TURKEY ON IRAQ: STUMBLING UNWILLINGLY TOWARD THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001132

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN PINS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY ON IRAQ: STUMBLING UNWILLINGLY TOWARD THE
COALITION OF THE WILLING

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5
(b,d).



1. (C) Summary: Virtually all interlocutors from across the
spectrum assume eventual GOT agreement to deployment of U.S.
forces through Turkey. However, there is no clear GOT
decision on the horizon; for their part, key elements of the
Kemalist State are compounding the delay by using the Iraq
question for domestic purposes -- to weaken the ruling AK
party. End summary.



2. (C) In Feb. 17-20 conversations, long-standing political
contacts in ruling AK and other parties, journalists,
businessmen, and think-tank contacts with close ties to the
Turkish General Staff have elucidated for us why the Turks
have dragged their feet. Virtually all contacts assume
Turkey will join the coalition, but all underscore the
reluctance of the AK government/AK parliamentary group and
State bureaucracy, and most acknowledge the reluctance of the
General Staff, to join quickly. Our contacts' comments come
in the midst of (1) general public indifference to the
economic and financial cost of failing to garner U.S.
economic assistance in return for U.S. deployment and (2)
sneaking admiration among many in and outside government for
the way the French have sought to stymie us.


AK Party



3. (C) Vice chairman for press Mercan, usually a belligerent
interlocutor, was uncharacteristically subdued in readily
admitting to us the necessity of coming to agreement on the
economic package and on deployment. He remains concerned,
however, that opposition within the party is too big to
overcome.



4. (C) Parliamentary foreign policy deputy chairman Sirin has
lobbied publicly and privately for a larger economic package,
not in the form of loans but of a rescheduling of $50 billion
of Turkey's sovereign debt. However, acknowledging the
overriding importance of coming to agreement on U.S.
deployment, he declared off-handedly that we should not worry
because the AK government will -- at some point -- pass the
necessary deployment decision through parliament. Becoming
more acerbic, Sirin attributed the delay to party leader
Erdogan's "outsized" sense of self importance and
preoccupation with doing nothing that might ruin his chances
of being elected to parliament in the re-run of the general
election in Siirt province March 9. Sirin half-jokingly
asked whether we would consider delaying any operation until
after that date. He also lamented the failure of P.M. Gul to
keep the AK parliamentary group sufficiently informed about
the state of negotiations with the U.S.


CHP



5. (C) CHP parliamentary group deputy chairman Ozyurek told
us CHP will continue firmly to oppose any U.S. deployment
because the party sees no international legitimacy for an
operation absent a new UNSC resolution specifically
authorizing enforcement. However, he assumed that permission
for U.S. deployment will pass in parliament. Ozyurek
confirmed that, since the deployment permission would come
through a parliamentary decision and not a law, President
Sezer, who has categorically proclaimed the need for a second
UNSC resolution, cannot veto it or otherwise prevent its
going into force.



6. (C) Former ambassador to NATO Onur Oymen also focused on
what he asserted is CHP's real concern -- and that of Sezer,
he hastened to add -- over lack of international legitimacy.
Then, when faced with our argument that one can find
legitimacy in UNSC resolution 1441 and the resolutions it
builds on, he quickly backtracked to the point of
volunteering that international legitimacy can be based on UN
Charter article 51 (self defense).


Think Tanks



7. (C) Umit Ozdag, director of ASAM (Center for Eurasian
Strategic Studies, which has long-term close relations with
the more radically nationalist elements in the General
Staff),attributed General Staff hesitancy to convictions
that the U.S. has other motives in Northern Iraq. Ozdag
cited the General Staff's deep suspicions that the U.S. is
ready to tolerate an independent Kurdish state and is
unresponsive to Turkish demands for a "fair share" of
territory and petroleum reserves for the Iraqi Turkmen.
Ozdag asserted as well that Turks are wary of joining the
U.S. because they are convinced our main aim is to control
Iraq's oil reserves, not do away with WMD.



8. (C) Deputy director of YSM (High Strategy Center, which
has a national security focus and solid connections to the
General Staff, National Security Council, and Turkish
National Intelligence Organization) Demir and five members of
his advisory board all opined to us Feb. 19 that the AK
government is certain to agree to U.S. deployment. They also
underscored the determination of the Turkish State -- in the
form of the General Staff and Presidency -- to use the Iraq
question to shatter AK party's ability to govern by insisting
that the AK government shoulder all the responsibility for
the decision while they (the representatives of the State)
drag their feet and refuse to give AK advice. We have heard
the same from many AK party reps -- e.g., deputy chairman for
policy Firat, Erdogan foreign policy advisors Bagis and
Celik, and parliamentary foreign policy committee deputy
chairman Sirin, who stated bluntly, "The Army is making us
wear the jacket."



9. (C) Demir had a different assessment of timing when we
followed up with him Feb. 20. The dawning realization that
the U.S. is moving ahead and that further delay would
jeopardize chances for an economic package big enough to help
AK win both Erdogan's election in March and country-wide
municipal elections in April 2004 has shaken the AK
leadership's confidence and for the first time introduced the
fear of electoral defeat, Demir said. However, the window of
opportunity will last only a day or two before AK either
regains the sense that it can get away with continuing to
test the U.S. or sinks into a more defeatist, but still
defiant, attitude.



10. (C) Demir added that a smaller group in the General Staff
is reluctant to have the U.S. deploy in a northern front
through Turkey lest U.S. forces get in the way of what Demir
characterizes as this group's keen desire to hit the Kurds
hard in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. However, the
main group in the General Staff, aside from using the delay
in decision-making to put the AK government under further
pressure, favors a delay because it fears that a war will
suck the Turkish military into its own Vietnam in northern
Iraq, Demir concluded.



11. (C) One of Demir's advisory board, General Director of
Customs Saygilioglu, expressed regret that the U.S. had not
been more decisive, with unmovable deadlines, earlier. Lack
of USG pressure or credible deadlines led both the GOT and
General Staff to think they had extra room to delay.


Press



12. (C) Akif Beki, an Islamist-oriented journalist with
exceptionally open access to Erdogan and Gul, also insisted
that the GOT will approve U.S. deployment. He explained the
delay in decision-making as stemming from P.M. Gul's
conviction that he could prevent war by delaying the U.S.
deployment request. In this regard, Gul has been influenced
most by (1) Islamist journalist Fehmi Koru, who has
insistently hammered home the line that the U.S. is powerless
to go to war absent Turkish support for a northern front, and
(2) the prime ministry's senior foreign policy advisor Ahmet
Davutoglu, who has convinced Gul that blocking the U.S.
through a continuing Turkish-Islamic peace initiative is best
for the U.S. as well.



13. (C) Beki added that one reason the Turks have insisted on
a much larger economic package than the U.S. is ready to give
is Erdogan's and Gul's conviction that the main U.S. goal is
to control Iraq's oil and that Turkey should have the right
to a healthy slice of what Davutoglu and others have told Gul
will be huge ensuing profits for the U.S.


Comment



14. (C) While virtually all our interlocutors assume some
agreement for deployment is inevitable, none has given us a
clear and convincing timetable. Feb. 18-20 saw ambiguous
bluster from AK chairman Erdogan and at the same time a
flurry of consultations with foreign policy advisors by an
increasingly nervous-looking P.M. Gul. Several interlocutors
interpret Gul's increased activity as a sign that, under our
lobbying barrage, the AK government is now becoming aware of
the financial costs of not agreeing to U.S. deployment and
has finally accepted that we are serious about enforcing
Iraq's WMD disarmament.



15. (C) However, the GOT and parliamentary leadership have
deferred any possible consideration of a deployment
resolution past Feb. 21, i.e., until the week of Feb. 24; we
have also heard from AK party through the Swedish ambassador
that the government may split any draft resolution into two:
one which would authorize deployment of Turkish troops in
Iraq (certain to pass) and one which would authorize U.S.
deployment through Turkey but which would not be submitted
until we have reached agreement on the economic package,
military operations MOU, and a joint declaration on post-war
aims in Iraq.
PEARSON