Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN893
2003-02-09 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

SUPPORT FOR KING ABDULLAH SOLID, BUT CHANGING:

Tags:  PREL PGOV SOCI ECON KPAL JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000893 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI ECON KPAL JO
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KING ABDULLAH SOLID, BUT CHANGING:
PART I OF IV

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000893

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI ECON KPAL JO
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR KING ABDULLAH SOLID, BUT CHANGING:
PART I OF IV

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
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1. (C) This is the first cable in a series that will examine
the stability of the Hashemite regime based on the support of
its traditional pillars.


2. (C) Despite troubling times in the region and a majority
Palestinian population angry over continued Arab-Israeli
violence, King Abdullah maintains the support of his
traditional base of power: the East Bank tribes, the
military/the security services, and the economic elite. We
foresee no near term loss of support from these "pillars of
the regime" despite difficult circumstances in the region.
However, political and economic reforms that do not result in
any demonstrable improvements in living standards, as well as
the ever-present influence of Islamists, may pose future
challenges to the King. End Summary.

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KING ABDULLAH: NOT HIS FATHER
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3. (C) When King Abdullah ascended to the throne on February
7, 1999, it became clear that his relationship with the
traditional pillars would differ from his father's. King
Hussein built his reign on fostering personal relationships,
especially with East Bank tribal leaders. King Abdullah has
not been able to pursue these relationships with the same
deftness. Consequently, King Abdullah does not command the
same personal, emotional appeal with many Jordanians that his
father did. While most saw King Hussein as a father figure
(even as a divine right King, an image he spent decades
cultivating),King Abdullah sees himself, and is viewed by
most, as the head of state, more a constitutional monarch.
It does no good to point out to Jordanians that King Hussein
had many very difficult moments in his long career--for
better or worse, he is an icon.

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THE PILLARS
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4. (C) In the three following cables, we will be examining
the regime's relationship with each pillar and its
challenges.

-- One of the most important pillars that we will examine is

the King's East Bank constituency, particularly his reliance
on several notable tribes. The tribes constitute 35-45
percent of the population, but also figure prominently in the
other two pillars. The second cable in our series will
address the East Bank tribes.

-- The military/security services consist of the Jordanian
Armed Forces (JAF),Public Security Directorate (PSD),and
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). As the Kingdom
faces crises on both of its borders, King Abdullah has become
more reliant on the military and security services--whose
upper ranks are also mostly East Bankers--to consolidate his
support and keep a lid on popular dissent. The third cable
in our series will examine the role of the military and
security services.

-- We would argue that the economic elite, with whom King
Abdullah has an affinity, should be considered another pillar
in modernizing Jordan. It is the only pillar to include
Palestinians as a major force. The King and government look
to the economic elite to finance the economy; the business
community in turn depends on the other pillars, particularly
the military/security services, to provide a secure
environment to invest and do business. The fourth cable in
our series will look at who the economic elite are and what
role they play in Jordanian society and in supporting the
monarchy.

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CHALLENGES
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5. (C) Even though support of the traditional pillars and the
economic elite is firm, King Abdullah will face numerous
challenges as he moves Jordan along the path of economic
(and, hopefully, political) liberalization. The wasta-based
system of patronage (including the very generous military pay
and pension system) that underpins East Bank society will
come under pressure from those--including many in the
economic elite--who support a more merit-based and
transparent system. Resistance to economic reform could come
from the first two pillars, some of whom see the reform
efforts as benefiting Palestinian Jordanians at the expense
of "real" Jordanians.


6. (C) The King's success in confronting future challenges
will depend in large part on his success in raising living
standards and reducing the wide cleavage between the haves
and have-nots. During his four years in power, King Abdullah
has attempted to close the disparities with economic and
social development programs. In the framework of his
commitment to sound macroeconomic policy, these programs have
had some success in raising living standards and
productivity, but poverty and underemployment will continue
to be issues for the King, especially to the extent that
regional political uncertainty keeps Jordan from reaching its
full economic growth potential.


7. (C) As in the rest of the region, managing Political Islam
will also be a challenge to King Abdullah. Historically, the
GOJ has been able to co-opt the Islamists (i.e. offering the
Islamic Action Front--the political arm of the Muslim
Brotherhood--legitimacy and an occasional ministry) instead
of trying to quash them. As descendants of the Prophet
Mohammed, the Hashemites also have some religious legitimacy
among the Islamists. However, the IAF offers the only
organized opposition in Jordan, and as such, holds popular
appeal with those who oppose the GOJ's peace treaty with
Israel and its "neutrality" vis a vis the Iraq issue. King
Hussein rewrote the election law in 1993 to undermine the
political power of the IAF, but the IAF has channeled its
efforts to other venues, such as the professional unions.


8. (C) King Abdullah has acted aggressively in containing the
influence of Islamists--moderate and radical. In November
2002, the JAF and security services moved into the city of
Ma'an with overwhelming force to ferret out members of the
radical Islamic group, Takfir wa Hijra, led by Mohammed
Shalabi, aka Abu Sayyaf (who is still at large). At the same
time, the GOJ moved to encourage the political unions to
divest from politics and focus on professional development.
It remains to be seen what balance King Abdullah will strike
in continuing his father's twin policies of co-opting
Islamists, and, when necessary, aggressively countering their
influence.

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MITIGATING FACTORS
--------------


9. (C) Apart from the pillars, there are a number of other
factors that will support stability in the Hashemite Kingdom.
While King Abdullah's popularity does not yet equal his
father's, there are no popular rival leaders in Jordan, nor
is there any other Jordanian public figure--within the regime
or outside--who has the following or leadership to challenge
the King. Cultural constraints also favor the King.
Jordanians generally support monarchy as the best form of
government for Jordan, and are uncomfortable criticizing the
Royal Family. The self-censoring press also adheres to the
unspoken rule of never criticizing the King--at least not
directly. These two factors work to mute criticism of the
King, and blunts the ability of opposition groups to
publicize or gain wide acceptance of criticisms of the King
or Monarchy.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) The three pillars form the foundation of the
Hashemites, and so far, we have identified no major cracks.
All three pillars continue to benefit from Hashemite rule and
King Abdullah has moved cautiously on reforms that threaten
the status quo. A major conflict in Iraq will have an effect
here, and while we expect public displays of anger, all of
our contacts predict that the pillars will hold steadfast.
The biggest challenges the King will face down the road will
come from within: political and economic reform, raising
living standards, and dealing with the Islamic opposition.
BERRY