Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN1843
2003-03-27 05:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

TFIZ01: THAI AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ PROVIDES MORE

Tags:  PREL IZ TH JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001843 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013
TAGS: PREL IZ TH JO
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: THAI AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ PROVIDES MORE
INFORMATION ON SITUATION IN BAGHDAD

REF: AMMAN 1581

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001843

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013
TAGS: PREL IZ TH JO
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: THAI AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ PROVIDES MORE
INFORMATION ON SITUATION IN BAGHDAD

REF: AMMAN 1581

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (S) On March 26, Thai Ambassador to Iraq (also accredited
to Jordan) Tawatchai Piyarat (please protect) invited A/DCM
and A/Pol to his temporary Amman residence to discuss ongoing
events in Iraq. Piyarat said that he was speaking in a
personal capacity and not on instructions from Bangkok, and
was motivated to provide any help he could "to end the war
quickly and end the suffering of the Iraqi people." (Note:
Piyarat had earlier provided us the information contained
reftel.)


2. (S) Piyarat began by noting that the Iraqis are "tough,
smart, and will fight you with all they've got." He noted
that before he departed Baghdad on 3/11, he saw Baath party
officials distributing weapons to party members and other
Saddam loyalists. Such tenacity notwithstanding, he offered
the following observations to help coalition military
personnel define targets:

-- Every Mukhabarat building has a pole with red and white
stripes. He noted that care must be taken as many of these
buildings are co-located in residential areas (the
Mukhabarat's HQ -- long since relocated to a building near
the UNDP HQ -- is only 30 meters from the official Thai
residence.)

-- Iraqi Generals and senior officials drive white Mercedes
320S sedans. Government vehicles have blue license plates,
however GOI officials drive in regular white plated vehicles
as well making identification difficult.

-- Many senior Iraqi officials have homes near the park by
the Parade Grounds (where the large crossed swords monument
is located). Most of these officials have moved out of their
residences and have commandeered buildings along the river

-- There are many underground roadways in Baghdad. He says
that Thai workers have told him of being blindfolded, put on
a bus, and then arriving at an underground construction site
where they would labor in six month rotations. He noted
specifically that under the garden and "pool" of the palace
beside Saddam tower is an underground roadway. Piyarat did
not specify where the road went or what its use is but
offered that "perhaps another 'bunker buster' can finish it
off." (DAO Comment: This reporting is similar to reports of
Chinese laborers working on underground facilities in the
1990s.)

-- In attacking Baghdad, the U.S. should consider attacking
or gaining access to the city by using the river: "they
expect you to come by land or by air, but not by water."


3. (S) Piyarat offered the following additional thoughts on a
range of topics.

-- Iraq's strategy: Piyarat assessed that "they will lure you
into Baghdad and then take down a lot of people with them."

-- WMD labs: He has no doubt they exist, but the Iraqis have
been very smart in breaking down individual factories into
very small units, each of which produces only a small part of
the overall item.

-- The average Iraqi's psychological state: Among the
younger people "they've created a generation of hatred, they
hate America" but among older Iraqis a reservoir of good
feelings about America still exists. "Its about 50/50." (DAO
Comment: Past DAO reporting has indicated a similar
generational divide in Iraq regarding attitudes toward the
U.S.)

-- Radio/TV: Iraqis listen to Iranian radio and watch Iranian
TV, both of which they can receive well in Baghdad. He
suggested that the coalition should take out Iraqi TV as soon
as possible. Saddam uses that to "create instant casualties"
whenever he wants. Piyarat suggested that an area in the
desert west of Baghdad would be a good place to locate radio
or TV transmitters that could reach Baghdadis.

-- The Power of Giving: As a final observation, Piyarat
commented on how much of Saddam's power derives from favors
which he can provide or deny: "When Saddam gives, he's good.
When he doesn't give, he's bad. That's the way it is."


GNEHM