PLO REFUGEE AFFAIRS OFFICIAL QUIETLY TRYING TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000014

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y////PARAS TWO AND FOUR////

DEPT FOR NEA AND PRM

E.O. 12958:DECL:12/31/12
TAGS: PREL PREF KPAL KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT: PLO REFUGEE AFFAIRS OFFICIAL QUIETLY TRYING TO
LAY GROUNDWORK FOR COMPROMISE ON RIGHT OF RETURN

REF: A) JERUSALEM 3982

B) JERUSALEM 3541

CLASSIFIED BY DCM GREG BERRY PER 1.5 (b) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Jordan-based PLO Refugee Affairs official
Mohamed Abu Bakr told refcoord December 24 that he and West
Bank Refugee Affairs Director Saji Salameh are quietly
trying to prepare the Palestinian refugee community for
what they see as an inevitable compromise on the right of
return. Working in secret -- and without the knowledge of
either Abu Mazen or de facto PLO Refugee Affairs Department
head Marwan Abdelhamid -- Abu Bakr and Salameh are seeking
funding from the Canadian and Norwegian governments for
public opinion surveys and a broad public relations
campaign that would convince Palestinians of the need to
think pragmatically about right of return. Abu Bakr said
they will not raise the proposal with PLO or PA leadership
until they have received Canadian and Norwegian reaction to
their proposal. End summary.


2. (C) In a December 24 meeting with refcoord, Jordan-
based PLO Department of Refugee Affairs Director (for
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) Mohamed
Abu Bakr dismissed as "nonsense" the notion that "five
million Palestinians will return to a country of five
million Israelis." Abu Bakr told refcoord that
Palestinians need to think pragmatically about the right of
return and start preparing public opinion now for an
eventual, inevitable compromise. In order to do so, Abu
Bakr said, the PLO must conduct studies and surveys of the
entire Palestinian population, including those not
typically included in the diaspora such as the 45,000 1948
refugees believed to be resident in Iraq. Abu Bakr
believes that any settlement made without a comprehensive
survey will not last, as the absence of a unified
Palestinian position would provide a pretext for
rejectionists to disavow and destroy the settlement.


3. (C) In order to prepare the groundwork for what they
see as an inevitable compromise, Abu Bakr said that he and
PLO Refugee Affairs West Bank Director Saji Salameh are
seeking funding from the Canadian and Norwegian governments
to conduct studies and surveys, followed by a wide-scale
public relations campaign to convince Palestinians of the
need to compromise on the right of return. Abu Bakr
cautioned that neither Abu Mazen nor de facto head of the
Department of Palestinian Affairs Marwan Abdelhamid are
aware of this plan; neither he nor Salameh wanted to raise
the proposal until they had received an initial reaction
and hopefully a promise of funding from the Canadians and
the Norwegians. Salameh was to have meet with the
Canadians on the margins of a late November Geneva forum on
compensation, but was unable to travel due to health
problems. Abu Bakr promised to brief refcoord as soon as
he had reaction from the Canadians and Norwegians.


4. (C) When queried about the timing of his proposal --
and specifically why Abu Bakr believes Palestinians might
be receptive to the idea of compromise when the situation
on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza had deteriorated so
dramatically over the last two years -- Abu Bakr said the
Palestinians havc "no choice" but to compromise. (Note:
PLO Refugee Affairs West Bank Director Salameh appears to
have reversed his early position that the timing wasn't
right for a public debate on the issue -- see ref b.)
Although political realities dictate that PLO and PA
officials must use "different language" when discussing the
right of return in public, Abu Bakr said that more
pragmatic statements, such as those made by Sari Nusseibeh,
reflect the reality of the PA's position. While little
appears to be moving on a political level between the
Israelis and the Palestinians, Abu Bakr believes that the
Palestinians cannot afford to waste time by not pushing
forward on their own internal political issues. Should the
Israelis decided to negotiate, Abu Bakr said, political
progress could come very quickly and the Palestinian public
needs to be convinced of the importance of compromise. To
this end, Abu Bakr and Salameh havc decided to change the
focus of the Department of Refugee Affairs, away from
humanitarian assistance projects and toward broader
political mobilization such as their proposed survey and PR
campaign.


5. (C) Comment: Given the vehemence with which the PLO
publicly denounced Sari Nusseibeh's October 2002 proposal
for compromise on the right of return (ref a),it is
unlikely that the PLO leadership will publicly embrace Abu
Bakr and Salameh's proposal. Yet their proposal reflects a
core truth essential to any long-term settlement: that the
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y/////PARAS TWO AND FOUR//////
Palestinian public -- both within the West Bank and Gaza
and elsewhere -- will need to be convinced of the
importance of compromise on the right of return. Only a
serious internal Palestinian debate will reduce the gap
between public and private PLO rhetoric on this pivotal
question -- though the present circumstances hardly seem
propitious for a dispassionate discussion of anything
connected with the refugee issue.


6. (U) ConGen Jerusalem cleared this cable.

GNEHM