Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA343
2003-02-12 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA'S OBASANJO ON ZIMBABWE

Tags:  PREL EAID ZI NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000343 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL:02/14/2013
TAGS: PREL EAID ZI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S OBASANJO ON ZIMBABWE

REFS: (A) FBIS 131123Z FEB 03
(B) FBIS 121434Z FEB 03
(C) Harare 322


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000343

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL:02/14/2013
TAGS: PREL EAID ZI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S OBASANJO ON ZIMBABWE

REFS: (A) FBIS 131123Z FEB 03
(B) FBIS 121434Z FEB 03
(C) Harare 322


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b).



1. (C) Summary: Nigerian President Obasanjo February 14 told
DAS Bridgewater and Ambassador Jeter that Tsanvirgai had made
a mistake by going to court. Dialogue was not possible under
the circumstances, and it made no sense to continue sanctions,
still less since Australia had implemented additional measures
outside those established by the Commonwealth. Obasanjo urged
the US and UK to be patient and supportive; Africans would
produce the desired results, though perhaps not on the West's
schedule. End Summary.


--------------
OBASANJO RECOMMENDS AN END TO SUSPENSION
--------------



2. (C) In response to visiting AF DAS Bridgewater's query,
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo February 14 confirmed
that he had recommended and end to Zimbabwe's suspension from
the Commonwealth in a letter to Australian Prime Minister
Howard and South African President Mbeki. DAS Bridgewater
replied that the USG urged him to reconsider that position.
"Why?" Obasanjo asked. Because there needs to be dialogue
between the GOZ and the opposition first, DAS Bridgewater
answered. With what opposition? Obasanjo wanted to know.
Primarily the MDC, DAS Bridgewater responded.



3. (C) Obasanjo contended that Tsvangirai and the MDC had
precluded dialogue by going to court. Obasanjo said he had
counseled Tsvangirai against such a step: "We have a saying
here; when you are in court, you cannot be friends." If your
case is in court, you cannot have dialogue. The MDC argued
that it had to file suit within a limited period of time or
lose the right to contest the election and that it had been
urged to pursue legal redress if it wanted to contest the
results, Obasanjo continued. Therefore, the MDC had gone to
court despite its early rejection of that course of action.
Now, the case had been in court for over a year, with no
progress. "I told [Tsvangirai] that his case could be in
court for five years and nothing would happen." Obasanjo
remarked that he and Mbeki also objected to the Australian
decision to implement sanctions that went beyond those
prescribed by the Commonwealth.


--------------
LET US SOLVE IT THE AFRICAN WAY
--------------



4. (C) Acknowledging the Nigerian efforts, DAS Bridgewater
said the USG would continue to provide humanitarian relief.
Obasanjo cut in, "We should press for realistic things. I
have always pleaded, as I did with Cote d'Ivoire, to let us
[Africans] take care of it. You should stand behind and give
us support." Obasanjo went on to describe steps ECOWAS had
taken toward resolving the conflict and hinting that some of
the false starts and stumbling blocks resulted from the well-
meaning but ill-advised proposals of non-Africans.



5. (C) Returning to Zimbabwe and the MDC's court case,
Obasanjo rhetorically asked what he should do. Ambassador
Jeter wondered what Tsvangirai's response to the implicit
advice to drop the court challenge had been. "He seemed
confused," Obasanjo replied. "he wanted to keep his options
open."



6. (C) Obasanjo rhetorically moved northward, saying that the
key to the success of Kenya's elections was that Africans had
convinced arap Moi that he really had to give up power. "That
is what we must try with Mugabe." Obasanjo said he had told
the Zimbabwean that he (Obasanjo),though younger than Mugabe,
was already making plans for succession. Mugabe should do the
same thing. "I broached it with him, and he said, 'Oh, that
is difficult.'" Had he even thought about it, wondered DAS
Bridgewater. "No, he had not," Obasanjo replied.



7. (C) "I think the British influence has been negative on
this issue," Obasanjo offered, arguing that HMG wanted too
much, too fast. African leaders should have time to work on
Mugabe, to convince him to give up power without feeling
pressured to do so. "It may not be at your speed, Obasanjo
concluded, but we'll get there."


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



8. (C) Zimbabwean opposition reaction (refs A&B) to the
letter was swift, denunciatory and vigorous. The domestic
profile of this issue is lower, and also lower now than it was
six months or a year ago. For this part, Obasanjo has become
more relaxed and confident about addressing it. A year ago,
he avoided the Ambassador for nearly six weeks in order to
preclude a discussion on Zimbabwe. This time, Obasanjo sought
out Ambassador Jeter to give him a heads-up; the Ambassador,
however, was in Katsina at the time and could not return to
Abuja in time for the requested appointment. While the USG
and the GON are unlikely to see eye-to-eye on Zimbabwe, the
way to genuine dialogue is open, and with it the possibility
to influence Obasanjo positively. End comment.



9. (U) Ambassador Bridgewater cleared this message.


JETER