NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO'S STRATEGY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000555

SIPDIS


NSC FOR JENDAYI FRAZER
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 03/22/13
TAGS: EPET ASEC CASC PGOV PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO'S STRATEGY FOR
HANDLING VIOLENT UPSURGE IN THE DELTA


REF: A) LAGOS 575
- B) LAGOS 568


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason 1.5
(B) and (D).



1. (C) Summary: The Ijaw militants in the Delta who
instigated this latest round of communal violence are
surprisingly well armed, according to President
Obasanjo. In order to avoid a potentially bloody
confrontation, Obasanjo has opted for a strategy of
attrition and containment instead of directly
attacking the armed militants. Obasanjo hopes this
approach will protect oil production while ending the
current ethnic eruption with minimal loss of life.
End Summary.



2. (C) During a midnight March 21 meeting at the
Villa, Ambassador Jeter asked President Obasanjo how
the GON planned to handle the upsurge of violence in
the Delta. The Ambassador said that violence had
already caused a significant reduction in oil
production for Shell and ChevronTexaco; if the
situation were to exacerbate, it might cause a serious
dent in Nigeria's daily production and affect global
oil prices at a very sensitive time. Even more
tragically, people already have been killed and
several villages razed, causing hundreds of Itsekiris
to seek refuge at the Escravos Tank Farm.



3. (C) Obasanjo said he was cognizant of the
seriousness of the situation and was tracking it
closely. He had sent the Chief of Army Staff (COAS),
who is indigenous to the area, and the Chief of Navy
Staff (CNS) to assess the situation. Their report was
eye opening. The COAS stated the Ijaw militants who
initiated the fighting were surprisingly well armed.
In fact, they were better equipped than the soldiers
the GON initially deployed in response to the
violence. The Ijaws had "machine guns, rocket
launchers and bazookas," the President said. In
response, the COAS had augmented the Army's initial
deployment with additional men and weaponry (he did
not specify weapon types).



4. (C) Obasanjo said that he had conferred with the
COAS who said he was prepared to attack the Ijaw
militants' positions; however, that battle would be
very bloody and significant damage would be done. In
an apparent but indirect allusion to impending
elections and the overall tense security environment,
Obasanjo stated that now was not the time for more
violent confrontation. He explained that the upheaval
was basically due to political competition between the
Ijaws and Itsekiris over the demarcation of local
governments in the area. The two groups were long-time
rivals who feud frequently. Frustration over oil
revenue allocations, which the President said he
thought he had resolved, was another factor in the
Ijaw's militant dissatisfaction.



5. (C) Instead of a frontal attack that might make
matters worse, Obasanjo said he had chosen the path of
attrition. The army would not engage the Ijaws but
would instead encircle them, hoping to hold them in
check. He hoped that within a short time, this would
starve the youth of both their ardor and ammunition.
Once they were sufficiently weakened, the army and
police would probe and begin to exploit their
weaknesses. The President did not give a timetable for
this strategy to work and, for the time being, seemed
content to wait things out. Obasanjo added that Delta
State Governor Ibori had held talks with Ijaw and
Itsekiri leaders months ago; coming out of those talks
Ibori had assured the President that all was calm.
Obasanjo intimated that further talks would be needed
but did not think Ibori would be the one to do it. The
President did not say that he would intervene
personally.



6. (C) During a luncheon today with the Ambassador,
the National Security Advisor's Political Advisor Ben
Obi (fully protect) expressed reservations about the
President's plan to resolve the Escravos impasse.
First, although from the Delta, the Chief of Army
Staff is Urhobo not Ijaw. (Obasanjo thought the COAS
was Ijaw when he had the appointment, Obi claimed.)
Because Urhobos are often at odds with the Ijaw, COAS
Ogumudia's influence on the Ijaws will be limited, if
not counterproductive. Second, Ijaws are deeply
involved in oil bunkering; therefore, the ability to
resupply and rearm their militants may be much greater
than the GON estimates.



7. (U) Meanwhile, evacuation operations in and around
Escravos continue. According to reports received by
RSO/Lagos, there were still approximately 800 people
within the tank farm by late morning, but most
American citizens had been evacuated. There were
still approximately 39 people at offshore sites
associated with Escravos. At one point during the
morning, Ijaw militia fired three mortar rounds, one
of which landed near the Escravos Tank Farm. The Ijaw
have repeatedly made it clear that their quarrel is
neither with GON Armed Forces nor with ChevronTexaco
but with their Itsekiri neighbors.



8. (C) COMMENT: Obasanjo's approach may be the only
reasonable course of action for the GON. A shootout
now would give provide ammunition to Obasanjo's
political opponents, who already claim that his
Administration has allowed festering ethnic tensions
to flare into open conflict, that it has failed
broadly to maintain law and order, and that when he
finally acts, it is heavy-handed and too lethal. An
attack now could also turn the populous Ijaw community
(the largest ethnic group in the South-South and the
fourth largest in Nigeria)) against him just weeks
before the presidential election. Moreover, Obasanjo
is caught between the "rock" of security for oil
installations and the "hard place" of human rights
concerns. He and his advisers want to avoid a third
incident (after Odi and Zaki Biam) of military abuse
of force.



9. (C) However, the siege approach is not ideal in
terms of sustaining oil production levels and,
ultimately, might not be successful in averting a
possibly very bloody encounter between the Army and
the Ijaws. The longer the two sides are in close
proximity, however, the more likely a confrontation
becomes. Indeed, the territory the Ijaws claim they
control extends beyond the immediate area of Escravos.
Additionally, there will have to be some dialogue with
the Ijaws. While Obasanjo seems content to wait things
out, he also is aware that a protracted siege could
provoke similar flare-ups elsewhere in this important
oil-producing area. END COMMENT.


JETER