NIGERIA: DEMARCHE: DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION CRUSHED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000637

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM SF ZI NI SADC
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMARCHE: DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION CRUSHED
IN ZIMBABWE


REF: STATE 76465


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons: 1.5 (B & D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter delivered the demarche
on Zimbabwe to President Obasanjo on March 26. At that
meeting he was joined by British High Commissioner Philip
Thomas. Allied with South Africa, the GON opposes
continued suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, and
wants to disband the Troika. Despite Mugabe's
recklessness, publicly ostracizing Mugabe remains
unacceptable to Obasanjo. For as long as he can, Obasanjo
will stick to an approach of private dialogue and mild
suasion in hopes of coaxing Mugabe to soften his violent
opposition to political reform. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Meeting with President Obasanjo March 26 to
discuss the crisis in the Niger Delta (septel),British
High Commissioner Philip Thomas and Ambassador Jeter used
the meeting as an opportunity to discuss Zimbabwe. In an
earlier meeting on the same day, Obasanjo's Foreign Affairs
Advisor Ad'obe Obe had mentioned that Commonwealth
Secretary General McKinnon had visited Abuja on March 25 to

SIPDIS
meet Obasanjo and plan next steps in light of the end of
the one year suspension of Zimbabwe (in March) and current
events in that country. After canvassing some Commonwealth
members, McKinnon had concluded there was a consensus for
extending the suspension, Ad'obe said.



3. (C) In the meeting later that night with Obasanjo he
confirmed that the GON disagreed with McKinnon's assertion.
South Africa also viewed continued suspension as
unacceptable and supported the reinstatement of Zimbabwe at
the expiry of the suspension in March. President Obasanjo
told Thomas and Jeter that he concurred with Mbeki's
position. McKinnon was mistaken about consensus within the
Commonwealth, Obasanjo contended. South Africa, Nigeria
and several other African states opposed extending Mugabe's
suspension. The Commonwealth was effectively at an impasse
- with Obasanjo and Mbeki representing one stream of
thought and McKinnon representing its antithesis.



4. (C) Obasanjo continued that McKinnon had developed a
list of "5-6" issues to raise with Mugabe (Obasanjo avoided
mentioning the specific issues.) Obasanjo revealed that
his gameplan was to visit Zimbabwe after the Nigerian
elections on April 19. In Zimbabwe he would personally
raise these issues with Mugabe and press him to deal with
these matters. It was clear that these issues were of
great concern within the Commonwealth, and it was in
Mugabe's interest to deal with them, Obasanjo declared,
contending that he "would find a way to help Mugabe out of
his current predicament."



5. (C) Obasanjo further stated that after delivering his
message to Mugabe, the Commonwealth should wait a
"reasonable period" to give Mugabe a chance to act. After
that, the body should decide if the Zimbabwean President
should be invited to the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting (CHOGM) if the suspension should be reactivated.
If Mugabe made favorable progress, Obasanjo said he favored
Mugabe's return to the fold in time to attend the CHOGM.



6. (C) Obasanjo also said he supported Mbeki's position
that the Troika (AUSTRALIA, South Africa and Nigeria)
should be disbanded. His chain of logic was that sanctions
should not be automatically extended since there was no
consensus in the Commonwealth for sanctions. If sanctions
were no longer valid, then the Troika had lost its reason
of existence.



7. (C) In response to Thomas' question about Mugabe
stepping down, Obasanjo responded the British were not
approaching this sensitive matter properly. Obasanjo said
he had no difficulty raising the issue of retirement with
Mugabe; the key was how to put the issue to him. Mugabe
had to be convinced that it would be in his own interests
to leave office, and that conclusion could not be reached
through direct confrontation with him.



8. (C) COMMENT: The Troika is split, perhaps irrevocably
so. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe became an "us versus them"
issue within the Troika with South Africa managing to pull
Nigeria its way. This probably did not take heavy exertion
on Pretoria's part. Still, there ultimately may be some
space between the Nigerian and South African positions.
Nigeria sides with South Africa on ending the suspension
and on the fate of the Troika; however, Nigeria also seems
to realize that, at some point in the not too distant
future, defending Zimbabwe will become untenable. For now,
however, Nigeria is seeking every out, not only for Mugabe,
but for itself.



9. (C) Comment Continued: Nigeria does not want to
condemn an old ally and a leader who once symbolized
African liberation. Thus, Nigeria will temporize and will
be loathe to criticize Mugabe too harshly. The Nigerian
preference is: (1) to meet with Mugabe in late April, (2)
in order to raise the "concerns" of the Commonwealth, (3)
with a decision on reinstating Zimbabwe (4) delayed until
Mugabe has a chance to address these concerns is
characteristic of this mind-set.


JETER