NIGERIA: WARRI CRISIS COMING TO A HEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000718

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR AF AND DRL
.
CAIRO FOR J.MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013
TAGS: PGOV PINS EPET NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: WARRI CRISIS COMING TO A HEAD


REF: A. DAO ABUJA IIR 6 B871 0098 03 (17APR03)

B. ABUJA 716


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


1.(C) Summary: In the dense mangrove swamps of Delta State,
a group of perhaps 300 militant and well-armed Ijaw youths
last month was able to shut down over 40 percent of Nigeria's
oil production, costing over USD one billion to date.
Although initially emanating from a local political dispute,
this crisis is also the product of the environment of easy
money, lawlessness, and ethnic chauvinism characterizing this
turbulent region. As the youths continue to issue public
threats to disrupt elections and attack oil facilities, the
Federal Government, oil companies and even the traditional
Ijaw leadership, appear stumped and unable to find a
solution. Bluntly put, the GON is at an armed impasse with
the Ijaw militants. Unless the Ijaws back down, the GON is
likely to attack them. The countdown to military action will
likely be after the elections, and that countdown may have
already started. End Summary.


The Ijaw
--------------


2.(C) The Ijaws assert they are Nigeria's fourth largest
ethnic group, numbering over 8 million. Two organizations
based in Port Harcourt claim to represent the "Ijaw Nation"
which spans across five states -- the Ijaw National Congress
(INC) and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). Historically, the INC
has been more conservative. The more aggressive IYC drafted
the 1998 Kaiama Declaration that called for the cessation of
oil production until Ijaw political and environmental
grievances were heard and addressed. There are some 22 Ijaw
clans spread out across the coastal swamps of the states of
Ondo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom. Only two of
these are involved in the current crisis in Warri -- the
Gbaramatu and Egbeme.


3.(C) The village that appears to be the base of operations
for the Ijaw militants is Okenrenkoko, a former Itsekiri
village on the Escravos creek in Warri Southwest. According
to NGO workers who have talked to Gbaramatu youths, these
militants are radicalized and are now beyond the control of
traditional village or clan leaders. One NGO worker building
a school in a nearby village was confronted by a Gbaramatu
youth who said, "I could kill you right now and it wouldn't
mean a thing to me." Older Ijaws admit these Delta creek
youths are outside the traditional authority structure. They
have become an anti-establishment gang.


4.(C) Many of these youths have been used to receiving
direct payments from the oil companies to refrain from
vandalizing oil installations or threatening oil companies'
personnel. Disbursed under the guise of a community guard or
watch program, these payments average the equivalent of $300
per month. These widespread individual payments, coupled
with the companies' continued practice of paying communities
or youth groups to resolve incidents such as hostage takings
or demonstrations, have underminded indigenous institutions,
delegitimized traditional leaders, and created a culture of
criminality. Education, vocational skills, and community
elders are no longer held in high esteem; capacity to disrupt
or to be violent has become the coin of the realm. Uneducated
criminal youths have become the local power elite.


5.(C) Though the demands of these Delta State Ijaws may
diverge from the aspirations of the larger Ijaw body, the INC
and IYC leaders feel restrained to disagree publicly with
those militants for fear of being labeled a sell-out or being
the victim of reprisals. In an early April meeting with
Embassy's Corporate Responsibility Officer (CRO),the IYC
President admitted that the Gbaramatu youth did not
coordinate their actions with IYC leadership. However, the
IYC would not condemn the Delta militants' use of force or
threats to destroy oil installation; the IYC is in solidarity
with their struggle, he declared.


6.(C) That struggle is somewhat hard to understand given the
lack of clear leadership or representation of this anarchic
armed gang in Warri Southwest. Despite repeated pleas from
the government and even some Ijaw elders to stop fighting and
rescind the threats to oil facilities, the Gbaramatu
militants have yet to tone down their political demands for
increased representation among the ten electoral wards of the
Warri Southwest Local Government Area (LGA) and their grander
economic demands of some control over oil company operations
in "Ijaw-land." A recent statement, attributed to the group,
proclaimed that "all the oil companies that vacated Ijaw
territory should sign a memorandum of understanding with the
Ijaw communities with respect to the development of the area
. . .before resuming production." In short, these youth are
advocating an inchoate yet militant nationalism. They claim
the land is theirs, so the oil under it also belongs to them.
Thus, they also must be included as one of the important
ethnic groups in Nigeria. Instead of talking about the big
three (Yoruba, Hasua-Fulani, and Igbo) there should now be
the big four.


The Itsekiri
--------------


7.(C) Although fewer in number (estimated population of
300,000),the Itsekiri are the descendents of the 600
year-old Warri Kingdom. They have far greater representation
in local and state political circles and, as stated recently
by several Ijaw leaders, they have a more effective public
relations effort, with great influence over at least one
major newspaper (The Vanguard),which is owned by an
Itsekiri. The are viewed as the victims in the Warri
violence, and have vowed not to send the displaced Itsekiri
(most currently camped in Warri and Sapele towns) back to
their villagers until the Ijaw youths are subdued. House of
Representatives member for the Warri area Temi Harriman
(ethnic Itsekiri) and Itsekiri leader Chief Rita Lori told
POLCOUNS recently that they are demanding federal action be
taken to protect the "Warri Kingdom" of Itsekiri.


Boycotting and Disrupting the Vote
--------------


8.(C) All of the Gbaramatu and part of the Egbeme clan --
together making up a majority of the Warri Southwest
population -- boycotted the 1999 elections and boycotted the
voters registration for the 2003 elections. Not content with
abstaining from the polls, the militant Gbaramatu and Egbeme
have sought to disrupt all polls in the three Warri LGAs.
Chief E.K. Clark, a local Warri Ijaw leader explained to CRO
that the Ijaws would not tolerate an election that would
yield inadequate Ijaw representation. (Note: Since they
failed to register although they are more numerous than the
Itsekiri, this is tantamount to saying elections should never
be held in Warri. This is another manifestation of militant
ethnic chauvinism. Since the Ijaw claim to "own" the land,
the GON has no right to hold elections that would help their
rivals, the Itsekiri. End Note)


9.(C) A violent April 11 attack on the Warri North LGA
capital of Koko by Gbaramatu youth contributed to the
postponement of the National Assembly elections in the three
Warri area LGAs by a day. Dan Ekpedibe of the Federated
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (lately serving as the
mouthpiece for the militant Gbaramatu and Egbeme youth)
stated April 15 that "We are going to make sure on Saturday
(April 19) there won't be any election in our area."


The Lucrative Business of Bunkering
--------------


10.(C) Both Itsekiri and Ijaw are guilty of bunkering,
according to GON officials and oil company executives, but
the more numerous and maritime Ijaw most likely have the
lion's share of this trade in stolen oil. Tapping into
Shell's pipelines and flow stations in Warri Southwest and
North at night, hoses are run to small tankers and barges
that come up the creeks to load the stolen crude. These
sophisticated operations must be sanctioned by some senior
officials in Abuja, according to Shell's MD and other GON
officials. According to a GON source, Naval personnel are
also involved, but they rely on the help of well armed Ijaw
militants to secure the tapped pipelines and hookup the hoses
to the tankers.


11.(C) Shell claims it loses 80,000-100,000 barrels per day
to this illegal bunkering. Multiple oil industry sources and
ethnic leaders subscribe to the belief that the Warri crisis
started as the result of a oil bunkering deal between corrupt
Nigerian Navy officers and Ijaw militants gone sour: the Navy
opened fire on the militants and a full fight ensued. In a
recent meeting with Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo
confirmed that Navy personnel stationed in the Warri area
were involved in bunkering; he stated that the Navy Commander
responsible for Warri, Titus Aweyemi, and his deputy were
transferred to another post shortly after the crisis because
of their involvement in this illegal trade.


Companies cautiously resume . . .
--------------


12.(C) Although the two affected oil companies -- Shell and
Chevron-Texaco, have resumed limited production in Delta
State, all of this is south of the Warri LGAs or off shore.
The shortfall in pre-March production is running on the order
of 300-400,000 barrels-per-day. While the oil companies'
continue to state publicly that they are awaiting further
calm in the local security situation before moving into the
creeks of Warri, there may be another more powerful factor.
Shell's Director for External Relations, Precious Omuku, told
CRO that Shell is concerned that the Army will carry out
reprisal attacks on the Ijaw soon after the April 19
elections. This view is widely shared by NGOs in the area.
The recent movement of approximately 1,000 Ijaw from villages
to central towns such as Warri and Obe-Ijoh -- reportedly
because they fear imminent military reprisals -- add further
weight to this view.


While GON pushes peace . . .
--------------


13.(C) On the surface, the Federal Government continues to
show patience and restraint. The Ijaw's repeated protests
that the Army is planning a reprisal attack on their
communities have been met by cool reassurances from the Army
spokesmen both in Abuja and in Warri that force would not be
the answer to this crisis. Seeming to reinforce that
message, President Obasanjo summoned Ijaw and Itsekiri
leaders to Abuja for an April 7 meeting to "find a lasting
solution to the Warri crisis." This "Warri Summit" led to the
forming of a committee chaired by Minister of Defense Danjuma
that began meeting immediately.


Power Shift Among Ijaw
--------------


14.(C) This crisis is not new to Delta State, but rather a
close repetition of Ijaw-Itsekiri fighting that broke out
almost six years to the day -- in early March 1997. At that
time, Ijaw went on the rampage after the military
administrator for Delta State changed the capital of the
Warri Southwest LGA from Obe-Ijoh (Ijaw village) to Ogidigben
(Itsekiri village). That outbreak of violence left many
Itsekiri villages in ruins, but was resolved peacefully.
(Note: The Warri Southwest LGA capital was moved back to
Obe-Ijoh in 2002 as the result of Delta State Assembly
legislation. end Note)


15.(C) The Ijaw aggressors in the current violence, however,
appear more radicalized and much better armed than their
brethren six years earlier. This gang of some 300 Ijaw youth
are armed with new assault rifles and rocket-propelled
grenade (RPG) launchers and are aided by a fleet of fast
speedboats. They have made the former Itsekiri village of
Okerenkoko their home. From this village situated
strategically on the north bank of the Escravos Creek, they
can control a major waterway while conducting attacks
throughout Warri Southwest and Warri South LGAs. According
to GON and oil industry sources, they barter some of their
stolen oil for weapons, ensuring a steady flow of arms into
the region.


The Pressures
--------------


16.(C) To date, the GON has hewed to the path of dialogue in
addressing the conflict, but most observers believe this is
because it has no other choice at the moment. A large-scale
attack by the Army and Navy would probably be indiscriminate
and result in significant human rights violations. This would
be politically costly for President Obasanjo and his PDP
governor of Delta State just before elections. The two
ethnic factions in this crisis, however, have little faith in
a dialogue and time is not on the side of the "doves" in the
GON seeking a negotiated settlement. With oil revenue losses
mounting, the post-April 19 government will be under pressure
to end this stalemate. During an April 17 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, Shell Managing Director Ron Van den Berg
predicted a military campaign against the Ijaw soon after the
April 19 elections. Indications of this have been given by
Defense Minister Danjuma, who told the Ambassador on April 16
that only "overwhelming force" would resolve this problem
(ref A),and by the Director of the State Security Service
(SSS) who told the Ambassador April 11 that an "enforcement
action" would be launched soon against the Ijaw militants
(ref B).


Comment and Forecast
--------------


17.(C) The Warri crisis is clearly embedded in an historic
inter-ethnic feud over land and resource control. The
purported political demands of the lawless Ijaw youth,
however, smack of attempting to place a thin veneer of
legitimacy over ongoing criminal enterprises (the large-scale
theft of oil). It seems illogical to demand additional
electoral wards when all affected Ijaw have effectively
boycotted the electoral process. The opportunity to extort
the oil companies and the government through their use of
force is a far more likely driving force behind the armed
toughs. 80,000 bpd at $15 per barrel would be $1.2 million
per day for the Ijaw criminals and their associates, with no
production costs to cover.


18.(C) Ijaw elders see the looming military reprisals on the
horizon but seem helpless to improve the prospects for
peaceful reconciliation. The absence of alternatives is all
too apparent. The GON appears to hold few prospects for the
peace dialogue it started in Abuja (read reftel) while the
pressures for a quick but bloody military solution mount as
conditions remain unstable in the economically vital area.
The only effective solution many see is force, overwhelming
force.


19.(C) A large-scale military operation against the Ijaw is
very likely in the near future, despite our own and the oil
companies' best efforts to counsel restraint at the highest
levels of the GON. If taken, this action will probably lack
precision, resulting in human rights abuses and could again
shut down Shell and Chevron-Texaco oil production.
JETER