Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA279
2003-02-07 12:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH OBASANJO

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MASS IV NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000279 

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MASS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH OBASANJO

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000279

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MASS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH OBASANJO

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: During a one-hour January 25 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo spoke optimistically,
though briefly, about his electoral chances. In the lead-
up to the election, the President predicted his opponents
would try to exploit Iraq and the perception of the USG as
anti-Moslem to mount protests assailing his Administration
and its pro-Western leaning. On Cote d'Ivoire, Obasanjo
declared Nigeria would not send peacekeeping troops but
might give logistical support to the ECOFORCE deployment.
Nigeria would also remain engaged diplomatically. End
Summary.


--------------
THE DIFFICULT PART IS OVER!
--------------



2. (C) The President described the PDP convention as his
most troublesome hurdle on the road to reelection. Having
cleared that obstacle, he predicted winning approximately
"60%" of the vote in the April general election. Obasanjo
gauged that religion could become a divisive element in the
campaign, given ANPP's flagbearer Muhammadu Buhari's
purported statements on Shari'a and on the imperative of
Moslems voting for a co-religionist. However, the
confident Obasanjo planned to counter the centrifugal
tactics of his foes by getting on the campaign trail to
inform the electorate that, during his term at the helm, he
had benefited Nigeria's Moslem's more than Buhari did as
Head of State.



3. (C) Regarding electoral violence, Obasanjo felt
violence would not mar the election although some incidents
would be inevitable. However, he warned that the emotive
confluence of electoral politics, religion, Iraq and the
Middle East made for a potentially combustible mixture in
Nigeria. Electoral foes would try to stoke religious
sentiment and indirectly generate opposition to him by
protesting against USG policy on Iraq and the Middle East.
(Note: The previous day, President Obasanjo telephoned the
Ambassador that Nigerian security forces had blocked
numerous "rascally boys" from entering Abuja for the

purpose of protesting USG policy on Iraq. Although the
alleged hirelings had been turned back (Obasanjo would not
reveal where they were coming from),Obasanjo remained
concerned that trouble was still afoot. At the President's
express insistence, we cancelled State Department Public
Affairs Officer Nabeel Khoury's speaking engagement on
USG's Middle East policy scheduled that day in nearby
Kaduna.



4. (C) Comment: We are unable to verify the presence of
the alleged protesters but the account is plausible. Some
Embassy Officers had heard rumors of a protest scheduled
for either Abuja or Kaduna. Obasanjo certainly does not
want the security headache that goes along with such
protests. Demonstrations in Abuja can be like wildfire --
once started, they can get out of hand quickly. Given
Obasanjo's strong identification with America in the
Nigerian mind, the President recognizes that an anti-
American protest is tantamount to an anti-Obasanjo outing;
in any event, it could quickly take that turn. While
confident in winning the election, protests in the capital
would not present an attractive visual and would dampen
Obasanjo's campaign. End Comment.)


--------------
HOW IRAQ IS PLAYING IN NIGERIA
--------------



5. (C) Because of this volatility, Obasanjo cautioned that
we tread lightly in using public fora to explain our Middle
East and Iraq policies. He also thought that any overt
attempts by Nigeria's friends in the West to defuse
religion as a potential campaign issue would be counter-
productive. If we decided, nevertheless, to go forward
with such programs, Obasanjo asked that our plans be vetted
with him.



6. (C) Ambassador Jeter informed the President about the
January 25-27, private conference on USG engagement with
Islam that we were co-sponsoring with the Emir of Kano and
that was closed to the public and press. Obasanjo responded
positively to the idea but asked that we inform him of any
similar future events. When Ambassador Jeter mentioned the
receipt of a letter from Zamfara State Governor Ahmed Sani
requesting the Embassy to co-sponsor a conference on
Shari'a, Obasanjo shook his head negatively. He asserted
that Sani was not a suitable co-sponsor. (Note: Although
in different political parties, Obasanjo has a congenial
personal relationship with Sani, referring to the firebrand
as his "campaign manager" in Zamfara. The President
probably believes Sani, known as the champion of Shari'a in
the North, would not be able to resist inflammatory
statements in an attempt to milk all the political capital
that he could from such a conference. End note.)



7. (C) Before accepting proposals for public conferences
on religion or Shari'a, the Embassy should first seek the
advice of the Sultan of Sokoto, the spiritual leader of
Nigeria's Muslims. Obasanjo said he sought out the Sultan
when Zamfara's Deputy Governor issued his infamous Fatwa
against Isioma Daniels, the journalist who wrote the
controversial Miss World editorial that sparked rioting in
Kaduna last year. "I asked the Sultan was this the proper
way to issue a Fatwa?" Obasanjo recalled. The Sultan's
response was negative. As a result of their conversation,
the Sultan rescinded the improper Fatwa and the controversy
began to die, Obasanjo remarked. If we decided to go
forward on a conference on Shari'a, Obasanjo said that we
too should seek the Sultan's advice.


--------------
Cote d'Ivoire and Regional Peacekeeping
--------------



8. (C) Obasanjo's comments indicated his endorsement of
the Ivorien peace plan was not whole-hearted. He described
the plan as effectively "disrobing" President Gbagbo.
However, in the final analysis, Nigeria "could not be
holier than the Pope." If this is what the Ivoriens
agreed, Nigeria will support it, he declared.



9. (C) However, deployment of Nigerian peacekeepers would
not be part of that support, the President said. Nigeria
might send engineers, medical units, signal corps or other
logistical help, however, front-line troops, not even after
the elections, would not be included. Prior to embarking
on another expensive peacekeeping deployment, Nigeria
needed to put "some things in order" regarding its ECOMOG
deployments in Sierra Leon and Liberia, he opined.
Foremost, Nigeria had not rendered an accurate public
accounting of the losses it suffered in those missions.
"No one knows how many died in Sierra Leone and Liberia" he
lamented. The closest approximation to an accounting is
former ECOMOG Force Commander S.V. Malu's estimate of 800
Nigerian soldiers dead. Ambassador noted that several years
ago, he had heard very confidentially from Malu's ECOMOG
Chief of Staff that Nigeria had lost more than 1,000 troops
in Liberia. Obasanjo noted that that figure also matched
his conclusions. Obasanjo went on to clarify that Nigeria
was not turning its back on peacekeeping, but that it must
"come to closure" on these two missions prior to joining
any future PKO's in the region.



10. (C) If Nigeria could not participate in the Ivorien
peacekeeping mission, Ambassador Jeter urged Obasanjo to
become more engaged diplomatically in the Ivorien peace
process. Nigeria has been "missing in action" on the
diplomatic front, he stressed. Obasanjo pledged Nigeria
would become more engaged politically, making clear that
Nigeria had not repudiated its heretofore active
involvement in sub-regional peacekeeping. Moreover, he
said that Nigeria would engage again in peacekeeping but
must do so in a way that is more transparent to the average
Nigerian.



11. (C) Obasanjo discounted reports of official Liberian
involvement in the Ivorien morass. He believed ex-factional
fighters from Liberia were gravitating to Cote d'Ivoire
because it represented what they knew, a way to make money
by the use of a gun. Poverty was the ultimate culprit, he
argued. Poor men with guns were like locusts swarming to
the latest harvest. No country was immune to this somber
reality; any country in West Africa could be destabilized
for USD 100,000. Obasanjo hoped to address this issue
within the larger context of regional development during
the July Sullivan Summit in Abuja. Already, six Heads of
State had accepted his invitation. He hoped POTUS would
also accept. (Note: A copy of the invitation to POTUS has
been forwarded Septel. End Note.)


--------------
Comment
--------------



12. (C) While very confident about his reelection
prospects, President Obasanjo was very concerned about the
possible protests regarding Iraq and the Middle East. He
also has become more reticent about Cote d'Ivoire. Before,
the Nigerians were giving some indications that they would
consider an active peacekeeping role after the April
elections. Obasanjo seemed to nix that idea. His rationale
that Nigeria must publicly account for its Liberian and
Sierra Leonean deployments is valid and essential for a
democracy. However, the timing is a bit odd. Perhaps it is
an indirection to let us know that stiff opposition would
mount should he propose a major Nigerian peacekeeping
operation right after the election. Additionally, his
reluctance may be due to France's role in forging a
controversial peace agreement that Obasanjo personally
probably does not like.
JETER