NIGERIA: DIFFERENT INSIDER VIEWS ON THE PDP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000216

SIPDIS


POL -- FOR J. MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958 DECL 01/15/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DIFFERENT INSIDER VIEWS ON THE PDP
CONVENTION


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: The PDP convention was a study of
rough-hewn politics. All participants agree the
convention was not for the faint-hearted; but they
also give differing, sometimes conflicting, versions
of what happened. We probably will never fully know
the complete truth because so much was blurred by the
hectic pace of events and distorted by the person's
political bias. However, we can state with confidence
that the actual vote count did not accurately reflect
the heated competition at the convention. Less than
one day before the vote, delegates were more evenly
divided between Ekwueme and President Obasanjo. The
power of incumbency and the liberal use of pay-offs
tipped the scale in Obasanjo's favor, turning what
looked like a close race on January 4 into an Obasanjo
landslide by the morning of January 5. What follows
are observations of the convention by three insiders.
We provide them to afford Washington a view of what
many players perceived as what happened behind the
scenes and not necessarily as the complete picture of
what transpired at the convention. End Comment.


--------------
From Inside The Villa
--------------



2. (C) While the voting was being conducted at the PDP
convention late into the night of January 5, PolCouns
met Tunji Abayomi (strictly protect),Obasanjo's
private attorney before the President assumed
Nigeria's highest office. Now an informal advisor to
the President, Abayomi described a panicky President
and coterie the previous day. Obasanjo and his aides
were caught off-guard when, on the eve of the
convention, PDP state governors decided to abandon the
President. Confronted with this betrayal, Obasanjo
issued an "all hands-on-deck" call. Responding to
this mayday, Abayomi spent most of January 4 at the
Villa huddling with numerous Obasanjo advisors,
confidants and friends.



3. (C) The President was dazed, Abayomi recalled.
Jarred by the unexpected possibility of defeat, the
usually know-it-all Obasanjo eagerly solicited counsel
on how to escape the closing vise. Early that day,
the dominant theme was to seek a court injunction
postponing the convention. Proponents suggested the
delay to afford Obasanjo time to marshal support and
undermine Ekwueme's momentum. However, this idea was
ultimately discarded, partially because of
apprehension over the public's reaction. More
importantly, the push for an injunction became less
urgent when the President's advisors began to sense
their man was regaining ground by the hour.



4. (C) The President owed much of his recovery to his
own tenacity and, at times, shamelessness. He pulled
out virtually all the stops to clinch the nomination,
according to Abayomi. For most of that day, the
President's diet consisted of liberal portions of
humble pie. The President pleaded and cajoled; on at
least two occasions his eyes welled with emotion as he
pursued fence-sitting delegates and governors.
However, Obasanjo saved his best to keep Vice
President Atiku from defecting.



5. (C) With rumor swirling that Atiku would opt to
run with Ekwueme, Obasanjo wasted no time visiting the
Vice President's residence. Obasanjo begged,
declaring he would not leave Atiku's home unless the
Vice President accompanied him to win back the
delegates and governors. The performance had the
desired effect. Atiku joined Obasanjo in publicly
lobbying the conventioneers. While it might not have
been Obasanjo's finest hour it was the defining moment
of the convention. What had been a suspenseful
contest would now turn into a rout.



6. (C) Abayomi thought the convention had taught
Obasanjo some valuable lessons. The President learned
that victory was a collective effort but defeat was
solitary; the President, despite all the trappings of
office and the buzz of advisors, was a frightened and
lonely figure much of January 4. Abayomi thought
Obasanjo would show more humility and act less
imperiously as a consequence.



7. (C) However, Abayomi admitted Obasanjo could
easily learn the wrong lessons from the convention
victory. The events could reinforce the notion that
the coercive powers of his office are a President's
chief assets. Abayomi admitted the pleading and
cajolery would not have worked without the underlying
threat that, even if he lost the convention, Obasanjo
still would retain the presidency for another five
months. During that period, he could wreck the
political ambitions of those who sided against him.
It was this reality that kept the Vice President in
line and with him, the governors, and ultimately the
delegates. All things being equal, Ekwueme would
probably have won the convention, Abayomi contended.
Obasanjo was disliked by most of the political elite,
while most people think highly of Ekwueme, he said.
However, the conventioneers' fear of Obasanjo
ultimately corralled their respect for Ekwueme. The
convention boiled down to a street fight between a
hard-nosed bully and a reserved intellectual. In the
end, the bully won.


--------------
The View From The Ekwueme Group
--------------



8. (C) During a January 9 conversation with DCM and
PolCouns, Alhaji Isaiku Ibrahim, Ekwueme's campaign
coordinator, fulminated that Obasanjo cheated his way
to victory. Ibrahim's delegate count the morning of
January 5 revealed a virtual dead heat between
Obasanjo and Ekwueme; thus, Ekwueme's camp anticipated
a second ballot not an Obasanjo first round landslide.
Ibrahim acknowledged that throughout January 4 and
into the early hours of January 5, Ekwueme's fortunes
began to crumble. He cited several reasons for the
change. First, Obasanjo's camp generously showered
delegates and governors with money. Ibrahim contended
governors were given 30 million Naira each while every
delegate received at least 1,000 dollars. The
Obasanjo campaign, not the PDP, paid for the
delegates' hotel rooms. Ibrahim claimed Obasanjo's
team required so much money to pass around that the
Central Bank and Habib Bank kept their doors open
Friday and Saturday nights. (Comment: Money was
certainly passed around at the convention, but
Ibrahim's figures are high even by Nigerian standards.
More importantly, Ekwueme's team should not protest
too loudly. Ekwueme received support from former Head
of State Babangida; if Babangida is in the mix, money
cannot be too far behind. There were numerous reports
that Ekwueme's team also paid for delegate support.
End Comment.)



9. (C) Early on Saturday, Obasanjo was in deep
trouble and he knew it, maintained Ibrahim.
Obasanjo's campaign rousted a High Court judge from
his sleep to prepare the ground for an ex parte motion
to enjoin the convention. Ibrahim said Obasanjo's
minions dropped this idea after the angry judge chided
that their antics not only disturbed his sleep but
also his professional integrity; if they filed the
motion, he would summarily deny it, the judge
promised.



10. (C) Ibrahim claimed Obasanjo's campaign then began
tinkering with delegate accreditation. They
successfully padded the delegate lists of some states
while substituting new lists for other states. He
asserted this manipulation of delegate lists
demonstrated that the PDP machinery was not neutral,
but an adjunct of the Obasanjo campaign. PDP chairman
Audu Ogbeh had compromised his integrity, declared
Ibrahim. (Comment: Others say that Ogbeh had saved the
day and that it was VP Atiku who wanted to cancel the
convention to afford himself more time to a way to
ease Obasanjo out and take first place on the ticket
without infuriating the President. End Comment.)



11. (C) The Ekwueme team's biggest complaint was the
vote counting procedures at the convention. The party
had agreed to conduct the vote by secret ballot,
ostensibly to minimize the fear of intimidation.
However, Obasanjo's team used numbered ballots to
achieve the very thing (intimidation) the secret
ballot was to eliminate. The numbered ballots were
the tip of an elaborate scheme to intimidate
delegates, according to Ibrahim. He claimed Ekwueme
had been hoodwinked by Ogbeh, who ironically was
Ekwueme's campaign manager in the 1980's. Prior to
the convention, Ogbeh had guaranteed he would keep the
ballot paper close-hold to prevent tampering. Because
of their past relationship, Ekwueme trusted Ogbeh.
Thus, Ekwueme did not request to examine the ballot
papers prior to the convention. This was an
irreparable mistake, Ibrahim asserted. With the
ballots numbered, the President's team could determine
how each delegate voted.



12. (C) Ibrahim maintained the President and Vice
President pressured the governors to deliver their
states or risk the overturn of their own re-
nominations. In turn, the governors put their feet on
the neck of their respective state chairmen. The state
chairmen were told to record the numbered ballots
given to each delegate; more ominously, they were
instructed to make sure the delegate knew a ledger was
being kept so that their votes could be traced,
maintained Ibrahim.



13. (C) Even with these devices, the Obasanjo-Atiku
team was not completely sure of victory. They
continued to pressure governors as the vote was being
conducted. Ibrahim claimed VP Atiku cornered Niger
Governor Kure, reminding Kure a favor was owed. The
Vice President reminded Kure, an Obasanjo foe and a
friend of former Head of State Babangida, that Atiku
has supported Kure for renomination in Niger while
Obasanjo and the rest of the party hierarchy backed
Commerce Minister Bello. Calling in his chip, Atiku
said now was Kure's time to reciprocate. Unless he
backed the Obasanjo-Atiku ticket, Atiku threatened
that both he and Obasanjo would make Kure's life
unbearable. Ibrahim also described Kaduna State
governor Makarfi as waffling. Prior to the
convention, Makarfi met Ekwueme and personally pledged
to deliver Kaduna's delegates. After being threatened
by Obasanjo, Makarfi reversed direction. While other
states were voting, Makarfi reportedly gathered
several key delegates from Kaduna pleading with them
to return to Obasanjo. Makarfi said he would "lose
his job" if Kaduna did not vote Obasanjo.



14. (C) Ibrahim maintained that most delegates
recognized Ekwueme was better qualified and
intellectually superior to Obasanjo. However, he
accused Obasanjo of scare tactics and bullying his way
to victory. Ibrahim had no kind words for VP Atiku.
Ibrahim felt Atiku was the person who most influenced
the convention due to the relationship with the
governors. Atiku disliked Obasanjo but listened to
expediency's counsel and stuck with the President.
Atiku ultimately was too frightened that Obasanjo
would ruin him if he defected, Ibrahim asserted.
Obasanjo needed Atiku now. But given Obasanjo's
history of ingratitude and untrustworthiness, Ibrahim
predicted Obasanjo would dump Atiku after the general
election.



15. (C) Because of the perceived irregularities with
the convention. Ekwueme's camp had not "recognized"
the result. Ibrahim stated they were undecided
whether to quit the party or to continue to challenge
the convention results from within. Whatever decision
is made, will be done as a bloc, he said. (Note:
Ekwueme filed a lawsuit to overturn the convention
results. The court denied his request for a temporary
injunction prohibiting the PDP from referring to
Obasanjo as the winner. However, the court will still
hear the substantive issues raised in Ekwueme's suit
at a later date. End Comment.


--------------
One Governor's Perception
--------------



16. (C) In a post-convention discussion with
Ambassador Jeter, Kaduna Governor Makarfi asserted
that Ekwueme's candidacy was never a serious threat to
Obasanjo. The report that he and other governors had
shifted to Ekwueme was a complete feign. The
governors leaked the story to "teach Obasanjo a
lesson" to end his autocratic ways. Makarfi said
Ekwueme's candidacy was ill fated because he
procrastinated by waiting to announce his candidacy a
mere one month before the convention. He logically
could not have expected to catch Obasanjo within such
a brief time. Second, Ekwueme erred by canvassing
delegates independently instead of first talking to
the governors who resented being short-circuited.
Ekwueme learned the hard way that the governors
control the state machinery, Makarfi said.



17. (C) Last, many governors opposed Ekwueme because
he had never explicitly repudiated a proposal he
published in 1994 to reshape Nigeria into a
confederation of relatively autonomous regions. This
proposal, coupled with the fact that Ekwueme might be
sympathetic to Igbo secessionists, caused governors to
fear an Ekwueme presidency could occasion the
dismemberment of Nigeria. (Comment: Makarfi's
points, particularly the belated concern about the
1994 confederation proposal, seem somewhat contrived.
It seems that Makarfi was trying to put the best gloss
on his vacillations during the convention. End
comment.)


--------------
What A Convention It Was
--------------



18. (C) By all accounts, the convention was spirited
drama. The day before the vote was a day of high
anxiety. Obasanjo and Ekwueme's fortunes waxed and
waned several times that day. Vice President Atiku
occupied an extraordinary position. If any one person
determined the outcome, it was Atiku. However, his
situation was bittersweet. Courted by both Obasanjo
and Ekwueme, he could do no worse than emerge as the
Vice Presidential candidate; however, he also could do
no better. Atiku recognized the irony of his position,
although he certainly did not enjoy it. Meanwhile,
the PDP governors affirmed that they were powerful
players, yet, in the end they did not buck the
President.



19. (C) Backslapping, back-room deals, and
backtracking from promises made were all represent and
well accounted for during the convention. This was a
classic lesson in hardball politics. Throughout the
convention, principle was told to sit still and behave
while the players cut and uncut deals unmolested by
any tinge of conscience. The convention was about
people protecting and promoting their narrow
interests. Political conventions traditionally are
not profiles in rectitude but contests of ambition,
avarice and advantage. This one was no different. It
was both worse and better than it could have been.
Competition was limited to political tricks and
treachery -- there was no violence or physical
intimidation. Money exchanged hands but probably in
lesser amounts than in 1999. For all its demerits,
the convention was what realistically could be
expected for a second edition of a party convention in
a fledgling democracy like that of Nigeria.
JETER