NIGERIA: OULD ABDALLAH ON COTE D'IVOIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000351

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL:12/16/2012
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS NI IV FR ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OULD ABDALLAH ON COTE D'IVOIRE

Ref: Abidjan 271
- USUN 314


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(d).



1. (C) Summary: Amadou Ould-Abdallah February 6 told
Ambassador Jeter that several factors had engendered the
post-Marcoussis disarray. Ould-Abdallah thought Kufuor
would be more effective as ECOWAS Chairman than Wade had
been. The French had leverage but were losing a little
every day by failing to use it. Ould-Abdallah said Albert
Tevoedjre's appointment was a positive step but felt the
Beninois relied too heavily on prayer rather than
diplomacy. Nigeria could and should play a useful role,
but Gbagbo's prevarications early on had discouraged them.
End Summary.



2. (C) Over breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence on
February 6, UN West Africa Special Representative Amadou
Ould-Abdallah told Ambassador Jeter that he had been
spending a disproportionate share of his time on Cote
d'Ivoire. He thought the appointment of Benin's Albert
Tevoedjre would allow him more time for other issues, such
as advancing implementation of the ICJ ruling on the
Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute (septel). Ould-Abdallah
called Tevoedjre experienced and learned but commented that
the Beninois sometimes put too much faith in the power of
prayer to bring antagonists together.



3. (C) Ould-Abdallah thought Ghana's John Kufuor would be
a more effective ECOWAS Chairman than Senegalese President
Abdoulaye Wade had been. Kufuor "speaks frankly, but he is
friendly and not lecturing." While Wade had a strong sense
of the issues at play in Cote d'Ivoire, he presumed too
much as a result of his title as ECOWAS Chairman, signing
letters in that capacity without having first thoroughly
vetted them with his colleagues, for example. But his
heart was in the right place, and he sought a just outcome.
Ould-Abdallah was less sure of Eyadema's motivations.



4. (C) Ould-Abdallah sharply criticized Eyadema's efforts
to undermine Wade. The Ivoirian had wanted international
mediation "to become African under Eyadema." This was a
"very cheap" ploy that had been intended to "play African
against African." Ould-Abdallah thought that Kufuor's
accession to the ECOWAS Chairmanship would eventually
reduce Eyadema's role as Gbagbo had more confidence and
trust in Kufuor than in Wade.



5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Ould-
Abdallah contended that Gbagbo and others had not focused
on the implications of the rebels' request for the Defense
and Interior Ministries. "Bedie and Gbago wanted the money
portfolios - Agriculture, Finance and Works," Ould-Abdallah
said. He conceded that the rebels' alacrity in telling the
media of their coup had aggravated the problem but was not
the decisive issue. "Anyway, the demonstrations [by Gbagbo
backers] were not really spontaneous; we have reason to
think he (Gbagbo) encouraged them" (see also ref A). There
was also the problem of those who rebelled against lawful
authority in essence now becoming that authority over the
heads of those who had fought to uphold it, as well as
personality issues associated with Guillaume Soro and
Louis-Andre Dakourey. Finally, Gbagbo's wife, a power in
Parliament herself, was taking a hard line.



6. (C) Was there a role for Ouattara?, the Ambassador
asked. Ould-Abdallah responded with sharp criticism of
Ouattara for his failure to "bring people on board" after
his electoral victory. Ouattara had scarcely lived in
Africa and was "too much an international civil servant" to
identify effectively with the Ivorian people. However, the
GOCI and its political allies had "so demonized" Ouattara
that he was now a symbol of northern resistance.



7. (C) Ambassador Jeter regretted that contention at the
highest levels of Ivorian politics, and between TOGO and
Senegal had precluded a quick success for ECOWAS efforts.
Ould-Abdallah opined that in circumstances that come close
to civil war, those who can inspire fear and those who can
offer something to meet a need have leverage. The French,
he said, have leverage on both scores but are unable to use
it effectively. As a result, their leverage is slowly
being attenuated. The Nigerians were the first to come to
Gbagbo's assistance, but he lied to them, so Obasanjo
effectively withdrew from the fray. Ould-Abdallah was
pleased to see Abuja slowly re-engaging: Nigeria could and
should play a continuing diplomatic role; it would be
difficult to find a durable solution without Nigerian
participation.



8. (C) COMMENT: We concur in Ould-Abdallah's assessment
of the need for strong Nigerian engagement on the Cote
d'Ivoire, and we have done what we can to promote stronger
and more persistent Nigerian diplomatic engagement.
Obasanjo and others in the GON now seem to be paying close
attention to Cote d'Ivoire. Gbagbo may be more comfortable
with Kufuor as ECOWAS Chairman than he was with Wade in
that role. That fact too may facilitate mediation.
However, alone among ECOWAS states, Nigeria possesses the
military muscle and political weight to apply real pressure
to recalcitrant players.
JETER