950 ASYLUM SEEKERS AT JORDAN-IRAQ BORDER, UNHCR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 002427

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM; PLEASE PASS TO USAID
NICOSIA FOR LAPENN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2013
TAGS: PREF PREL EAID MOPS IZ JO
SUBJECT: 950 ASYLUM SEEKERS AT JORDAN-IRAQ BORDER, UNHCR
CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

REF: A. AMMAN 253

B. AMMAN 1054

Classified By: PolCouns Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GOJ is not admitting most asylum seekers to the
UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished. As of mid-day on
April 22, 950 people (roughly 800 Iranian Kurds, 50 Iranian
oppositionists and 100 Palestinians) are being held in
no-man's land between the Iraqi and Jordanian border posts,
where they are receiving assistance from UNHCR and its
implementing partners. Senior GOJ officials, who view the
Iranians as a security threat and a potential long-term
refugee population, have made it clear to UNHCR and us that
none of them will be admitted to Jordan. The GOJ is
pressing UNHCR to establish a camp for the Iranian
asylum-seekers inside Iraqi territory. In return, the GOJ
is promising to admit Iraqis and Palestinians to the UNHCR
refugee camp at Ruweished. Late on April 21, the GOJ
admitted to the UNHCR camp 94 Palestinians with family ties
to Jordan. UNHCR/Amman recognizes the need for cross-
border operations but needs UNHCR/Geneva approval and
guarantees -- including that coalition forces inside Iraq
can establish a secure environment for a camp. We view
the establishment of UNHCR cross-border operations as
the only practical solution to this increasingly
difficult problem. End summary.

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THE PROBLEM
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2. (U) Since April 12, a steady and growing stream of
asylum seekers (totaling 950 on April 22) has made its way
toward the Karameh/Trebil border crossing. The GOJ has
denied entry to this group, holding it in the roughly 2-km
wide strip of land between the Iraqi and Jordanian border
posts. GOJ border officials confirmed that this land,
generally referred to as "no-man's land," actually is
Jordanian territory. The asylum seekers are comprised
of the following groups:

- (U) At least 800 Iranian Kurds from UNHCR's Al Tash
refugee camp, located near the Iraqi city of Ar-Ramadi.
(According to UNHCR, total population in Al Tash camp
is approximately 13,000, comprised of Iranian Kurds
who first sought refuge in Iraq in 1982.) This group
began arriving on April 13 and is composed almost
entirely of families. Their stated reasons for
leaving Iraq range from a lack of humanitarian
services in Al Tash camp to a general breakdown of
law and order and fear of reprisals following the fall
of the Iraqi government. UNHCR believes that there
most likely is a lack of basic humanitarian services
in Al Tash camp, as UNHCR withdrew its expatriate
staff from Iraq before hostilities and cannot confirm
whether local staff is still at work. UNHCR also
reports that its implementing partner for Al Tash
camp had been the Iraqi Red Crescent which has
"disintegrated" during the war. UNHCR is unable to send
expatriate staff back into Al Tash camp -- even to conduct
an assessment -- until coalition forces and then UNSECOORD
declare the area to be permissive. UNHCR has been unable
to conduct detailed interviews with this group, due to the
chaotic and constantly changing conditions at NML. We and
UNHCR assume this influx will continue until the core
problems at Al Tash camp are resolved.

- (C) An estimated 50-60 Iranians who have identified
themselves as oppositionists and may have ties to
Mujaheddin-e-Khalq. A total of 96 such Iranians arrived in
several groups April 12-13. They are mostly men (only 12
women) and all are unmarried. They all are carrying travel
documents, but most are expired refugee convention travel
documents issued by western European countries. Three are
carrying expired US-issued refugee travel documents. UNHCR
reports that some members of this group whose travel
documents have been found to be invalid have willingly
returned to Iraq. Another five are carrying valid French
and Canadian passports and were allowed to enter Jordan
April 21 en route to France and Canada. Two Iranians are
carrying valid Australian passports but have been denied
entry to Jordan by GOJ border guards. GOJ officials have
announced -- including to the press -- that they will not
admit this group to Jordan (see para 6). UNHCR
understands that this group could have ties to a terrorist
organization and is not urging the GOJ to admit its
members to the UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished.

- (U) An estimated 100-150 Palestinians, carrying a mix of
Iraqi and Egyptian travel documents -- or no documents at
all. Some members of this group have family ties to
Jordan. Late on April 21, the GOJ allowed 94 Palestinians
from "mixed" families -- e.g., those with some Jordanian
passport holders -- to enter the UNHCR refugee camp at
Ruweished. UNHCR officials advise that another 80
Palestinians will be admitted to the UNHCR refugee camp
later today, April 22. The GOJ previously allowed a
separate group of 40 Palestinians to come to Amman on a
temporary basis, with guarantees from Jordanian family
members that the entry truly would be temporary.
Palestinians in no-man's land have told UNHCR protection
officers that they are being threatened by Iraqis, told
that they were "guests" of Saddam who no longer are
welcome in Iraq. Others have told UNHCR that they were
evicted from their homes by Iraqis.

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THE PRACTICALITIES
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3. (U) All of the above groups, plus a smattering of
Iraqis and other nationalities with document problems,
are being held in the roughly 2 km-wide "no-man's
land" (NML) between the Jordanian and Iraqi border
posts. This "no-man's land" actually belongs to the
Government of Jordan, as its territory extends to
the Iraqi border post. UNHCR and its implementing
partners are providing services to the NML population.
UNHCR has erected tents and rubb halls and is
providing non-food items (blankets, cook stoves,
hygiene kits, etc.) to each family upon arrival.
UNHCR implementing partner Oxfam is providing water
and sanitation facilities. UNHCR implementing
partner CARE is supporting overall "camp" management,
including tent set up and food distribution. MSF and
UNHCR implementing partner Japan Platform are
providing medical services. Food currently is being
provided on ad hoc basis by UNHCR, ICRC, Jordan Red
Crescent and its NGO implementing partners in the TCN
transit camp. UNHCR has not established an overall
"camp" management system -- registration lists, food
ration cards and an organized security and protection
system -- due to the temporary nature of the
arrangement. UNHCR also reports that it has been
unable to conduct thorough interviews of individual
asylum seekers, due to the chaotic and ever-changing
circumstances in this area.


4. (U) On April 20, UNHCR -- in cooperation with GOJ
implementing partner the Hashemite Charitable Organization
(HCO) -- decided to expand capacity in NML to provide
services for 5,000 people. UNHCR reports that
accommodations for 5,000 inside NML will be "tight" with
little space between tents and tents set up right to the
edge of the highway. UNHCR acknowledges that security
and protection would be difficult in such circumstances.

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THE GOJ'S POSITION
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5. (C) From our earliest discussions with the GOJ on
possible Iraq-related refugee flows (reftels),the
GOJ has made it clear it would not permit Iranians
or Palestinian asylum seekers to enter Jordan. Yet
it nevertheless signed a letter of understanding
(LOU) with UNHCR in which it agreed to provide
"temporary protection" to "persons in need of
humanitarian assistance caused by possible
hostilities ... in Iraq." When, in an April 20
meeting, the Ambassador reminded Foreign Minister
Marwan Muasher and Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Shaher Bak of the GOJ's obligations under
the LOU, both officials replied that, due to
security concerns, Iranians would not be permitted
to enter Jordan. Bak subsequently delivered the
same message to UNHCR Representative Sten Bronee
in an April 21 meeting. Minister of Information
Mohammed Adwan went public with the same message on
April 21, telling the press that the GOJ would only
allow Iranian Kurds and oppositionists to enter
Jordan on the condition that "they will leave
immediately after that," en route to other countries.
Adwan also said that the GOJ will facilitate the
establishment of a camp for Iranians near the
Jordanian border, but inside Iraqi territory.


6. (S) The GOJ views the Iranian Kurds from Al Tash
camp as a long-term refugee problem that must be
addressed by coalition forces and UNHCR. As FonMin
Muasher told the Ambassador April 20, coalition
forces must restore security to Al Tash camp and
create conditions appropriate for the Kurds' return
to Al Tash camp. UNHCR must also restore services
inside the camp. If UNHCR has been unable to
resettle this group since 1982, why should Jordan
open its borders and become host to yet another
long-term refugee population? Separately, the GOJ
views the Iranian oppositionists as both a potential
security threat and a political headache. Muasher
confirmed to the Ambassador on April 21 that the
Iranian Government had requested that the GOJ arrest
and extradite to Iran the presumed MEK supporters,
a political and human rights problem the GOJ seeks
to avoid. The GOJ seems content to leave this group
in NML until its members are moved to a third country,
choose to return to Iraq or can be deported to
coalition forces' control for internment.


7. (C) The question of the Palestinians is both more
complicated and potentially more manageable, should
the numbers remain small. With enormous pressure
not to allow Israeli "transfer" of Palestinians from
the West Bank, the GOJ is reluctant to allow the
"transfer" of Palestinians from Iraq to Jordan.
Given its historical absorption of Palestinians
following every major regional conflict since 1948,
the GOJ also worries that it will be forced to
accept another large influx of Palestinians
from Iraq, an economic burden the GOJ feels it is
unable to accommodate. Yet given the numerous
family ties between Palestinians in Iraq and Jordan,
the GOJ also faces internal political pressures to
allow at least some displaced Palestinians to enter
Jordan. The GOJ allowed 40 to do so in early April,
as long as their relatives in Jordan provided
guarantees that the stay truly would be temporary.
We expect the GOJ will ultimately allow this current
group of Palestinians to enter Jordan as well.
MinState Bak offered such a "deal" to UNHCR on
April 21, promising to admit all Palestinians if
UNHCR would set up a camp for the Iranians inside
Iraqi territory.

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THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION
--------------


8. (C) Although UNHCR would like to continue pressing
the GOJ to uphold its first asylum obligations, UNHCR
Representative Sten Bronee understands that the GOJ
will not let the Iranians or the Iranian Kurds into the
(nearly empty) UNHCR refugee camp at Ruweished. UNHCR
also realizes that establishing a camp for thousands of
people in a very limited physical space where their
status remains uncertain is not a viable solution.
Bronee has told us he is considering establishing
cross-border operations, but cannot make that decision
without UNHCR/Geneva's approval. He also said that
UNHCR as an institution cannot agree to cross-border
operations until it has key guarantees from the GOJ,
donors and coalition forces regarding cross-border
access for UNHCR staff, logistical and infrastructure
support for a new camp, access to Jordan for critically
ill asylum seekers (the nearest hospital is in
Ruweished, Jordan),financial support for a camp inside
Iraq, and -- from coalition forces -- guarantees for
camp security requirements. Finally, Bronee reported
that he has requested an UNSECOORD assessment of the
immediate cross-border area (an important first step
in establish cross-border operations) as well as of
Al Tash camp.

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COMMENT -- AND SUGGESTIONS ON USG NEXT STEPS
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9. (C) This rapidly growing population of asylum
seekers is causing difficult political problems.
We, the GOJ and UNHCR all believe that the current
arrangements in NML are neither adequate nor
long-term, especially if Al Tash camp continues
to bleed refugees. From both a political and
practical perspective, we view the establishment
of UNHCR cross-border operations as the only
solution.


10. (S) In order to prepare the groundwork for
what we see as an eventual UNHCR-run camp inside
Iraqi territory, we suggest the following next
steps:

- A formal message of support (political and
financial) from PRM to UNHCR/Geneva on
cross-border operations in western Iraq.

- Initiation of CENTCOM discussions with
UNHCR over security requirements for a camp
in western Iraq.

- Designation of appropriate coalition forces
to meet camp security needs.


11. (S) We also request that CENTCOM conduct
a civil affairs assessment of Al Tash camp as
quickly as possible, to determine the root
causes of the population flow from the camp. If
security is a problem in the camp, we also request
that CENTCOM designate appropriate forces that
would enable UN agencies to re-establish
operations inside Al Tash camp.
GNEHM