly asserted that a second UNSC
resolution authorizing force against Saddam is necessary to
achieve the "international legitimacy" necessary for
Parliament to act. Arinc declared Feb. 24 that he opposes
acting on a proposal absent the requisite "international
legitimacy" as required by art. 92. Arinc's stance resonates
with the great majority of the AK parliamentary group.


-- According to Advanced Strategy Center executive director
and close observer of State affairs Faruk Demir, Sezer is
trying to leave the strong impression in the public's mind
that AK Party, both as the government and parliamentary
majority, bears full responsibility for any consequences of
an affirmative vote absent a new UNSC enforcement resolution.
Demir predicted that, if Sezer and the General Staff
representatives on the NSC try to put additional pressure on
the government to increase AK's internal splits and
uncertainty, the vote might be delayed beyond March 1.
-- Murat Yetkin, the influential and well-connected columnist

for the daily Radikal wrote Feb. 28 that the military has
reversed course and now signaling its unease about the
"haste" with which the AK Government brought its petition to
Parliament. According to Yetkin, Sezer is trying to "create
the impression that AK wants to pull the country into war
over the objections of the military and the President."


--------------
What Next?
--------------



3. (C) The political ground continues to shift as the various
players maneuver for tactical advantage:


-- Akif Beki, a senior correspondent at Islam-oriented
Kanal-7 news, asserted to us Feb. 28 as Faruk Demir did that
Sezer's comments yesterday amounted to a step back, leaving
the formal decision completely in Parliament's hands. He
predicted that the NSC is likely to strengthen GOT's hands
somewhat by underscoring the need to protect Turkey's
national interests -- and that Parliament will pass the
petition.


-- Former ambassador to Washington Nuzhet Kandemir, now a
senior figure in right-of-center DYP, opined to us Feb. 28
that the NSC will not go beyond its January decision and will
avoid pushing the GOT or Parliament in a specific direction,
thus leaving all the public responsibility for the decision
in the GOT's and Parliament's (i.e., AK Party's) hands. He
predicted that Parliament will approve the resolution.


-- Hasan Cemal Guzel, a close advisor to the late P.M. and
President Turgut Ozal and now a leading columnist for daily
"Tercuman", and Sevket Bulent Yahnici, a leading figure in
nationalist MHP and a State Minister in the 1999-2002 Ecevit
government, rejected Sezer's approach on international
legitimacy in separate discussions with us Feb. 26-27 and
predicted that the resolution will pass.
-- Sami Selcuk, recently retired as the Chief Justice of the
High Court of Appeals, offered to us Feb. 27 that Sezer is
powerless to formally challenge a parliamentary "decision" --
as in this case on Iraq -- before the Constitutional Court.
Nevertheless, a current senior Supreme Court Justice
cautioned us Feb. 24 that, if the Parliament violates its
by-laws or incorrectly applies them "in any way", then Sezer
will have grounds to take the decision to the Constitutional
Court.


-- Opposition CHP shares Sezer's Kemalist outlook and is
committed to voting en bloc against the Government's draft
resolution. Offering a representative view, Sukru Elekdag, a
retired senior diplomat and now a CHP M.P., declared publicly
that he and his colleagues would not support "America's dirty
war" against Iraq. He also expressed sympathy and support
for the Arinc-led anti-war faction in AK. His public
comments are more pointed than but not different from those
he and other senior CHPers, such as former ambassadors Onur
Oymen and Inal Batu, have made privately to us steadily over
the past month.


-- M.P.s in both AK and CHP do not appear to be motivated by
any concern over a possible financial collapse in the event
of a no vote. As reported ref B, Central Bank Governor
Serdengecti intimated to us that AK in particular does not
appreciate how serious the situation is, and seems to think
it can manage its way through without either the U.S.
assistance or the IMF program. "Their lack of awareness
makes me very scared," he said.


-- On the other hand, Mustafa Gunay, General Secretary of the
Fethullah Gulen-connected (Islamist) ISHAD businessmen's
association and well connected with Gul, said that the
Turkish State and Government is fully aware of the economic
considerations at stake, but the GOT is concerned above all
by what it perceives as weak USG assurances that an
independent Kurdish state will not emerge in a post-Saddam
Iraq. According to Gunay, Gul and TGS Ozkok share a more
conciliatory (pro-US) view, but are being stymied by: 1)
hardliners in the military leadership, including TGS Deputy
Chief Buyukanit; and 2) FM Yasar Yakis, who shares
traditionalist Turkish State suspicions of the U.S.


--------------
Comment
--------------



4. (C) We will have to await the NSC decision, due the
evening of Feb. 28, before being able to assess with more
precision whether the March 1 debate will lead to a vote or a
further postponement. As our contacts suggest, what is
driving the delay is, ultimately: 1) fear on the part of the
Turkish State regarding USG intentions in northern Iraq; 2)
the internal dynamics of the AK power struggle.
PEARSON