Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA715
2003-04-17 20:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NOT A GOOD TIME TO BE THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000715 

SIPDIS


NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER
CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT


DECL: 4/17/2008
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS NI
SUBJECT: NOT A GOOD TIME TO BE THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
IN NIGERIA

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reason
1.5 (b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000715

SIPDIS


NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER
CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT


DECL: 4/17/2008
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS NI
SUBJECT: NOT A GOOD TIME TO BE THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
IN NIGERIA

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reason
1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: The United States-Nigeria bilateral
relationship recently has experienced more friction
than has been noted for months. A confluence of
foreign policy differences, bilateral concerns, and
Nigeria's domestic politics produced this strain.
Disagreement over Iraq and our suspension of military
assistance clearly contributed to the dissonance.
However, the agent that really ionized the atmosphere
has been the edginess and cynical political
considerations influencing the GON psychology during
this pressurized election period. In short, some of
the President's advisors decided that wise diplomacy
did not make for good politics. Gauging U.S.
unpopularity due to Iraq, they saw that some
publicized U.S.-bashing might sway a few votes and
perhaps even distract some citizens from their
unhappiness with the GON's poor performance on key
issues. Thus, they decided, in an effort to appear
"even-handed," to bait the electorate by linking our
military suspension to GON opposition to the war on
Iraq. End Summary.



2. (C) The tripartite letter Obasanjo signed with
Presidents Wade and Mbeki was an ineffectual effort
that should have expired in the world of thought
before it entered the realm of action. Nevertheless,
the GON did not vociferously oppose our stance on
Iraq, not prior to the actual intervention and even
less now. Its opposition was consistently moderate in
both tone and substance. While we had hoped Nigeria
would have been more supportive, its position was not
so extreme as to portend the media fall-out that
ensued.



3. (C) However, for the GON, bad diplomacy equalled
good domestic politics. Given widespread opposition
in Nigeria to the war in Iraq, strategists within the
Administration figured electoral mileage could be had
by stating that our military assistance suspension was
in response to the GON stance on Iraq. By casting
this willful misrepresentation, they hoped to stir the
prickly nationalism of elites, Northerners and
Southerners alike, all too aware of the centrifugal

forces that affect their country. Doing so would lay
to rest accusations that Obasanjo was so intent on
doing America's bidding that he had become "Yoruba
First, the United States Second, and Nigeria Third."
Publicly slapping the U.S. would, these strategists
hoped, counter the President's pro-American
reputation, helping him particularly in the North,
where his support is the weakest and the risk of not
reaching the 25% threshhold therefore highest.



4. (C) Moreover, but less importantly, Obasanjo
strategists felt this tack also would shift attention
away from the true reason for our assistance
suspension. After having said that the suspension was
due to Washington's anger over Nigeria's policy on
Iraq, it would be difficult and nigh unpatriotic for
any opposition politician to correct the record by
pointing to the unresolved questions surrounding Benue
massacre. If so, that politician ran the risk as
being labeled the new American lackey. Creating this
fake linkage with Iraq helped minimize the impact of
our military assistance suspension as a campaign issue
and muted people from raising the Benue massacre as an
issue as well. The GON's chief flack, Information
Minister Jerry Gana went a step beyond the original
words of the never-helpful Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs (Dubem Onyia),lashing out at the U.S.
during a regular weekly media brief for presuming to
know Nigeria's national interests better than its own
leaders.



5. (C) In a recent discussion, Presidential Special
Advisor on International Affairs Ad'Obe Obe told
Ambassador Jeter "it was not a good time to be the
American Ambassador in Nigeria." Among the Nigerian
political class, it was more popular to criticize
America right now and that reality had crept into the
electoral calculations of the President's team. Obe
admitted that veracity had become an easy casualty of
these electoral calculations. Obe claimed the
President had ordered a correction of the unfortunate
statements Onyia had used to precipitate this entire
episode. However, the "clarification" issued by Gana
merely compounded Onyia's sophistry. Obe said he
confronted Gana, who replied that the Onyia statement
was playing too well politically to be retracted.
COMMENT: In a spontaneous and undoubtedly somewhat
exaggerated remark to a Mission spouse at about this
time, Obe's wife exclaimed, "My whole country hates
America now, but I still love you!" END COMMENT.



6. (C) The Ambassador stressed to Obe that continued
public mis-statement of the U.S. position might play
well within this circle of advisors but it had begun
to irritate Washington. It projected a negative and
false image of the United States in Nigeria and
throughout Africa. This disservice could not simply
be cast aside to political exigency. The Ambassador
urged the GON to honor its promise to correct the
record; at the very least, the GON should cease and
desist from further negative comment on this issue.
He reminded Obe that if we were forced to clarify the
record, a USG statement would automatically focus
attention on the true cause of the assistance
suspension, the 2001 Benue massacre, presumably not an
issue that the GON would want to revive on the eve of
National Elections. Obe reiterated that a correction
would be too politically costly to contemplate but he
also understood that continued misrepresentation would
be costly as well. He said he would convey our
message.



7. (C) Comment: Since the Ambassador's conversation
with Obe, GON statements on the military suspension
have ended. Our message to Obe might have been
persuasive; but the cessation also likely reflects the
fact that the tale had lived out its immediate
utility. Also, senior GON officials had become far
too engrossed with the demands of campaigning in their
local government areas where this fiction and the
friction arising from it were far less useful tools.



8. (C) In any event, the clear U.S. victory in Iraq
and GON preoccupation with the elections have begun to
lessen the tension in the bilateral discourse.
However, the bilateral tension will spike again,
perhaps even higher, if our assessment of the
elections is critical. In an effort to impugn our
conclusion, Gana and Onyia would not be above claiming
that Nigeria's "stand against U.S. imperialism" (or
words to that effect) influenced our analysis.
JETER