Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN5569
2003-09-02 16:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

SOLANA IN AMMAN: DOWNBEAT ON ROADMAP, IRAN

Tags:  PREL KPAL PTER IS IR JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005569 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL PTER IS IR JO
SUBJECT: SOLANA IN AMMAN: DOWNBEAT ON ROADMAP, IRAN

Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005569

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL PTER IS IR JO
SUBJECT: SOLANA IN AMMAN: DOWNBEAT ON ROADMAP, IRAN

Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) EU Foreign Policy Chief Xavier Solana briefed EU
ambassadors in Amman September 1 on his recent swing through
the Middle East and Iran. On the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, Solana expressed extreme frustration that
Palestinian infighting and Israeli intransigence would
scuttle the roadmap, leaving no alternative solution in its
wake. On Iran, he reported that President Khatami was
stunned by the Najaf bombing, and that the Iranians were
evasive when questioned about Iran's nuclear program and
future cooperation with the IAEA. END SUMMARY.

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SOLANA VERY DOWNBEAT ON PALESTINIANS...
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2. (S) Spanish Charge Juan Jose Escobar (protect) briefed
PolCouns September 2 on Xavier Solana's readout to EU
ambassadors on his trip to the Middle Eats and Iran. In
Amman, Escobar said, Solana saw King Abdullah and Prime
Minister Ali Abul Ragheb, who listened to Solana's account of
his meetings in Israel and the West Bank, but offered little
in exchange. King Abdullah had criticized Arafat, Sharon,
and Syria for their inflexible positions on the roadmap.


3. (S) Speaking from his notes of Solana's briefing,
Escobar said Solana described himself as "very pessimistic"
about chances for success of the roadmap because of
Palestinian political infighting and the hardening of
Israel's position on roadmap implementation. Solana
expressed great frustration with the continuing battles
between PA Chairman Yassir Arafat and PM Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen). In his conversation with Solana September 1, Abu
Mazen told him that he wanted to remain in office, but Solana
believes Abu Mazen is "determined to provoke a vote of
confidence" in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).
PLC speaker Abu Alaa told Solana that, if Abu Mazen seeks a
vote of confidence, he might well lose, then the PA would be
left without a PM or a PM candidate acceptable to Israel and
the U.S. By saying that Israeli considers Abu Mazen its only
acceptable Palestinian interlocutor, Solana argued, Israel is
inadvertently contributing to Abu Mazen's decline.


4. (S) Solana also expressed discomfort about infighting
between Mohammad Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub for control of
Palestinian security forces. The best solution to this
battle, Solana posited, was to "end the dual control" of the
security services by unifying them under an Interior
Minister. Solana said that Arafat was working against this
solution.

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...AND ISRAELIS AS WELL
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5. (S) Solana had even harsher comments for the GOI and PM
Sharon. Israel's position that it will not accept a new
Palestinian "hudna" (truce),its policy of continued targeted
assassinations, and its hardened position on Arafat were
"endangering the roadmap." Solana was particularly disturbed
by Israel's policy not to talk to foreign leaders who visit
Arafat. Solana said UN envoy Terje Roed Larsen, EU Middle
East envoy Otte, and several EU foreign ministers had
complained that this policy would make it impossible for them
to speak to both sides and seek solutions. Solana had hoped
to see PM Sharon on September 1, but was afraid that Sharon
would refuse to see him (Note: Escobar said it was his
understanding that Sharon had not seen Solana. End note.)

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"A VERY GRAVE MOMENT"
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6. (S) Solana feared that the peace process was at "a very
grave moment." He told the EU envoys that the best possible
-- although unlikely -- end to the current crisis would be

-- Abu Mazen winning a vote of confidence;

-- Dahlan gaining control of all Palestinian security
services;

-- the PA taking some real steps against HAMAS and Islamic
Jihad in southern Gaza; and

-- Israel responding positively to these Palestinian
gestures by relaxing the closures and ending assassinations
of Palestinian militants.
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IRANIANS SHAKEN BY NAJAF BOMBING
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7. (S) Solana then briefed on his visit to Tehran. Solana
arrived in Tehran just hours after the bombing at the Shia
shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, Iraq, and said that President
Mohammad Khatami and Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi were
"stunned" by the bombing. Solana said that, for the first
time in his meetings with the Iranians, he saw "the
realization that Iran had to fight against terrorism, no
matter its source or justification." Solana said Khatami
and Kharrazi were "evasive" when questioned about Iran's
willingness to cooperate with the IAEA on alleged Iranian
enrichment of uranium.

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COMMENT
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8. (S) Escobar said Solana spoke most -- and most
passionately -- about the peace process and his frustration
with both the Israelis and Palestinians.

HALE