NIGERIA: CONCERN FOR CRISIS IN THE DELTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000629

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013
TAGS: EPET PREL MOPS PHUM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CONCERN FOR CRISIS IN THE DELTA


REF: A) ABUJA 555


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons:
1.5 (B & D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a March 26 evening meeting,
President Obasanjo, Ambassador Jeter and British High
Commissioner Philip Thomas discussed the ongoing
crisis in the oil-producing Niger Delta. Jeter and
Thomas expressed concern about the implications of a
continuing crisis on stability and on Nigeria's
economy. In the face of the violence that has already
taken place there, Jeter urged restraint by Nigerian
military units deployed to the area to contain the
Ijaw militants. Obasanjo inveighed against these
militants for killing several soldiers, commenting
that he would "do what I have to do as President" to
restore law and order. Despite the air of toughness
and emotion that permeated this meeting, GON action
has been relatively measured thus far, consistent with
the line expressed in the Ambassador's earlier
discussion with the President (Reftel). END SUMMARY.



2. (C) During a late night March 26 discussion of the
upheaval affecting the key oil producing areas in
Delta State, Obasanjo explained that "troops with
armor" had been ordered into the area, and that the
Army and Navy would do everything necessary to ensure
security on Nigeria's waterways. Accusing Ijaw
militants of killing four soldiers, Obasanjo condemned
them as "criminals," and said they would have to
answer for their misdeeds. As Head of State, it was
his duty to restore order. Jeter and Thomas expressed
concern that the conflict, if not properly handled,
could spill over into the entire Delta. Given the loss
of life and property destruction that has already
occurred, Ambassador Jeter counseled that the Nigerian
military show restraint and professionalism in
handling the local militants.



3. (C) Clearly agitated and angered, Obasanjo bristled
that he would "do what I have to do as President."
Obasanjo asked rhetorically, "What should I do?" He
then expressed his displeasure with the cutoff of
security assistance, something he did not do when
initially informed about the decision several weeks
ago.



4. (C) Obasanjo rebuffed the notion that the violence
was politically motivated, asserting instead that
illegal oil bunkering was at the heart of the matter.
He claimed to have removed the top Naval commander in
Warri, as well as his deputy for collusion in the
illegal bunkering. Obasanjo then stated that Delta
State Governor James Ibori had promised to apprehend
those responsible for killing the soldiers; if Ibori
did not produce the suspects, Obasanjo declared, "then
we will go in and find them."



5. (C) Meeting Minister of Defense Danjuma the
following day, BHC Thomas was treated to an even more
emotional encore. According to Thomas, Danjuma "blew
up." "They killed four of our soldiers," Danjuma
repeatedly said, "and we must do what we have to do."
Danjuma chided Thomas by asking how he could offer
advice on the Delta region, "given what you are doing
in Iraq."



6. (C) COMMENT: Obasanjo knows that he is in a
delicate position at the worst of all conceivable
times -- the eve of elections. On the one hand, he
wants to end this crisis quickly to get downstream oil
facilities back on line before the economy feels the
pinch. Taking strong action to punish the soldiers'
killers and restore the authority of the army is added
incentive to talk tough and perhaps move quickly.
However, Obasanjo also knows that an aggressively
offensive strategy could produce another Odi or the
Zaki-Biam, a development that could dim his electoral
chances and further diminish Nigeria internationally.



7. (C) COMMENT CONT. This will be a complex dilemma
for Obasanjo. A key will be figuring out what exactly
the Ijaw militants want. After taking control of this
key oil producing area, it seems implausible that they
will drop their weapons and simply hand themselves
over to the authorities. More to the point, much
depends on the leeway Obasanjo feels he has to resolve
this issue. This has been a stiff challenge to GON
authority; the militants have bested some of his
soldiers and scared away international oil firms; by
possession of key oil installations, have held the
country's economy to ransom. Obasanjo cannot easily
swallow a deal that allows the culprits to walk away.
However, if the perpetrators know they will be
severely punished, they have little incentive to give
up. Resolution of crisis lies in Obasanjo's ability to
identify an out for both sides.



8. (C) COMMENT CONT. Last, speculation is rife about
who is actually behind this crisis. For many, this
challenge looks too organized and strong to have been
entirely the work of local authors. Some people point
the finger at Delta Governor Ibori. Many others see
even more distant and powerful hands, including former
Head of State Babangida, in the mix. They believe
Babangida and his ilk stoked this turmoil as part of a
larger plan to create enough unrest that would scuttle
the elections. (Septel will provide a more detailed
analysis of these points.)


JETER