KING'S SPEECH TO NATION UPSTAGED BY "SHOCK AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001718

SIPDIS

NEA/ARN, NEA/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM JO
SUBJECT: KING'S SPEECH TO NATION UPSTAGED BY "SHOCK AND
AWE"; EMOTIONAL JORDANIANS CYNICAL ABOUT USG INTENTIONS.

REF: AMMAN 6692 (2002)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM REASONS: 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. King Abdullah's March 21 speech was largely
upstaged by the televised coverage of the beginning of
extensive coalition bombing. Many people we spoke with
missed the beginning of the speech to watch the bombing, but
most read a transcript the following day. Already very
emotional and pre-occupied with coverage of military activity
in Iraq, many Jordanians didn't focus too much on the King's
message. Some, particularly in the younger generation, were
critical of the King's stance "against" Iraq and dismissive
of his attempt to "empathize" with the Jordanian people.
Contacts in the middle class felt the King didn't really say
anything surprising or new, and their focus remained almost
exclusively on events in Iraq. END SUMMARY.

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KING: I FEEL YOUR PAIN, BUT JORDAN MUST COME FIRST
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2. (SBU) At 2000 local time March 21, the King delivered a
five minute speech to the nation on Jordan TV. He asked
Jordanians for "a sense of responsibility" in placing "our
national interest above all interests and considerations."
He was clear that the GOJ's current primary objective is "to
preserve the security and stability of our homeland and
protect its top interests." As for the people of Iraq, the
King noted Jordan's "humane brotherly obligation," and said
he would work as hard as possible to end the war and "ease
the suffering of our brethren in Iraq." On demonstrations,
the King said Jordanians should express themselves with
civility.


3. (SBU) The King empathized with his people, saying "I know
the pain and true anger you are feeling because of the
suffering and ordeal that the Iraqi people are facing. I am
one of you, and I share the feelings of every one of you."

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DISTRACTED JORDANIANS TUNED TO THE WAR;
SOME YOUNG PEOPLE DISMISSIVE OF SPEECH
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4. (C) Most Jordanians were (and have been for the past two
days) almost exclusively focused on the military conflict in
Iraq. Many contacts report that they missed the King's
remarks because they were watching the beginning of the
coalition "shock and awe" bombing campaign against the Iraqi
regime. Contacts report most Jordanians -- who read the
speech the morning after -- regard it as "nothing new."
However, there appears to be some anxiety among moderates
that the King will be unable to deliver a "dividend" for
Jordan's "allegiance" to Washington. A senior Foreign
Ministry official expressed the belief that the King struck
the proper tone in the speech, and that his message of the
need to focus on Jordan would inevitably win over public
opinion when fighting in Iraq ends.


5. (C) Many younger contacts were more derisive of the King,
with some scoffing openly at his attempt to "relate" to the
Jordanian people. This cynicism is apparently also more
concentrated within the Palestinian-Jordanian community,
which appears to be reacting more emotionally, in general, to
the Iraq situation.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Faced with vivid images of US bombs exploding in
downtown Baghdad, the populace is extremely angry and
emotional. They are glued to the television and internet and
in this context, considered the King's message less important
than the immediate war. It is worth mentioning that the
meaning of the King's "Jordan First" campaign, introduced in
October 2002 (reftels),was well understood by Jordanians
prior to the onset of hostilities, and probably made it
easier for him to effectively articulate the need to focus
now on Jordan's interests.


7. (C) Many embassy contacts are optimistic that if the
operation in Iraq proceeds well, much of the street's emotion
will subside. That said, as our reporting has indicated, in
moderate, traditionally pro-western circles here there is a
growing presumption of bad intentions toward the USG that
even a best-case outcome in Iraq may be unable be to quash
completely. Jordanians will need to see more progress on the
Roadmap, and gain confidence that Iraq will truly prosper and
stabilize, before their trust in US intentions will return.
GNEHM