Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN967
2003-02-12 10:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

PILLARS OF THE REGIME PART II OF IV: THE EAST BANK

Tags:  PREL PGOV ASEC SOCI ECON KPAL JO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000967 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC SOCI ECON KPAL JO
SUBJECT: PILLARS OF THE REGIME PART II OF IV: THE EAST BANK
TRIBES

REF: AMMAN 6535

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000967

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC SOCI ECON KPAL JO
SUBJECT: PILLARS OF THE REGIME PART II OF IV: THE EAST BANK
TRIBES

REF: AMMAN 6535

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Traditionally, the most important pillar of the
Hashemite regime has been its East Bank constituency,
including both Bedouin and non-nomadic tribes. East Bank
tribes have also played an integral role in the other pillars
that have emerged--the military/security services and the
economic elite. However, reform-minded King Abdullah may
face problems as he tries to move Jordan into the 21st
century while seeking to maintain the support of the most
conservative elements of Jordanian society--the East Bank
tribes. End Summary.

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WHO ARE THE TRIBES?
--------------


2. (U) The East Bank tribes of Jordan constitute roughly
35-45 percent of the total population of Jordan. The
Bedouins--nomadic tribes--make up roughly seven percent of
the population. The Bedouin tribes, including the
historically famous Howeitat (of Lawrence of Arabia fame),
were instrumental in the formation of the Hashemite regime
and continue today to serve in disproportionately large
percentages in the armed forces and security services. They
also make up one of the Public Security Directorate (PSD)'s
best-known units, the Badia, or desert, police. The
semi-nomadic tribes--traditionally herders--make up roughly
13-15 percent of the population and include the single
largest tribe in Jordan, the Bani Hassan, who number over
200,000.


3. (U) The non-nomadic tribes account for much of the rest of
the East Bank population and include such notable Jordanian
families as the Majalis and the Tarawnehs from Kerak, both of
whom have produced a number of Jordanian leaders and
Hashemite advisors. These families, whose names are
instantly recognizable in Jordan, are very influential
elements of Jordanian political and economic life.

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THE HASHEMITE DEPENDENCE ON THE TRIBES
--------------


4. (C) There has long been a symbiotic relationship between

the Hashemite rulers in Jordan and the East Bank tribes.
Jordan's tribes figured prominently in the Arab revolt
against the Ottoman empire, led by King Abdullah I's father.
Until recently, the tribes were unquestionably the
Hashemites' most significant source of political power. As
such, the Hashemites have cultivated personal relationships
with the tribes, while carefully maintaining the balance of
power between each. Regular contact with the tribes became a
mainstay of Hashemite rule, beginning with King Abdullah I,
who received tribal representatives at his al-Ma'wa palace
every Friday during his reign. The Hashemites also often
bestowed generous cash payments on the tribes to ensure their
loyalty.


5. (U) King Hussein continued the tradition of nurturing the
relationship with the tribes. He often camped with the
Bedouins and frequently visited individual tribes for mensaf
(the traditional East Bank Jordanian meal). On many
occasions, he brought his sons, including King Abdullah and
Crown Prince Hamza, to instill in them the importance of
tribal ties. At the same time, King Hussein ably used
historic tribal rivalries to check the power of individual
tribes, thus ensuring that no tribal sheikh could ever rival
his base of power.


6. (C) The tribes in turn benefited from their exclusive
relationship with the Hashemites. While West Bank
Palestinians are a majority of the population in Jordan,
political institutions favor members of the East Bank tribes.
While some ministerial positions traditionally are reserved
for Christians and others, Muslim East Bankers occupy almost
all the upper ranks of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the
General Intelligence Directorate, and the PSD, (their
children are favored in university admissions at Jordan's
competitive public universities); and they dominate almost
every level of Jordan's bureaucracy.

--------------
KING ABDULLAH AND THE TRIBES
--------------


7. (C) When King Abdullah II ascended to the throne, he
lacked his father's touch with the tribes and initially spent
little effort in shoring up their support. He also ascended
to a cash-strapped throne and, as some contacts have
insinuated, he was unable to continue with the generous
payments to the tribes. In 2000, just over a year into the
King's reign, a tribal leader told us that the King had made
a poor first impression on the tribes; "...his father left
him a large political inheritance with the tribes, but he is
spending it quickly." In 2001, during visits with the
Howeitat and the Bani Hassan, tribal members voiced support
for the Hashemites (and King Hussein),but rarely singled out
the King for praise. To avoid direct criticism of the King,
tribal members criticized the King's advisors, blaming them
for what they perceived as the King's disappointing
performance.


8. (C) That said, support for the Hashemites never really
wavered. Tribal contacts are quick to stress their loyalty
to the regime. One Howeitat told Poloff that he and his
tribe would support the Hashemites down to Princess Salma
(King Abdullah's youngest child). On a recent visit to the
Shihab tribe, one tribal member told the Ambassador that it
didn't matter if "we go to sleep hungry, it is fine with us"
as long as the King was okay.

9. (C) Over the past two years, according to Palace
contacts, King Abdullah moved to strengthen his ties with his
tribal base. The King has done this by shuffling the Palace
offices responsible for tribal relations, increasing
(somewhat) his personal contact with key tribal leaders,
greater attention to small tribal requests, and job-creation
programs in tribal areas (such as busing employees from
tribally-dominated areas such as Shobak, Kerak, and Tafileh
to QIZ factories).


10. (C) These efforts have paid some dividends. During one
outing last summer, the King met with almost 2,000 tribal
leaders. In addition to pursuing closer contacts with the
tribes, he initiated his social and economic development
program, which targets the rural (more undeveloped) and
heavily tribal areas. Sheikh Nawaf Eiton, a leader of the
Bani Hassan tribe, had sharply criticized those around the
King during a 2001 visit with Poloff. By the Summer of 2002,
however, Sheikh Eiton was effusive about the King, telling
one Poloff that the King had begun to reach out to the "real"
tribal leaders (whom Eiton described as those leaders who
have a genuine or moral authority with the tribe.)


11. (C) Prior to the build-up to the Iraqi situation, King
Abdullah was also winning praise for his international
political sensibilities. Politically savvy tribal members
have commented on the King's ability to shore up regional
alliances, secure economic and military assistance, and
become a player in the international arena. Other tribal
leaders have also positively remarked on the influence that
King Abdullah has built in Washington.

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CHALLENGES
--------------


12. (C) King Abdullah will likely weather any tribal
discontent stemming from a U.S. offensive against Iraq,
though not without some difficulties. Some Jordanian tribes
have links to Iraq and/or extensive business ties. However,
the desire for the stability and patronage offered by the
Hashemites will likely overcome any pro-Iraqi sentiment.
Looking into the future, however, the King will be challenged
to move forward with the political and economic progress he
envisions for Jordan while maintaining the support and
loyalty of the East Bank tribes, who may be displaced by this
progress.


13. (C) As the King attempts to move Jordan forward, his
political and economic reform efforts threaten to undermine
the patron-client relationship the tribes have traditionally
enjoyed. Since King Hussein's "one man, one vote" electoral
reform in 1993, tribes have enjoyed increased proportional
representation in Parliament. King Abdullah reaffirmed this
policy when he approved of a new electoral law in July, 2001,
which increased the number of seats in Parliament but did not
redistribute them. Whereas one representative in the second
district of Amman represents roughly 500,000 people, one
representative in Ma'an represents close to 50,000. (The
Ma'an governorate houses the Howeitat--one of the King's most
loyal tribes--although the non-Howeitat town of Ma'an has
proved more troublesome to the Hashemites in the last decade.
See Ref.) There has been intense pressure from those
underrepresented groups--namely West Bank-origin
Palestinians--to democratize the electoral system. Thus far
the King has resisted the pressure to do so because it would
severely undercut the representation of the tribes--his most
loyal constituent--in Parliament.


14. (C) Political reform has affected the tribes on the local
level. Since the early 1990s, the Kingdom has moved to
decrease the number of municipal governments. In 1991, there
were over 700 municipalities in Jordan, each with their own
government and employing thousands of people. To increase
the solvency of the municipal governments (many of which were
bankrupt),King Abdullah moved in 2001 to again reduce the
328 municipalities to less than 100. Tribal leaders
complained that this undermined their ability to secure
employment (and other patronage) for their members. To
counter criticism from the tribes, the King ensured that
tribes would remain at the helm of municipal governments by
changing the law to allow the central government to appoint
mayors instead of electing them.


15. (C) The King is also under domestic and international
pressure to decrease the prevalence of the patronage system
(wasta),the power base of the East Bank tribes. As King
Abdullah moves (slowly) towards a merit-based system, the
tribes have the most to lose.

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COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) The loyalty offered by the East Bank tribes may be
the most important component of Hashemite rule. King
Abdullah in the future will have to engage in a very
important balancing act: moving forward in reforming
political and economic systems, which the majority of the
population demand, while maintaining the support of his most
important pillar, which benefits most from the status quo.
BERRY