Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03AMMAN1433
2003-03-11 09:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

LOOKING AHEAD: JORDANIAN ELECTIONS AFTER AN IRAQ

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM IZ JO MEPP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001433 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD: JORDANIAN ELECTIONS AFTER AN IRAQ
WAR: A CHANCE TO SHOWCASE DEMOCRACY?

REF: AMMAN 1336

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001433

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD: JORDANIAN ELECTIONS AFTER AN IRAQ
WAR: A CHANCE TO SHOWCASE DEMOCRACY?

REF: AMMAN 1336

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) We believe it is essential that we start to think
seriously about Jordan's position in a post-Iraq war
environment: what the GOJ will expect us to do, and how
Jordan can contribute to achieving our longer term regional
goals. Assuming that a military campaign is of limited
duration and fully successful, the King will focus on a
number of issues soon after military action ceases. These
will include pushing for (1) a renewed U.S. emphasis on the
MEPP and (2) a positive and credible U.S. message to the
region that will reinforce his own domestic reform efforts.


2. (C) Looking to our own priorities, Jordan's parliamentary
elections now scheduled for June 17 (reftel) will offer an
important (and probably the first post-war) opportunity for
the U.S. to highlight and encourage democracy in the Arab
world. Given the deep skepticism that permeates Arab
perceptions of U.S. ambitions in the region, we will need to
quickly find ways to demonstrate that our democratizing
rhetoric prior to military action is translated into concrete
and positive expression following it. Jordanian
Parliamentary elections that are free, fair, and credible
could help provide a timely model for the President's vision
of a reformed and progressive Middle East. To that end, we
should think at two levels: (1) helping create the broader
political context in the region that will facilitate the kind
of campaign and election results that support our interests
in broadening democracy in the Arab world generally, and (2)
providing (at a programmatic level and with a light touch)
assistance that facilitates the electoral process without
appearing to meddle. If we do this right, it could have
positive effects not only for Jordan, but for our influence,
both long and short-term, in the Post-Saddam Middle East.
End Summary.

-------------- ---
A Reenergized MEPP:
Step 1 in Rebuilding Credibility with The Street
-------------- ---



3. (C) As the King, FM and PM have all made clear to senior
Washington decision makers, there is no more important issue
in the hearts and minds of Jordanians than Palestine. The
relentless conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, and
the belief among most here that the U.S. has abdicated its
historic role as "honest broker," has done more to hurt U.S.
credibility with the average Jordanian than any other single
factor -- and, in turn, has forced the GOJ to adopt a
defensive tone when characterizing the U.S.-Jordan
relationship to its citizens.


4. (C) In order to begin to reverse this current reality, the
King will press us to move forward quickly to reenergize the
MEPP and demonstrate clearly the political will to restart
serious negotiations, press Israel to take positive steps,
and forge a solution that brings peace and security to both
Israelis and Palestinians. In and of itself, such an
approach will not mend our frayed image and influence.
Without it, however, the task is likely to be impossible.

--------------
A Message We (And He) Can Take to the People
--------------


5. (C) A broader USG message should also address the
corrosive effects of months of virulent anti-American
rhetoric throughout the region. By demonstrating -- through
our actions not only our words -- that we are on the side of
average people, and that our actions are emphatically not "a
war against Islam," the greater resonance our efforts will
have with Jordanian audiences. This will help not only to
rebuild a pro-U.S. constituency in the Kingdom, but will also
help support the King's own program to steer Jordan in a
progressive, pro-Western direction.

-------------- --------------
June 17 Elections: Showcasing Democracy in the Arab World
-------------- --------------


6. (C) As we consider what the King and GOJ will ask of us
and how we can help Jordan after a war, we should recognize
that political developments here will inevitably contribute
greatly to the pattern of our goals and strategy for the
region in the eyes of Jordanians and all their neighbors. An
important marker in this regard will be the upcoming
Parliamentary elections -- which the PM recently announced
would be held on June 17. If handled adroitly, these
elections may offer a timely opportunity to highlight the
possibilities and promise of democracy in the Arab world.


7. (C) It is in our interests -- and the GOJ's -- that these
elections be inclusive, spirited, and reflect a broad debate
on Jordan's future. The structure of the elections --
single-member constituencies -- will almost certainly result
in a pro-Hashemite majority, but one with traditional tribal
views. That said, we would also want to see an end result
that reflects a genuine commitment to democratic reforms.


8. (C) In our view, the best way to accomplish this objective
is to help create the broader political context that
neutralizes those issues that detract attention from that
agenda: the most obvious example being Palestine. The
relative popularity of the Islamic Action Front (IAF),the
political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, is rooted more in
its steadfast rhetorical support for the Palestinian cause
and opposition to an Iraq war than in its policy
prescriptions for Jordan. If we can take those two hot
button issues off the table, and the GOJ can show near-term
tangible benefits for Jordanians following the cessation of
hostilities, the likelihood of a strong showing by pro-reform
candidates could increase significantly.


9. (C) In addition to taking policy steps to help create a
more favorable political climate for democratic progress, we
should also look for ways that the U.S. can help facilitate
the election process itself programatically. Given the deep
suspicions that the U.S. intends to "redraw the map" and
impose its own political design on the Arabs, we must
scrupulously avoid any appearance of trying to influence the
election's outcome. Whenever possible we should assist the
elections through NGO's and follow a multinational approach,
possibly in cooperation with the Europeans and Japanese. We
should also ensure that any assistance to candidates (e.g.
speaker programs or training) be available to all potential
candidates who do not pose any security concerns. Clearly,
this is a delicate matter for the GOJ. That said, a careful
offering of traditionally successful programs such as guest
speakers on democracy and voter education programs could
provide useful ways to spur popular interest and solidify
credibility for the event and its outcome. If done right,
the Jordanian example could help communicate to a wider
regional audience that the vision of reform in the middle
east is neither a distant possibility, nor a scheme to
benefit outsiders in the West.


10. (C) We should also recognize that the elections and the
campaign period leading up to them is likely to come during a
period in which the economy is buffeted by the loss of the
"special" economic relationship with Iraq that Jordan has
enjoyed for the past decade in terms of cut price oil
supplies and a protected market for Jordanian exports. The
end of this relationship, plus the effects of lower tourism
and export revenues expected to coincide with a war, is
likely to mean job losses for low income Jordanians and
higher prices for some oil products. To some extent, these
effects will be concentrated in areas of the country --
poorer parts of Amman and the south -- that have been the
biggest beneficiaries of the Iraq relationship.


11. (C) The short-term economic consequences of a war are
likely to strain Jordan's political fabric, and to test the
commitment to sound economic policies and fiscal discipline
that has undergirded the impressive strength of recent
economic performance. The King and his advisers are counting
on economic assistance from the United States and other
countries (including Gulf oil suppliers) to blunt the
economic and political impact of these short-term disruptions
by smoothing out the adjustment process over time. Still,
maintaining the balance between smoothing the economic
adjustment and avoiding loss of macroeconomic control in a
pre-election environment will be a delicate issue on which we
will have to work closely with the Jordanians.
GNEHM