Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA333
2003-02-13 17:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: MANPADS INFORMATION REQUEST

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL PTER 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000333 

SIPDIS


CAIRO POL FOR MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MANPADS INFORMATION REQUEST

REF: A. STATE 32841

B. ABUJA 249

C. 02 ABUJA 720

D. 02 ABUJA 1131


CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASON 1.5(D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000333

SIPDIS


CAIRO POL FOR MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: MANPADS INFORMATION REQUEST

REF: A. STATE 32841

B. ABUJA 249

C. 02 ABUJA 720

D. 02 ABUJA 1131


CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASON 1.5(D)



1. (C) SUMMARY: The GON maintains a stockpile of several
hundred poorly maintained SA-7s and has made efforts to
purchase more modern SAMs from Russia and Ukraine. The GON
maintains control of MANPADS stocks, but poor security and
an active illicit arms trade make theft a very real risk.
The GON can be expected to participate in efforts to
enhance the security of its MANPADS and other weapons
stocks provided the USG or third country picks up the bill.
END SUMMARY.


--------------
GENERAL MANPADS SITUATION IN NIGERIA
--------------



2. (C) The GON has a stockpile of several hundred poorly
maintained MANPADS. After Russia declined its request for
more modern SAMs, the GON contracted to purchase an unknown
number of SAMs from Ukraine (REF B). (COMMENT: While the
degradation of the GON's SA-7 stockpile makes it less
effective against the military aviation the missiles are
designed to attack, they would prove more than adequate
against slower moving and easier to track civilian
aircraft. END COMMENT.)



3. (C) Nigerian MANPADS are under the control of the GON
and are stored as ammunition by the Nigerian Armed
Services. Security is considered to be lax and highly
ineffective. Theft by security personnel or private
individuals is possible.



4. (C) The Nigerian small arms black market is very
active. Post is unaware of any reports of MANPADS sales on
the Nigerian black market. (COMMENT: Post might not be
aware of MANPAD availability on the black market. Nigerian
military personnel are poorly paid, and a relatively small
payoff by an arms trader might be sufficient to suborn a
guard. There were rumors after the Ikeja ATD fire and
explosion in early 2002 that the fire was set to cover up
illicit transfers. These rumors were never substantiated.
END COMMENT.)



5. (C) Post is unaware of any Nigerian effort to export
MANPADS.


--------------
OPPORTUNITIES FOR GON COOPERATION
--------------



6. (C) The GON sees MANPADS as vital to its national
defense and is unlikely to take action to reduce its
stockpile.



7. (C) While the GON may state it will take action to
control the black/gray arms market, its enforcement
mechanisms are too weak to have a significant impact.



8. (C) Without prodding or proctoring, post does not
expect the GON to appreciate the gravity of the threat its
improperly secured MANPADS pose to civil aviation nor the
magnitude of the GON's liability should one of its MANPADS
be used in a successful attack.



9. (C) The GON might be amenable to a USG-funded program
that upgraded existing storage facilities to adequate
security standards or built entirely new facilities if the
USG could allay GON concerns over espionage. In that
regard, the GON refused USG offers of assistance, except in
three limited cases, in determining the safety of Nigerian
ammunition depots after the January 2002 Ikeja disaster
because of espionage concerns. Since personnel present a
major vulnerability, it would also be necessary for the USG
to pay for the training of GON security personnel.



10. (U) Appropriate GON contacts for this issue are
Minister of Defense T. Y. Danjuma and National Security
Advisor Aliyu Mohammed.



11. (C) COMMENT: In addition to maintaining its current
stocks of MANPADS, the GON will most likely continue to
attempt to acquire ever more sophisticated types of MANPADS
and other surface-to-air missiles. The GON could accept a
USG-funded program to enhance the security of its MANPADS
stocks. However, the success of such a program is doubtful
since the most serious security concern is the poverty-
level wages the GON pays to the soldiers guarding storage
sites. Until the GON boosts the pay of those guarding its
weapons stockpile, the risk of stolen equipment finding its
way to the black market will remain high.
JETER