NIGERIA OPEN TO DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 98

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000552

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL:03/20/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA OPEN TO DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 98


REFS: (A) 02 STATE 192375
(B) STATE 22119
(C) 02 ABUJA 2872
(D) 02 ABUJA 2978
(E) ABUJA 328
(F) ABUJA 342


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b).



1. (C) Summary: Embassy efforts to obtain GON signature to
an Article 98 Agreement continue despite initial resistance
and skepticism in several GON quarters. The Ambassador most
recently raised the subject on March 20, this time with MFA
PermSec Hart. Hart voiced strong "personal" reservations but
said the GON was open to discussion. We doubt the threat of
ASPA-based sanctions will move the GON, but its own interests
might. We continue to pursue this key objective
energetically. End Summary.


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STRATEGY
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2. (C) The GON was deeply involved in the establishment of
the International Criminal Court (ICC),and Nigeria offered a
candidate (who lost) for one of the seats. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) resistance to an Article 98 Agreement
was anticipated. Thus, Mission strategy in pursuit of an
agreement foresaw approaching others in the GON before
engaging with MFA. Indeed, an early mention of Article 98 had
produced very strong opposition from Foreign Minister Sule
Lamido (Ref C).


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DEMARCHES
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3. (C) In October and November of last year, the Ambassador
raised Article 98 with National Security Advisor LTG Aliyu
Mohammed (ret) and Minister of Defense LTG Theophilus Yakubu
Danjuma (ret),providing each with a draft agreement for
consideration. Mohammed (Ref C) was interested in exploring
possibilities and encouraged us to engage with Danjuma and
Minister of Justice Kanu Godwin Agabi. The Ambassador
stressed that, as a major contributor to PKOs in Africa and
beyond, Nigeria's national interest might be well-served by
signing Article 98 agreements with other countries as well,
particularly countries in ECOWAS. Danjuma (ref D) expressed
some doubt and said he would discuss the matter with FM
Lamido.



4. (C) In a meeting at the end of January, Agabi (Ref E) took
on board the Ambassador's points, including those about the
ASPA, and promised to acquaint President Obasanjo with the
issue. We left a draft Article 98 Agreement with Agabi also.
The Ambassador and AF DAS Bridgewater raised Article 98 with
Obasanjo on February 14 (Ref F). Initially criticizing the
USG for not being a member of the ICC, Obasanjo became more
receptive to Article 98 as the discussion proceeded. At the
end, he instructed his International Affairs Advisor (Ad'Obe
Obe) to ask FM Sule Lamido to convene an Inter-Ministerial
Committee to examine whether Nigeria should enter into an
Article 98 Agreement.


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CONTINUED RESISTANCE
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5. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, March 20 made a
strong pitch for Article 98 to MFA Permanent Secretary Dan
Hart. Hart explained that Nigeria had played an important
role in the establishment of the ICC and strongly backed its
principles. The Ambassador responded that the USG had no
objection to the principles behind the ICC and that Article 98
Agreements were bilateral accords for which the Rome Statute
specifically provides. The Ambassador related to Hart the
substance of his meeting with Obasanjo (Ref F) and wondered
whether the Inter-Ministerial Committee had been formed. Hart
said it had not. He welcomed the Ambassador's offer of a
draft Article 98 Agreement and other materials, adding that he
was certain the matter would be discussed within the GON
"before long."



6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's point that Nigeria
might have its own strong interest in concluding Article 98
Agreements with countries in the region, Hart commented that
he "personally" was not concerned about the possibility of
Nigerian troops being convicted of war crimes if they had
committed them. War must be conducted to "correct and humane
standards," he added. The Ambassador replied that the U.S.
agreed completely but took a different approach; accusations
of war crimes should be addressed in national courts or by
special-purpose ad-hoc bodies established to respond to the
results of a particular conflict situation. The U.S. believed
that the Rome Statute had gone too far, could be manipulated
for political purposes, and infringe on national sovereignty
issues.



7. (C) COMMENT: MFA opposes Article 98 and is not in any
hurry to convene an Inter-Ministerial Committee. We will
again raise President Obasanjo's mid-February instruction with
Obe in the near future. However, progress in a positive
direction is very unlikely as long as the war in Iraq
continues. We do not think the threat of ASPA sanctions will
motivate the GON to conclude an agreement with us. Obasanjo,
who seemed not to fully understand the ICC's mandate ("The
International Criminal Court is fine for drug traffickers,
money launderers and the like, but I'm not sure it's right for
the military."),clearly was open to considering an Article 98
Agreement with the U.S.



8. (C) For now, our approach will be to prod the various
players gently to gather in their Inter-Ministerial forum and
discuss Article 98 in the context of Nigeria's role in PKOs in
Africa and beyond. We will, of course, ensure that they are
aware of the provisions of ASPA, but we will not make these
provisions a central theme.
JETER