MULLAH KREKAR EXTRADITION: JORDANIANS THINK THE

S E C R E T AMMAN 000150

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2013
TAGS: SNAR PTER KCRM PREL JO NL
SUBJECT: MULLAH KREKAR EXTRADITION: JORDANIANS THINK THE
DUTCH ARE ASKING FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE

REF: (A) THE HAGUE 27 (B) 12/30-12/31 BERRY-RUSSEL
E-MAILS

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (S) Post shares Embassy The Hague's frustration with the
current state of play of the Mullah Krekar extradition case.
To have Krekar walk free would be an outcome that would serve
no one's interests and would send the wrong signal to all
those working tirelessly in the fight against terrorism
around the world. In the last week, the Ambassador has
talked with the Foreign Minister about the case, the DCM with
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and other
appropriate officers with GOJ counterparts.


2. (S/NF) Based on those multiple discussions and many
previous contacts over the past several weeks, we have a
different perspective from that in reftel on where the
problem lies and what needs to be done to address it. The
bottom line is that GOJ -- and the GID in particular -- has
little confidence that anything they can provide the GONL
will be sufficient to satisfy Dutch legal requirements. Both
the Dutch reaction to the Jordanians' original efforts to get
Krekar extradited on assassination charges, and the recent
outcome of the Courtallier case (ref b) have solidified their
thinking on this. Moreover, there is a real cost to the
Jordanians in providing detailed intelligence information
which will become public in a court hearing.


3. (S/NF) In the first instance, the Dutch refused to
consider a Jordanian extradition request based on a valid
Interpol arrest warrant because the charge in question was
attempted assassination -- a crime which we understand the
Dutch system does not recognize as a basis for extradition.
Then, with the Courtallier case, the Dutch court ruled that
information gathered through intelligence channels does not
constitute a suitable basis for extradition. As the Krekar
case is -- like Courtallier -- based on intel, the GID sees
the writing on the wall and believes that there is little to
be gained by providing the Dutch with yet more information
that once in the public domain would jeopardize sources and
methods. The end result, they believe, will be the same -- a
Dutch court will refuse to extradite Krekar.


4. (S) In our view the current dilemma springs not from some
sort of uncharacteristic recalcitrance on the Jordanians'
part (although we agree that they could have been much more
transparent in presenting their concerns to us at an earlier
stage of the process),but rather with the standards of
evidence required by Dutch courts. The Jordanians
conscientiously have taken steps to address Dutch concerns
(providing written assurances that Krekar would only be tried
on the drug trafficking charges and, if convicted, would not
face the death penalty). They tell us they have provided the
evidence available to them short of compromising sources and
methods. However, neither our Jordanian counterparts nor we
can see how they can meet Dutch requirements in a case
clearly based on sensitive intelligence information.


5. (S) As we are not familiar with Dutch law we can not
offer suggestions as to whether there are unexplored avenues
to deal with the case in Dutch courts. We would welcome
Embassy Oslo's comments on the likely outcome if Krekar is
expelled from the Netherlands to Norway, as presently seems
likely. Recommendations from the Department on legal aspects
of the case would also be most welcome.


6. (C) Note: For the record, we note that the Dutch are
mistaken if they believe a Jordanian security court has
overridden the civilian courts on the matter of Ra'ed
Hijazi's appeal of his death sentence (ref A). The issue
will ultimately be decided by the Court of Cassation, not by
the Security Court.
GNEHM