Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN7620
2003-11-23 12:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

JENIN CAMP REHOUSING PROJECT: A PARABLE IN

Tags:  PREF PREL KPAL KWBG JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007620 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL KWBG JO
SUBJECT: JENIN CAMP REHOUSING PROJECT: A PARABLE IN
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE POLITICS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007620

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF PREL KPAL KWBG JO
SUBJECT: JENIN CAMP REHOUSING PROJECT: A PARABLE IN
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE POLITICS


1. (U) ConGen Jerusalem cleared this message.


2. (SBU) During a donor briefing on rehousing projects
(other issues reported septel),UNRWA officials shared
stories from the prolonged and difficult negotiations
surrounding UNRWA's ongoing USD 27 million project to rebuild
the part of Jenin refugee camp that was razed during intense
fighting in April 2002. The negotiations revealed the
truisms of Palestinian refugee politics: a resounding "no"
to transfer or anything that could even remotely be viewed as
giving up the right of return and an unwillingness on the
part of political leaders to give up perceived rights for the
humanitarian benefit of the community. Yet persistent
discussions with ordinary camp residents led to a solution
that addressed humanitarian, political and urban planning
concerns, while saving face for all parties. The
implications for a negotiated political solution are
interesting, as the Jenin rehousing experience implies that
solutions are likely to fail without the intense cultivation
of support among ordinary refugees. The parable begins.


3. (SBU) As sole donor for the Jenin rehousing project, the
UAE Red Crescent Society told UNRWA that it wished to
reconstruct the center of Jenin camp "exactly as it was." No
expense was to be spared in rebuilding three- and four-story
homes in their previous location, regardless of urban
planning concerns, camp residents' income level or even
verifiable evidence of the refugees' preexisting housing.
The UAE and the refugees themselves viewed the rehousing
project as compensation, pure and simple, for everything the
refugees had lost during the April 2002 incursions.


4. (SBU) Differences began to arise over the location for
the new housing. Some Palestinian political factions wanted
the camp center, known locally as "ground zero," left vacant
as a memorial to those who died there in April 2002. Other
Palestinian factions wanted the houses to be rebuilt exactly
where they'd been in the densely populated center, largely,
as UNRWA explained, to hinder future Israeli incursions into
the camp. The majority of the 400 displaced families also
wanted new housing in the razed center of the camp, for a
variety of political and personal reasons, including deeply

held fear of change. UNRWA, on the other hand, viewed the
rehousing project as a rare opportunity to improve the
infrastructure and reduce density of an overcrowded camp.
(It also argued that UNRWA's long-standing agency-wide policy
on new housing construction could not be ignored and refugees
should only be entitled to the standard formula that results
in an average shelter size of 65 square meters.) UNRWA's
arguments over location (but not square meterage) held sway
in discussions with the donor, and the UAE selected a plot of
land outside the boundary of the refugee camp to rebuild the
destroyed homes.


5. (SBU) Camp leaders of every political persuasion were
outraged. A move outside the boundaries of the camp
constituted a "transfer" of Palestinians from their land and
the elimination of their status as refugees. Protests were
held at UNRWA offices in the camp and camp leaders insisted
that the project could not proceed as planned. UNRWA then
began intensive counseling efforts with the displaced
families to sell them on the merits of a move outside the
camp boundaries and also began a search for new land closer
to the camp. After several tense months, a new smaller plot
of land was identified just on the boundary of the camp.
UNRWA again worked closely with individual families to
convince them that neither their status nor their benefits as
Palestinian refugees would be affected by the move and their
lives would be vastly improved by a less densely populated
environment. The deal was sealed when the PA agreed that the
official camp boundary would be extended to include the new
housing. The majority of the displaced -- 198 families --
will be rehoused in the new plot, while others will be
rehoused in a new, redesigned camp center that also will
include a community center. (The new land, purchased from
private owners by the UAE Red Crescent Society, is registered
in the name of the Awqaf. Although the refugees will own the
right to reside in the new houses, they will not own the
houses, a standard practice in all Palestinian refugee camps.
Property rights may well prove more complicated to resolve
than the right of return in the event of a political
solution.)


6. (SBU) And so, political differences were resolved by
negotiation not just among factions and political leadership,
but also through intensive discussions with ordinary
refugees. UNRWA officials believe that compromise would not
have been possible without a concerted effort to address
individual refugees' concerns; they also believe that
refugees would not have accepted the final deal without
having been informed of every step along the process. Their
analysis echoes concerns raised in the wake of Camp David II
and provides lessons to ponder in the event of progress
toward a final solution.


7. (U) Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
GNEHM