NIGERIA: DID VP ATIKU OUTFOX BABANGIDA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000401

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL -- J. MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DID VP ATIKU OUTFOX BABANGIDA AND
OBASANJO DURING THE PDP CONVENTION?


REF: ABUJA 216


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (C) Summary: During a late January conversation with
Ambassador Jeter and PolCouns, Lagos-based businessman Leno
Adesanya contended that VP Atiku finessed both President
Obasanjo and former Head of State Ibrahim Babangida during
the PDP convention in early January. Prior to the convention,
Atiku had decided to stick by Obasanjo, according to
Adesanya. However, Atiku feigned indecision in order to kill
two birds with one stone. First, his faked ambivalence
compelled Obasanjo to concede control of the domestic agenda
to Atiku should they win the 2003 election. Second, Atiku
wanted to deceive Babangida into believing that he had fallen
into Babangida's snare. Adesanya, who has one foot in Atiku's
camp and the other in Babangida's, said that Babangida's
objective was to coax Atiku to team with Ekwueme against the
President. With Obasanjo out of the race, Babangida would
have taken the ANPP nomination. When Babangida's plan went
awry, the ANPP nomination fell to Muhammedu Buhari. According
to Adesanya, Babangida, Ekwueme and NSA Aliyu Mohammed, a
staunch Babangida ally, were the big losers coming out of the
conventions. End Summary.



2. (C) During a late night conversation that extended well
into the early morning, Lagos businessman Leno Adesanyo
provided Ambassador Jeter and PolCouns an account of the PDP
convention from an Atiku insider's perspective. The account
is decidedly biased toward Atiku, but much of it rings true
because of Adesanyo's access and credibility, we are
reporting in detail what he had to say:


--------------
ATIKU, THE REALIST
--------------



3. (C) Going into the PDP convention, Atiku recognized his
limitations. While seeing himself as a much better
politician than the President, he knew Obasanjo would attempt
to destroy him politically if he challenged the President's
renomination. Thus, although the past year had been one of
considerable friction and mistrust between the two leaders,
Atiku recognized that his fortunes were wedded to those of
his boss. Equally important, Atiku also realized that
Obasanjo was stuck with him; Obasanjo could not secure the
party renomination without his endorsement. However, Atiku
was unsure if Obasanjo grasped this reality; if not, the
President might mistakenly precipitate their mutual downfall
by taking the advice of former Works Minister Anenih and
Babangida fifth columnist, NSA Aliyu Mohammed, to dump him.
Thus, Atiku needed to demonstrate clearly to the President
that he was indispensable to Obasanjo's return to office.



4. (C) Atiku also knew former Head of State Babangida had
been playing Atiku and Obasanjo against one another.
Babangida's plan was to coax Atiku to team with Alex Ekwueme
in order to defeat Obasanjo's renomination. With Obasanjo
out of the running, Babangida would have seized the ANPP
nomination, then watched as the ensuing enmity between
Obasanjo and the Ekwueme/Atiku ticket moved the PDP to
destroy itself.


--------------
Don't Change Horses In Mid-Stream
--------------



5. (C) To secure his future with Obasanjo while also
deceiving Babangida, Atiku felt he needed to wait until the
last minute before publicly affirming his support for
Obasanjo. The PDP governors' eleventh-hour rebellion against
Obasanjo gave Atiku the vehicle to perfect his strategy. A
few days prior to the convention, Obasanjo met the governors,
agreeing to support their renominations. The quid pro quo
was obvious. However, seeking to undermine this pact, NSA
Aliyu Mohammed visited Delta State governor James Ibori and
some others, frightening them that Obasanjo had compiled
embarrassing dossiers and planned to use the information to
disqualify the governors once he secured the PDP Presidential
nomination. The NSA's intrigue galvanized the governors and
temporarily injected suspense into the PDP convention. But,
instead of redounding to Babangida's benefit as Aliyu
expected, the governor's brouhaha with Obasanjo helped Atiku
to perfect his own plan.



6. (C) According to Adesanya, Atiku met the governors the
first day of the convention; they urged him to leave Obasanjo
and seek the nomination himself. Atiku demurred; he also
deflected the suggestion that he join Ekwueme. Finally,
Atiku arranged a meeting between Obasanjo and the now irate
governors. The governors railed that Obasanjo was
hypocritically pursuing them for corruption, while turning a
blind eye to corrupt politicians within his own
Administration. Atiku supported the governor's position,
telling Obasanjo that significant corruption was not the
exclusive ambit of the governors and that serious
transgressions occurred in the executive branch: he said it
would be unjust to focus exclusively on gubernatorial
excesses. Assuming the role of mediator, Atiku then asked
both sides to affirm their mutual support and cease the
antagonism being fueled by elements that wanted to destroy
the PDP. The governors agreed to bury the hatchet, if
Obasanjo would shelve the dossiers. Having demonstrated his
influence with the governors, Atiku continued to play coy
with Obasanjo.



7. (C) In the end, Atiku extracted an extraordinary
concession from the President. Obasanjo agreed to relinquish
the entire domestic agenda to Atiku, including the
appointment of key economic policy-makers. Since Obasanjo
focused on the world arena during his first term and aspired
for recognition as an international statesman, Atiku said
that is where he would like Obasanjo's attentions to remain.
Obasanjo would serve the role of a "super Foreign Minister"
and ceremonial Head of State. As Adesanya understood the
agreement, Atiku would be allowed to direct domestic economic
policy while Obasanjo busied himself with debt relief, NEPAD,
conflict resolution and other measures to shore up Nigeria's
image abroad.


--------------
Outfoxing Babangida
--------------



8. (C) As he exploited Obasanjo's political vulnerabilities,
Atiku simultaneously outfoxed the "Maradonna" and master of
political intrigue, Babangida. Leading up to the convention,
Atiku had maintained contact with Babangida, the central
topic being their displeasure with Obasanjo. Atiku wanted
Babangida to think he had swallowed the bait and would leave
Obasanjo if another suitor offered the right political
inducement. Wary of the Babangida camp's ability to disrupt
the convention, Atiku continued to signal willingness to
abandon Obassanjo if the price were right. This protracted
indecisive was, in fact a conscious ploy to prevent Babangida
from implementing a possible back-up plan to wreck the
Obasanjo/Atiku alliance. Atiku kept negotiating with
Obasanjo's challenger, Alex Ekweume. Atiku knew Ekweume had
Babangida's backing, as well as support from former Head of
State Abdulsalam and NSA Mohammed.



9. (C) In this context, Atiku's BBC interview the evening of
January 4, where he equivocated on his own Presidential
ambitions, was pure bluff. During the broadcast, Atiku said
he was considering all options before him. This remarkable
statement from an incumbent Vice President fooled many into
believing Atiku was leaning toward abandoning the President
and seeking the Presidency himself. Adesanya recalled
talking to Atiku immediately after the interview; the VP
called the statement a ploy to keep Babangida off-balance
until the last possible moment.



10. (C) The ploy worked, Adesanya contended. A few hours
after the BBC broadcast, Atiku was with Obasanjo lobbying
governors and state delegations to suggest this ticket. By
midnight, the Obasanjo/Atiku ticket was secure. With only a
few hours before the convention vote, it was too late for
Babangida and company to implement any "Plan B" they might
have had to thwart the Obasanjo renomination.



11. (C) Obasanjo's renomination killed Babangida's ultimate
objective, the ANPP nomination, Adesanya maintained.
Babangida wanted to run, but only if Obasanjo had been
sidelined. This reticence was not due to deference or
loyalty to the President, but out of respect for the power of
incumbency and its influence on the outcome of the election.
Babangida did not want to fight Obasanjo but did not mind
fighting an Ekweume/Atiku ticket that had drawn the wrath of
a sitting President. However, Babangida's manipulation of
the ANPP as his maid in waiting came to naught. He had
helped place his former second in command, Augustus Aikhomu,
into the important post of Chairman of the ANPP Board of
Trustees. Also, many ANPP governors and other party
stalwarts prayed Babangida would join the party at the last
minute. The party scheduled its convention after the PDP's
just to keep the door open for IBB.



12. (C) However, when Obasanjo emerged from the PDP confab,
Babangida left his faithful waiting at the altar. With
Babangida out of the picture, the internal dynamics of the
ANPP led to the nomination of former Head of State Buhari,
the only ANPP candidate with national stature.
--------------
Thumbs Up!
--------------



13. (C) Predictably, Adesanya saw Atiku as the biggest
winner in this rendition of events. First, Atiku secured his
slot on the Obasanjo ticket against the urging and treachery
of some Obasanjo insiders; additionally, with Obasanjo
surrendering the domestic agenda, Atiku will become the de
facto head of government in 2003. Moreover, Atiku's most
powerful rival for the 2007 presidency, Ibrahim Babangida,
has been weakened considerably. Adesanya asserted that Atiku
was not overly concerned that Obasanjo would renege on his
promises or try to dump or discredit him. Last year's
impeachment crisis and the recently concluded PDP convention
had demonstrated Atiku's weight with both PDP National
Assembly members and PDP governors. If Obasanjo moved
against Atiku, Atiku's allies would neutralize the President.
Atiku held the impeachment card and that threat alone would
discourage Obasanjo from seeking revenge or going back on his
promises. Adesanya also saw Obasanjo as a victor, albeit of
a lesser magnitude. The renomination exacted a high price;
Obasanjo had to concede considerable power to Atiku and had
to plead with delegates for their support. Although on the
road to likely re-election, Obasanjo has had to endure
several humiliating steps to get there. Domestically, he has
been diminished.


--------------
Thumbs Down!
--------------



14. (C) Babangida was the biggest loser. The patina of
invulnerability had been tarnished. In this instance,
Babangida's purported greatest skill -- keeping all his
options open and his opponents guessing -- proved to be a
liability. Instead of appearing masterful, he came across as
unreliable and indecisive. Babangida's vaunted secrecy also
failed him. His courtiers, anxious to be seen by others as
close Babangida confidants, behaved like hyperactive sieves,
leaking details of his conversations to whomever would
listen. Babangida's plans to trick Atiku were repeated to
the Vice President; they also featured prominently in the
press. Developing an effective counter-deception, Atiku
foiled the ambush, leaving Babangida waiting on the wrong
road for someone who would never show. (Comment: Adesanya is
not alone in this depiction. Many Babangida supporters are
shaking their heads. Babangida's swagger has been reduced to
political timidity. In reality, although Babangida has been
diminished, he is not a spent force and may still be able to
wield influence, albeit his options are considerably less.
End Comment)



15. (C) Another clear loser was the National Security
Advisor. In fomenting the governors' opposition to the
President, Mohammed entertained the prospect that Babangida
dangled before him: the vice-presidential slot under Ekweume
-- the same slot being offered Atiku. However, Adesanya
dismissed Mohammed as a credible national candidate. Aliyu
is considered to be a purveyor of intrigues and coups, not a
politician. He has no charisma, no constituency and little
cash. After his manipulation of the governors, Aliyu was of
little value and became invisible. His feeble performance
during the convention confirmed his weaknesses and the
quixotic nature of his political aspirations, Adesanya
declared. Adesanya revealed that Mohammed had attempted to
resign, but Atiku counseled Obasanjo to ignore his request.
Atiku advised it would be better to keep Mohammed on the
payroll and on a tight leash in order to contain his
infidelity and any future intrigues. If Mohammed were out of
office he would feel threatened; the NSA could use his
immense knowledge of the inner secrets of the Administration
to cause considerable embarrassment, if not, damage.



16. (C) PDP challenger Alex Ekweume also came up short in
Adesanya's estimation. Adesanya speculated that Ekweume's
strident criticism of the convention had as much to do with
the 1999 convention as last month's event. In '99, Ekweume
accepted defeat gracefully; this time, his supporters
pressured him to make a stink. They hoped the PDP would
offer some party positions to their faction in exchange for
his silence.



17. (C) Paradoxically, Adesanya rated Buhari as a loser
despite winning the ANPP nomination. With Babangida
sidelined, the ANPP governors pushed the nomination to
Buhari. Although they knew he had little chance in the
general election, he is popular in the North. The ANPP
governors, all from northern states, figured Buhari's
popularity in their region would have a bandwagon effect and
help their reelection. In short, Buhari was but the
sacrificial lamb for their gubernatorial ambitions.


--------------
What Next
--------------



18. (C) Adesanya said that Obasanjo/Atiku were confidently
looking forward to the general election. However, the PDP
could still have problems in the South-South unless Obasanjo
made peace with the coastal states on the volatile issue of
offshore oil revenues. Also, they needed to make amends with
Ekweume and other Igbos to keep the Southeast as a PDP
stronghold and prevent it from splitting its vote among the
several Igbo candidates in the minor parties. Adesanya felt
Babangida would further withdraw from open political
engagement and not chance additional setbacks. However,
Babangida is faced with the prospect of either his stiffest
political competitor, Atiku, returning for another four
years, or of Buhari, his arch-enemy, ascending to the
Presidency. (Adesanya scoffed at suggestions that Babangida
and Buhari had reconciled. On his return to Minna from
Sokoto where he met Buhari, Babangida shrugged of his session
with Buhari as a non-event.)



19. (C) Uncomfortable with this "lose-lose" situation,
Babangida could pursue a third option. Although not likely,
Babangida might encourage an alliance of the minor parties
against Obasanjo, particularly if a figure like Ekweume could
be coaxed to publicly spearhead this effort.


--------------
Comment
--------------



20. (C) As we have stated previously (Reftel),we will never
learn the whole truth regarding the PDP and ANPP conventions.
By giving us the view from Atiku's vantage point, however,
Adesanya has provided more pieces of the complex puzzle.
Adesanya's account is believable but it is also biased. An
associate of Atiku and Babangida, Adesanya is an astute
businessman who persistently gauges where his bread will
receive the most butter. Thus, he inclines more heavily
toward Atiku these days. In his rendition, Adesanya
conveniently glossed over the fact that Atiku wanted the
Presidency and had unsuccessfully searched for a mechanism to
oust Obasanjo without incurring his wrath. Only when that
search proved fruitless, did Atiku cast his lot with
Obasanjo. Additionally, Adesanya assigned no role to Atiku
in the governor's rebellion. We find this implausible.



21. (C) Atiku likely encouraged NSA Mohammed to go behind
Obasanjo's back to the governors. This would be consistent
with the objective of deceiving Babangida. Atiku probably
continued to harbor a splinter of hope that the governor's
rebellion would send Obasanjo packing. Atiku's counsel to
Obasanjo to retain Mohammed despite the latter's trespasses
is more understandable in this light. Mohammed might tell
Obasanjo about Atiku's role. Moreover, as long as Mohammed
is around, Obasanjo's suspicions would focus more on the NSA
than on the Vice President.



22. (C) Adesanya's rating of relative winners and losers
seems on point. However, Obasanjo adherence to his promise
to give the domestic portfolio to Atiku may not be as
ironclad as Adesanya thinks. While somewhat chastened,
Obasanjo still has his bark and plenty of bite. We would not
be surprised to see him "forget" some of his convention
concessions if he wins the general election. Obasanjo also
may someday "punish" Atiku for his humiliation.



23. (C) Last, we agree with Adesanya that January was unkind
to Babangida. Late last year, the media depicted him as a
mastermind who influenced five of the then six parties. At
least three parties were pining for him to announce his
candidacy under their banner. Now, he faces either Atiku or
Buhari, two enemies, as the second or the first most powerful
person in the country, respectively. Atiku is no boy scout;
his role in eroding the Babangida myth was clearly in his own
self-interest. However, Atiku has helped stabilize politics
at the national level by not breaking up the PDP ticket.
Moreover, by cutting Babangida down to size, this could
encourage politicians in the opposition that their path to
success lie more in working together than in making the trek
to Minna to seek Babangida'a favor.
JETER