PALESTINIANS AND PALESTINIAN-JORDANIANS PRAISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001720

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL PGOV IS IZ JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS AND PALESTINIAN-JORDANIANS PRAISE
APPOINTMENT OF ABU MAZEN, SAY IRAQ STRIKE HURTS U.S.
CREDIBILITY ON THE MEPP


Classified By: A/DCM Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B)(D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) During a series of discussions in the days before
the start of war in Iraq, prominent Palestinian-Jordanians
and Palestinians resident in Jordan told A/DCM that the
appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian Prime Minister should
provide a big boost to good government in the PNA. However,
they said Abu Mazen needed to secure immediately from Israel
concrete concessions -- an end to targeted killings, house
demolitions and a lifting of restrictions on movement within
the West Bank and Gaza -- to prove that he can have a
positive impact, and to strengthen him vis-a-vis Yassir
Arafat. While applauding the words of President Bush's March
14 White House statement on the Roadmap, all roundly
criticized (or angrily denounced) the President personally
for announcing U.S. support for the Quartet Roadmap only on
the eve of war with Iraq. All said that, because of the
(then) impending war against Iraq, U.S. credibility on the
MEPP has sunk to a new low. Only public U.S. pressure on
Israel and concrete and visible progress toward Israeli
withdrawal and creation of a Palestinian state can turn the
tide. We are struck that the President's March 14 Roadmap
remarks did not produce the usual local spike in optimism on
the MEPP. END SUMMARY.

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ABU MAZEN GOOD FOR PALESTINIANS AT HOME...
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2. (C) A/DCM met March 17-20 with several prominent
Palestinian-Jordanians and Palestinians resident in Jordan.
All praised the appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian Prime
Minister. Hamadi Fara'neh, a Palestinian-Jordanian former
Member of Parliament, said that Abu Mazen is personally
well-respected, has the support of Fatah and excellent
contacts in Israel. Abu Mazen's most important task,
according to Fara'neh, will be to speak to Israelis and
provide a positive Palestinian focus for the peace movement
inside Israel. Labor's decision to stay out of the
government should help Abu Mazen in this task, especially if
the new Palestinian PM and Labor leaders maintain public
contacts to put pressure on Sharon. PNC Chairman Salim
Zanoun hoped that Abu Mazen's appointment would help unite
different factions of Fatah and "show to Israel and the world
a positive, sympathetic Palestinian face."


3. (C) Fara'neh and George Musleh, a Palestinian
businessman from Beit Sahour but resident in Amman, said that
the appointment of a PM should help improve the quality of
Palestinian governance. It will be possible under a PM,
Musleh said, for an average Palestinian and the Palestinian
media to criticize the quality of work of a Palestinian
ministry without it being taken as an implicit criticism of
Yassir Arafat and, by extension, "the Palestinian struggle."
"Palestinians have never before been able to criticize the
job the PNA does without being seen as attacking Abu Ammar
(Arafat)."

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... BUT FACES AN UPHILL BATTLE WITH ISRAEL ON SECURITY
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4. (C) Fara'neh and Adnan Abu Odeh, a former advisor to
King Hussein and King Abdullah, said that the U.S. war
against Iraq will make it more difficult for Abu Mazen to
take the concrete security steps Israel is demanding. HAMAS
and Islamic Jihad (PIJ),they said, see Fatah as their enemy
and will oppose any real consolidation of PNA control in Gaza
or the West Bank. He expects HAMAS and PIJ to try to stir up
the Palestinian street to prevent Abu Mazen from taking
security actions against them. They argued strongly that
many Palestinians will not support strong security steps
without concrete Israeli "concessions" that Palestinians
could "see and feel." The most important things Israel could
do would be to end targeted killings ("assassinations") and
house demolitions, lift roadblocks between Palestinian towns
on the West Bank and Gaza, and withdraw from West Bank cities
reoccupied in the past year. In the fairly near term, Israel
would have to withdraw its forces to the September 28, 2000
lines, and engage in real negotiations. Both felt that
Israeli pledges to end settlement activity would be less
valuable since they would not be immediately visible to
average Palestinians.

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IRAQ WAR DESTROYS BUSH'S CREDIBILITY ON THE MEPP
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5. (C) The harshest words in these conversation were aimed
not at PM Sharon and his new, conservative government, but at
President Bush. All of these interlocutors asked pointedly
why the President had waited until the eve of war before he
endorsed the Roadmap. Fara'neh and Musleh angrily dismissed
the President's March 14 White House remarks as an "insulting
attempt to win Arab and European support for his war in
Iraq." When asked how the U.S. could win back the goodwill
it might lose during an Iraq campaign, all responded that a
quick, clean, and honorable campaign in Iraq coupled with
"real American pressure on Israel" that produced "real
movement toward a Palestinian state" would win back many
suspicious Palestinians.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Originally conceived as a way to promote the
President's March 14 Roadmap remarks with Palestinians here,
these meetings turned instead into acrimonious discussions of
the lack of credibility of the U.S. (in general) and
President Bush (specifically) in the region. Most previous
U.S. statements on the MEPP (such as the President's June 24,
2002 speech) produced in Jordan at least a temporary spike in
optimism. We were struck -- but given the intense focus here
on Iraq, not surprised -- that the President's very positive
March 14 statement produced criticism of American credibility.


GNEHM