Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA418
2003-02-28 15:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: BUHARI ON INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PINS EFIN KDEM NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000418 

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NSC FOR JFRAZER
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS EFIN KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BUHARI ON INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, THE
ECONOMY AND FOREIGN POLICY


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000418

SIPDIS


NSC FOR JFRAZER
CAIRO POL FOR JMAXSTADT
LONDON FOR GURNEY


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PINS EFIN KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BUHARI ON INTER-COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, THE
ECONOMY AND FOREIGN POLICY


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a lengthy January 30 meeting with
the Ambassador, ANPP Presidential candidate Maj. Gen.
(Ret.) Muhammadu Buhari shared his plans for winning the
April election and elaborated on the reported rapprochement
between him and former military ruler Ibrahim Babangida.
Buhari gave his views on communal conflict, the economy,
Nigeria's role in West Africa, and the country's
relationship with the U.S. Despite Christian antipathy
toward Buhari, the Northern Muslim Presidential hopeful
thought former Senate President Chuba Okadigbo's presence
on his ticket would begin to attract support in the
predominantly Christian South. While Buhari questioned the
wisdom of Nigerian peacekeeping deployments when government
finances are in disarray, he acknowledged that regional
stability was of paramount importance. Nigeria under
Buhari therefore could be counted on to help maintain peace
and security in the sub-region. The Ambassador emphasized
Nigeria's importance to African stability and prosperity.
He also assured Buhari of the USG's commitment to work with
any democratically elected government. Sule Y. Hamma, the
National Coordinator for the Buhari campaign, also attended
the meeting. END SUMMARY.




--------------
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
--------------



2. (C) During a 90 minute meeting with Ambassador Jeter on
January 30, Buhari said he would win the election by
"working from the ground up" in every state to engage the
ordinary Nigerian. When asked about the Christian-
dominated South, Buhari said his Vice Presidential
candidate, former Senate President Chuba Okadigbo, a
Christian from the Southeast, would be the "key" to his
victory. While he recognized that religion worked against
him in the South, Buhari thought this difficulty could be
surmounted.



3. (C) When Ambassador brought up the reported mid-January
rapprochement between Buhari and Babangida, Buhari became
palpably agitated. Buhari said he met Babangida in Sokoto
where the traditional leader of all Nigerian Muslims, the
Sultan of Sokoto, encouraged the two men to make amends.
Though the two supposedly parted on good terms, Buhari
still seemed miffed. Since Babangida had wronged him (the
1985 coup and Buhari's nearly four-year incarceration),
Buhari felt it was incumbent on Babangida to be contrite.
Nonetheless and despite their troubled history, Buhari
expected IBB's public support. Buhari said, however, he did
not expect his former rival to help finance his campaign,
although he would be grateful if he did.


-------------- --------------
COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION
-------------- --------------



4. (C) Buhari castigated President Obasanjo's handling of
communal violence. Buhari said none of the recent
outbreaks in Jos and Kaduna was large enough to warrant
military intervention. The retired general gave three
levels of police engagement before the government should
consider using the army. First, riot police, armed only
with batons, should be called to disperse crowds and keep
the peace. If ineffective, police with firearms should be
called. If neither prove effective in quelling violence,
then Mobile Police (MOPOL),with their superior training
and firepower, should be deployed. Only after ratcheting
up civilian police deployment should the military be
summoned. Citing the 2001 massacres in Benue, Buhari
criticized Obasanjo for being too quick to "use the
sledgehammer" of the military. Buhari said Nigeria needed
an organized approach to containing communal violence and
conflict.



5. (C) Noting that communal strife is sometimes based in
religious conflicts and expressing USG concerns over the
politicization of religion, Ambassador asked Buhari about a
statement attributed to him in which he called on Muslims
to vote only for Muslims. Showing agitation again, Buhari
called the attribution a misrepresentation then provided
his version of what happened. Attending a book launch in
Sokoto last April, Buhari told the audience that before the
advent of British colonialism, Shari'a was the law of the
North. Even during British rule, Shari'a remained part of
the North's legal fabric. Speaking in Hausa, Buhari told
his Sokoto audience that under Shari'a, their area had been
stable and peaceful. Now that Shari'a had found its way
back into the Nigerian legal system, he implored Nigerians
to vote for candidates who would uphold their traditional
values. Buhari said a reporter, for "This Day", who
neither spoke Hausa nor was present, misquoted him in an
article published in "This Day" on the book launch.
According to Buhari, when the reporter was subsequently
asked why he said Buhari called on Muslims to vote only for
Muslims the reporter replied the statement was what "he
thought (Buhari) meant."



6. (C) Buhari said he had no interest in politicizing
religion and that he wanted to avoid election-related
violence. He was interested in signing an electoral Code
of Conduct and he liked the idea of publicly condemning
political violence in a joint statement with the other
parties. Buhari thought the Independent Election
Commission (INEC) should coordinate such a statement.
(NOTE: In a published statement a week later, Buhari called
on his supporters to eschew violence in the election
campaigns. END NOTE.)


--------------
BLAME OBASANJO FOR FOUNDERING ECONOMY
--------------



7. (C) Turning to the economy, Buhari condemned Obasanjo's
lack of leadership. "Despite receiving more revenue than
any previous government, (Obasanjo) has failed," Buhari
argued. Buhari cited government waste and corruption as
primary causes of Nigeria's economic woes. Expressing
disgust with the Obasanjo Administration, Buhari said "We
don't need 25 Ministers and 60 Advisers with 5-10 cars
each. We are too wasteful." He then wondered how Obasanjo
could justify such expenses when the GON "cannot afford to
pay soldiers and police."



8. (C) Buhari said his Administration would immediately
reform the GON. Ambassador noted that 80% of the GON's
budget in 2002 went to civil service salaries and
maintaining the government. Sule Hamma responded by saying
a Buhari government would monetize many of the entitlements
going to senior civil servants. For example, instead of
providing cars and drivers or residences and household
staff for senior officials, the GON would increase their
salaries. This would reduce administrative costs by
reducing the number of GON employees and allowing the GON
to function more cost efficiently.



9. (C) Buhari said reforming the petroleum industry was
also high on his list of priorities. He pointed to massive
inefficiencies under the current government and questioned
why refineries were idle and in disrepair. He wondered
aloud whether official corruption had a hand in this,
asking if "Abacha was once blamed for this, who is
responsible now?" Buhari also questioned the slow
development of Nigeria's natural gas fields, noting that
Nigeria has no more trains today than it did in 1984.
(COMMENT: This, obviously, is not true. END COMMENT.)



10. (C) On a more positive note, Buhari thought Nigeria
and the Gulf of Guinea region could provide the United
States with a more reliable supply of petroleum than the
Persian Gulf States. In recognition of this potential, he
hoped U.S. companies would share in the costs of increasing
Nigeria's production capacity.


--------------
GIVE US DEBT RELIEF BUT NO IMF
--------------



11. (C) Asked how he would handle Nigeria's debt and
issues of economic reform, Buhari again maligned the
Obasanjo Administration's performance. The President had
been completely ineffective in gaining relief for Nigeria's
foreign debt, he declared. Buhari said Obasanjo had
forgotten the lessons of his term as military Head of State
and was, once again, leading Nigeria down the road to
greater debt and insolvency.



12. (C) Calling on the international community to help
Nigeria with its debt, Buhari said, "Unless creditor states
help us, we cannot develop." The Ambassador noted the USG
holds less than USD 1 billion of Nigeria's USD 30 billion
debt. Because of its small portfolio, USG leverage on
other creditors was correspondingly slight. Moreover, the
USG and more significant creditors would not take up
Nigeria's cause until Nigeria clearly enacted reform. If
Nigeria hoped to get relief, it would have to make visible
reforms enhancing transparency, tackling corruption and
increasing accountability. The GON would have to renew its
formal arrangement with the IMF.



13. (C) Buhari and Hamma reacted negatively to the
prospect of another round of IMF negotiations. Hamma
called the IMF's structural adjustment programs a "policy
of impoverishment." He remarked that the IMF based its
advice on numbers cooked up in Washington and New York. He
said the IMF should devise their programs for economic
revitalization using case specific information and keeping
in mind a particular country's political and socio-economic
context. Buhari interjected that, during his term as
military Head of State, he neither followed IMF
recommendations to devalue the Naira nor attempted to
liberalize the economy. Ambassador Jeter told Buhari that
before granting any sort of relief, creditor states would
require credible reform, and the IMF's stamp of approval
would lend credibility. Finally, Ambassador said debt
relief would only be possible if the GON demonstrated that
the money saved would lead to poverty reduction among the
rural and urban poor.


--------------
WARY OF PRIVATIZATION
--------------



14. (C) Buhari expressed misgivings about privatization.
He was uncomfortable with the privatization of some state-
owned enterprises. In all cases there was a need for
competent regulatory agencies to prevent the "drive for
profit from wrecking the economy", and further
impoverishing the people. Buhari felt that, in the end,
good regulation would attract more capital than premature
privatization.


-------------- --------------
GON FINANCIAL WOES WILL LIMIT BUT NOT END FOREIGN
DEPLOYMENTS
-------------- --------------



15. (C) Turning to foreign policy, Ambassador Jeter
characterized Nigeria as the "indispensable player in West
African security" and expressed worry over the fate of an
ECOWAS force in Cote d'Ivoire that did not have Nigerian
military support. Buhari asked that the USG "understand
the reality of the Nigerian economy." Calling Nigeria
"bankrupt", Buhari said the country could not afford to
expend resources on foreign ventures when there was so much
work to be done at home. However, Buhari noted that when
"absolutely necessary" Nigeria would act to help insure
sub-regional stability.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



16. (C) Buhari took pains to assure the Ambassador he had
no intention of exploiting Nigeria's religious divide as an
election issue. However, Buhari has waited a very long time
to clear his name regarding the "vote Muslim" statement,
which will make his explanation seem like an election ploy.
Convinced he has a lock on the Northern electorate, Buhari
hopes he can win by convincing Southerners that he is not a
religious bigot, but a force for reform in government.
However, his formulae for getting the government and the
economy back on track appear out-dated and statist.
Buhari's reputation for fighting corruption is second to
none in Nigeria. His antipathy for the IMF probably
indicates an inability to work with that institution.



17. (C) Overall, Buhari is optimistic about his election
prospects. Despite his claims to the contrary, most
Southerners and Christians believe he is an instrument of
the North. Many also find his staunch support for Sharia
worrisome. While he did not come across as an extremist,
he will be portrayed as one by his opponents in the South.
His reputation as a stern disciplinarian will prove a
double-edged sword, drawing support from those who feel
Nigeria is drifting without purpose but pushing those who
believe that Nigeria has more freedom under Obasanjo
despite the incumbent's shortcomings. END COMMENT.
JETER