Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA945
2003-05-27 13:39:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Oil

Tags:  CASC ASEC PREL PTER EPET NI 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000945 

SIPDIS


E.O.12958: DECL: 1.6x1
TAGS: CASC ASEC PREL PTER EPET NI
SUBJECT: Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Oil
Workers in Nigeria

Ref: TD 315/21866-03


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason:
1.5(c)


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000945

SIPDIS


E.O.12958: DECL: 1.6x1
TAGS: CASC ASEC PREL PTER EPET NI
SUBJECT: Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to U.S. Oil
Workers in Nigeria

Ref: TD 315/21866-03


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason:
1.5(c)



1. (SBU) The Mission understands that consideration
is being given to issuing a revised travel warning for
Nigeria to make specific mention of a possible
terrorist threat to U.S. oil facilities in Nigeria.
Given the dated and speculative nature of the possible
threat, the Mission strongly urges the Department to
consider carefully and fully the implications of
taking such an action.



2. (SBU) The Mission's two EACs (Embassy Abuja and
Consulate General Lagos) met during the week of May
19, and concluded that the information contained in
the referenced report did not warrant issuance of a
warden message or revision of the existing travel
warning for Nigeria to make specific mention of a
possible terrorist threat to oil facilities. U.S. oil
companies operating in Nigeria and American citizens
living here are acutely aware of security issues, and
possible threat emanating from within and outside
Nigeria. The possibility of an attack similar to
those perpetrated against the U.S.S. Cole and the
French tanker is clear to U.S. oil company managers,
and they ensure security awareness of their personnel
through in-house newsletters, emails, and other media.



3. (SBU) The oil-producing Niger Delta is a rough
neighborhood. Security incidents involving aggrieved
Nigerian employees or disaffected local inhabitants
are not unusual. U.S. and other companies operating
in the area maintain a constant state of vigilance.
While a terrorist attack would be qualitatively
different from an extortion attempt, many of the
measures a company would take to deter the former are
the same as those that would be taken to reduce the
chances of the latter. And, again, the companies are
aware that their facilities could be the target of a
terrorist attack.



4. (S/NF) Let us be clear about the quality and
timeliness of the information contained in the
referenced intelligence. The source is someone whose
reliability is unknown and who might have reason to

confuse or misdirect us. Moreover, the source
"recently recalled" a conversation from the year 2000
that the source had with a senior Al-Qaida figure, in
which the senior Al-Qaida figure said he had sent
someone to Nigeria for an unspecified purpose that
might have been surveillance of oil installations.
The source does not know that the Al-Qaida envoy
conducted any surveillance in Nigeria, much less that
the target of the surveillance (if there was any) was
oil installations. All the source really knows (if
the source is reliable, and, of course, we do not know
that) is that the journey took 45 days.



5. (SBU) The crucial question we need to ask is:
"What do we know as a result of this new information
that we did not know before?" We in the Mission do
not believe we know anything more of substance. The
follow-on question would be: "What can we say to the
oil companies that would help them be better prepared
than they already are for a possible attack?" We in
the Mission believe they are already as prepared as
the state of our current knowledge would warrant; we
should not unnerve them with speculation cloaked in
the guise of actionable intelligence, especially
intelligence that gathered nearly three year ago.



6. (C) In an email dated 24 May 2003, DS/ITA said it
"strongly feels that updating the travel warning
solely / solely on this one threat report would not /
not be sound. Not appropriate. ...it was confirmed
that the threat information was outdated and very
speculative in nature. However, DS/ITA does feel
(stating the obvious) that U.S. oil companies /
offshore oil rigs in Nigeria will always be "high
profile" targets. As noted in previous emails, U.S.
oil companies completely understand the security
environment in which they operate."



7. (S/NF) The Mission agrees. Were we to issue a
warning about a possible threat to oil installations,
we would have to provide context, i.e., that the
information is three years old and of questionable
reliability. If we did that, the U.S. oil companies
would wonder why we bothered. Being less specific
(e.g., the original tearline for the referenced TD:
"As of early May 2003, Al-Qaida may have been
considering attacks against U.S.-flagged oil tankers
and U.S. oil companies in Nigeria") risks leading our
fellow citizens and U.S. oil companies to conclude
that we have something new or "hot." Risk-averse
shipping and insurance companies would also wonder
what we know. We could see tankers refuse to call at
Nigerian ports and/or sharp rises in insurance rates
for tankers and rigs. U.S. economic interests and the
employment prospects of some AmCits in the industry
could be at risk. Do we want to run those risks on
the basis of "outdated and speculative" information?
We think not.



8. (C) In conclusion, the Mission agrees with DS/ITA.
Unless we have something more than the referenced TD
and the recent worldwide caution -- something current
and specific to Nigeria, we believe U.S. oil companies
in Nigeria are sufficiently concerned about and most
of their AmCit employees adequately aware of the
global terrorist threat to U.S. oil interests.
Because their security-consciousness is so high, any
warning other than one that makes clear how dated and
speculative the information is risks being confusing
and misleading rather than enlightening. If the
Department has information that would tend to confirm
the referenced TD, the Mission would like to receive
it, so that the EACs might consider it.



9. (SBU) The Mission is in the process of updating
the Travel Warning for Nigeria. We would like to
defer submission of a new text until after June 4. By
then a week will have elapsed since the Presidential
inauguration, and we will have a better idea of the
overall security climate.
JETER