USINT BAGHDAD PERSONNEL DEPART IRAQ; ARRIVE SAFELY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000855

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2013
TAGS: PREL IZ JO
SUBJECT: USINT BAGHDAD PERSONNEL DEPART IRAQ; ARRIVE SAFELY
IN AMMAN


Classified By: DCM Gregory L. Berry. Reasons 1.5 (b,d)


1. (C) All four Polish diplomats representing the U.S.
Interests Section in Baghdad (along with two spouses)
departed Iraq February 5 and have arrived safely in Amman.
They are scheduled to fly on to Warsaw on Sunday, February 9.
In a meeting with poloff February 6, USINT Baghdad chief
Krzysztof Bernacki recounted his staff's final tension-filled
week in the Iraqi capital and its culmination with a sunset
border crossing into Jordan the night before.

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The Sun Sets . . . For Now
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2. (C) Bernacki said that he had been notified by the Polish
MFA on Thursday, January 30 that USINT's Polish staff should
depart Baghdad on February 5. In the intervening week they
had been working long hours shredding documents,
disassembling equipment and packing official USG items as
well as their personal belongings. He prepared a diplomatic
note that his local staff will deliver to the Iraqi MFA on
Saturday February 8 that will inform the GOI officially that
USINT has "suspended operations" effective that day. He said
that he understood that the Department will announce this
publicly in Washington on 2/8 as well.


3. (C) Bernacki said that neither he nor his Polish
colleagues had slept more than 3 hours per night since being
instructed to depart, both because of the amount of work they
had to do and the level of stress they were under (he noted
that he had lost more than 10 pounds during that time alone).
Until they crossed the border last night, they were unsure
whether the Iraqis would let them out or not.


4. (S) The USINT convoy (4 vehicles all driven by the Poles
themselves) had planned to depart Baghdad early morning
February 5 in order to ensure that they would arrive in Amman
by sundown. However, at 2200 on February 4, Bernacki said
that he "received an encrypted message" asking him to obtain
the GPS coordinates for a number of Foreign Embassies in
Baghdad. In order to carry out this final task, he had to
delay his own departure "by a few hours" while he collected
that information (which he passed on to our DAO). The rest
of the convoy had departed the center of Baghdad without him
and waited at the checkpoint on the outskirts of the city
until he rejoined them. From that point on, he said that the
drive to the border was uneventful. Traffic was light and
they saw very few military vehicles.


5. (C) The convoy arrived at the Iraqi side of the border
(which was empty of other travelers) at approximately 1630
where he noticed "a lot of mukhabarat (secret police)
observing us. Clearly they knew who we were and that we were
all leaving." Bernacki said that he believed the reason they
were not hassled on departure was because of the presence of
UNMOVIC inspectors in the country: "they (the GOI) didn't
want a controversy now, so they let us go. If the inspectors
weren't there, I think it would have been different." After
finishing border formalities on the Iraqi side, the convoy
crossed over to Jordan about 1730, just as the sun was going
down over the Iraqi desert. After a short rest they
continued on for the final 3 1/2 hour drive to Amman.

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In Baghdad, Iraqis Wait for the Inevitable
and Hunger for Information
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6. (C) Regarding final impressions, Bernacki said that the
mood in Baghdad now is "very, very heavy. People are tired
and are waiting for a war that they believe is inevitable and
unavoidable. They feel that if its going to happen, let it
happen." He noted that "everything seems to be in suspended
animation . . . even the smuggling. Businesspeople --
legitimate or otherwise -- are worried about importing goods
that might get destroyed or looted" should military action
begin.


7. (C) In this environment, Bernacki offered that the U.S.
should step up its propaganda efforts with the Iraqi public
now, before any military action commences: "Make it clear
that they are not the target and that their future will be
better than what they've lived under. Do it by radio. It's
the most efficient and best way to reach all Iraqis and they
are hungry for independent information."

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Future Plans: A Hope To Return
One More Time And Turn Over the Keys
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8. (C) Bernacki is in the process of turning over all four
USINT Baghdad vehicles to Embassy Amman, along with the keys
to the Baghdad facilities and other USG equipment. After he
arrives in Poland, he intends to take a few days of leave and
will then debrief the Polish MFA and call on Embassy Warsaw
to discuss next steps. As our discussion concluded, Bernacki
stressed -- as he has in every meeting with us since he took
on the responsibilities of USINT Chief in January 2001 --
that he would like nothing more than the honor of handing
over the keys to the Interest Section to a U.S. diplomat when
it becomes -- once again -- the U.S. Embassy to Iraq.


GNEHM