Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN2528
2003-04-29 15:55:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

IRAQ WAR HITS POPULAR CREDIBILITY OF KING

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM IZ JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002528 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ WAR HITS POPULAR CREDIBILITY OF KING
ABDULLAH, U.S.; MANY LOOK FOR PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002528

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ WAR HITS POPULAR CREDIBILITY OF KING
ABDULLAH, U.S.; MANY LOOK FOR PROGRESS ON THE PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) The perceived support that King Abdullah gave to the
military campaign in Iraq -- which many Jordanians contrast
with his statements that U.S. forces in Jordan performed
merely a defensive role -- has led to a good bit of
anti-government grumbling and, during the war, some open
criticism of the King at anti-war protests. Jordanian
popular mistrust of U.S. motives -- already significantly
heightened over more than two years of the Intifada -- has
soared in the wake of the war, with Jordanians expressing
resentment and distrust of the U.S. While time and a rebound
in economic growth may convince some Jordanians of the wisdom
of King Abdullah's decision to support the Coalition,
concrete movement on the peace process would much more
quickly vindicate the King's decision, and help regain some
U.S. credibility as well. END SUMMARY.

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KING'S REPUTATION TAKES SOME HITS DOMESTICALLY
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2. (S) Several GOJ officials have expressed to us recently
worry over the effect of the Iraq war on King Abdullah's
domestic standing in Jordan. During the war, there were
several demonstrations in the southern cities of Ma'an,
Kerak, and Tafileh in which demonstrators carried signs and
chanted slogans critical of the King and his perceived
support for American military efforts against Iraq. Several
anti-regime pamphlets appeared in those and other cities as
well, prompting GOJ security forces to tighten their control
over demonstrations and watch opposition groups more
carefully. At the same time, there appears to have been a
sharp drop in economic activity in the first quarter of 2003
as businesses and individuals put off investment and
consumption decisions in the lead-up to war.


3. (S) Labor Minister Mozaheim Mohefen told Embassy FSN
last week that, indeed, several protests in Karak and Tafileh
during the war had contained "direct attacks" on King

Abdullah, something that had traditionally been completely
out of bounds. In response, Mohefen -- who has tribal
origins in the south -- said he had been dispatched to the
region to look into and deal with the anti-King sentiment.
Mohefen said the GOJ had offered paper "jobs" to hundreds in
the two governorates in an effort to defuse a worrisome
situation.


4. (C) Several contacts outside the government have also
reported to us that most average Jordanians believe that
Jordan provided significant military support to the Coalition
war in Iraq. Since GOJ public acknowledgment of U.S. troop
deployment was limited to Patriot air defense batteries, many
Jordanians have let their imaginations run wild and believe
the King permitted the launching of a "secret invasion" of
Iraq from Jordanian territory. Sketchy local press reports
of sightings of khaki-clad foreigners and strange aircraft in
the eastern desert have fueled this speculation -- and a good
deal of hyperbole. According to several contacts, many
Jordanians have contrasted this popular perception of
Jordanian support to the military effort with statements by
King Abdullah and other senior GOJ officials that Jordan did
not support the war or permit combat operations to be
conducted from Jordanian territory. The gap between the
King's statements and the perceived reality, they argue, has
damaged the King's credibility.


5. (S) Similarly, we have heard reports that there was a
certain amount of grumbling in the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF)
about Jordanian government support for U.S. military efforts
in Iraq. Military contacts tell us that senior JAF officers
held meetings with middle and low-ranking officers and troops
in an effort to explain Jordan's national interest in
supporting the U.S. Sources in the Jordanian JCS indicate
that a few soldiers who opposed the war were detained. In
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID),there was concern
that Jordan's public association with the U.S. campaign would
create problems GID would have to deal with -- both
internally and from the Iraqi Intelligence Service.

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AS DOES THE U.S.
--------------


6. (S) U.S. credibility -- already low following two and a
half years of the intifada -- has also taken a big hit.
Jordanian popular concerns about the U.S. in the aftermath of
the Iraq war are numerous: many worry that Syria will be the
next country to come under U.S. attack. Others criticize ORHA
Chief Jay Garner as a "Zionist" who will try to lead a new
Iraqi government into pro-Israel policies. Nearly all see
INC leader Ahmed Chalabi -- convicted of bank fraud in Jordan
-- as a sinister tool of U.S. policy. Finally, most
Jordanians believe -- fed by a long series of press stories
making this assumption -- that the U.S. invaded Iraq merely
to gain control over Iraq's oil resources and plans for a
long-term occupation much like the Israeli presence in the
West Bank and Gaza. The Jordanian press refers to both
Israeli and U.S. forces as "occupation forces." The number
of Jordanians who draw parallels between the U.S. presence in
Iraq and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank/Gaza is
strikingly high, and the U.S. presence in Iraq is already
referred to popularly as an "occupation."

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COMMENT
--------------


7. (S) The damage to the King's standing is real, but is
something from which he can recover given the right
conditions. The benefits of the King's decision will be more
evident if there is concrete progress on the Roadmap. The
economic pressures and uncertainties may now also begin to
ease, thanks to U.S. financial assistance and optimism about
Jordan's economic future in a Saddam-free region.


8. (S) For the U.S., the political cost is in lost
goodwill. Average Jordanians now ascribe to the U.S. the
worst possible motive for any action. This very negative
post-war popular impression of U.S. goals may begin to fade
if things move quickly and well in Iraq. Even more
important, however, will be U.S. moves to support the Roadmap
and secure real progress toward the formation of a
Palestinian state.
GNEHM