MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS: POST INPUT FOR JORDAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001081

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER JO
SUBJECT: MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS: POST INPUT FOR JORDAN

REF: STATE 36950

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) This message responds to reftel request for input on
the MANPADS situation in Jordan. Answers are keyed to
questions posed in reftel paras 7-13.

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General Information
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2. (S) Jordan possesses a limited stock of MANPADS, all of
which are under the physical control of the Jordanian Armed
Forces (JAF). The JAF has/had old U.S.-made Redeye MANPADS
but it is likely these systems, which were phased out of the
active U.S inventory more than 20 years ago and are well past
their shelf life, are no longer functional. The JAF does not
have any open FMS Repair and Return cases on the Redeye,
which most likely means they are no longer maintaining the
system. The JAF does, however, have operational
Russian-origin SA-8 and SA-13 MANPADS in an Air Defense
battalion. To confirm numbers and serviceability status of
the Redeyes and SA-8/13s would require bilateral coordination
with the JAF.


3. (S) Thus far, no MANPADS have been seized in Jordan
during interdiction operations, although the Kingdom has been
a very active weapons smuggling location for terrorist groups
including Hizbullah, Hamas, PIJ, IRGC and al-Qaeda. That
said, the quantity and sophistication of other weapons that
have been confiscated raise the possibility that
terrorist-linked groups in Jordan could seek to obtain
MANPADS now or in the future.

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Government Cooperation
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4. (S) The U.S. maintains an extremely close and productive
working relationship with the GOJ on a wide range of
military, security, anti-terrorism, political and economic
issues. As part of this overall relationship, and within the
constraints of Jordan's limited resources, we can expect the
GOJ to respond very cooperatively to a U.S. effort to
strengthen MANPADS anti-proliferation measures.


5. (S) Jordan, with USG assistance, continues to strengthen
its border security operations. USG has worked closely with
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) in the deployment
of detection and screening equipment in border areas.
Similarly, FMF funding for the JAF has devoted considerable
resources to enhancing the Kingdom's ability to patrol and
stop infiltration along its long borders. The JAF recognizes
that the groups that would use MANPADS for terrorist attacks
pose a threat to the GOJ and foreign targets alike and thus
the JAF, GID, and PSD are partners in preventing MANPADS from
falling into the wrong hands. As an example, Sky Marshals
for the national airline -- Royal Jordanian (RJ) -- are drawn
from the ranks of serving JAF officers and many JAF generals
are alumni of this program.


6. (S) Having noted Jordan's overall commitment to counter
MANPADS and other threats, it is important to recognize that
the GOJ's tools have certain limitations. For instance, the
JAF's standards for security and storage areas for these
weapons may not be equal to those of the U.S. The JAF would
likely welcome any U.S.-funded upgrade to JAF MANPAD storage
facilities. In an similar vein, the Kingdom's export control
laws and legal enforcement mechanisms could benefit greatly
from USG training and assistance. The planned NP-sponsored
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
program would address some of these shortcomings in designing
and implementing a national export control system. The GOJ's
receptivity for such training is indicative of a broader
recognition that it needs to shore up legal and other
deficiencies in its control of goods exported from or in
transit through Jordan.
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Feasible Arguments
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7. (S) The GOJ is acutely aware of, and is actively
combating, threats posed by terrorist groups seeking to use
MANPADS, WMD and/or other weapons to wreak economic havoc on
the local or international economy. The GOJ's success in
uncovering the Millennium Plot in which al-Qaeda cells
planned to execute mass casualty terrorist attacks on hotels
and other tourist sites in the Kingdom is testament to the
seriousness with which it views such possibilities. The
national air carrier -- Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) -- is
owned by the state. A successful MANPADs attack on one of
its planes would have deeply negative consequences not only
for RJ but for Jordan's overall business climate. The GOJ,
as it seeks to build Jordan's tourism sector and reform its
economy, would be responsive to efforts aimed at lessening
MANPADS threats.

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Financial Incentives
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8. (C) Any GOJ concern about participating in a coordinated
MANPADS anti-proliferation strategy would stem not from a
philosophical disagreement but rather from a lack of
resources. Earmarking USG funds for the destruction,
purchase, or enhanced storage of MANPADS in JAF stocks would
be a useful incentive in this regard.

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Government Contacts and Engagement Opportunities
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9. (C) The JAF, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
and the Public Security Directorate (PSD) are the GOJ
agencies that would be most usefully engaged in a bilateral
MANPADS strategy. When NP's EXBS program begins later in
2003, we believe it would offer a useful forum to engage
these government bodies and other relevant GOJ players on
MANPADS. Similarly, future visits by senior Washington
policymakers to Jordan on CT and military/security issues
should highlight the importance of countering MANPADS threats
as part of their overall bilateral presentations.
GNEHM