TAYLOR TO SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001937

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV LI NI
SUBJECT: TAYLOR TO SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT STRATEGY

REF: A. ABUJA 1730

B. ABUJA 1034

C. ABUJA 1134

D. ABUJA 1246

E. ABUJA 1327

F. ABUJA 1831


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ROGER A. MEECE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: The GON believes it has performed a major
service by taking a leadership role in arranging Taylor's
departure from Liberia, and committing its own troops to
participate in needed related follow-up peacekeeping efforts.
Both have involved significant domestic political risk.
Nigerians believe that Taylor is losing influence inside
Liberia as the transition there moves forward. There have
been signs that President Obasanjo eventually plans to rid
himself of Taylor, and the political burden that he
represents, but likely only in a fashion that preserves GON
integrity in commitments it made to get Taylor out of Liberia
in the first place. The GON is likely to react badly to
overt pressure to turn Taylor over to the Sierra Leone
special court too soon. Such overt pressure risks a
counterproductive inclination by at least some Nigerians to
keep Taylor a bit longer than might otherwise be the case vs.
appearing to give in to a fickle U.S. prevailing sentiment.



2. (C) A better alternative would be to engage the GON to
tell us what Obasanjo may see as an appropriate timetable for
Taylor's departure to a Liberian court, and perhaps
ultimately to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),a
logical extension of the GON's public position. A perceived
threatening approach to the GON for an immediate turnover
could result in embarrassment and a sharp if relatively short
downturn in bilateral relations, and we believe it would be
unlikely to get Taylor to the SCSL any sooner. END SUMMARY.


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BACKGROUND
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3. (C) Taylor was granted asylum in Nigeria as part of a deal
the GON made at our request and in Nigeria's own interest.
The USG also made clear on multiple occasions, including
President Bush's visit to Nigeria in July (REF D),that
Taylor's departure from Liberia was a prerequisite for any
deployment of U.S. combat forces to that country and related
progress in the peace process. By agreeing to accept Taylor,
with USG concurrence, the GON opened the door to allow the
Free Port and other key objectives to be secured much sooner
than would have been the case otherwise. Indeed, the GON
action could be argued as being the key that has led directly
to the current transitional government.



4. (C) Despite numerous international and some domestic calls
for Taylor to be transferred to the SCSL, it is clear
President Obasanjo does not plan to do so in the immediate
future, and prefers us not to ask (REF A). Obasanjo does not
want to renege on exile for Taylor so soon, for credibility
and reasons of African politics. Obasanjo has stated
publicly that he would, however, be in favor of sending
Taylor back to Liberia if the new GOL wanted to put Taylor on
trial. For this reason, GOL coating for a request to send
Taylor to the SCSL may be an easier pill for Obasanjo to
swallow eventually.



5. (C) Western public pressure or threats of sanctions are
likely to make that pill harder to swallow. Obasanjo also
has been unmoved by sticks in previous cases, such as the
sanctions over the 2001 Benue massacre (REF B),and probably
would not obligingly agree to a USG request based on such
threats. Obasanjo has already taken heat among some
Nigerians for granting Taylor asylum, overruling his Chief of
Defense Staff by deploying two battalions to Liberia (REF E),
and disregarding the wishes of his MFA and many top advisors
by signing the Article 98 agreement (REF C) -- all in
response to USG requests. After already enduring the fallout
from granting Taylor asylum in the first place, Obasanjo is
unlikely to send Taylor to the SCSL in a way that will make
him appear to be merely doing the USG's bidding again -- even
if that bidding is perceived to have changed.


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NIGERIA'S THINKING ON TAYLOR
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6. (C) In addition to the political aspects above, it is the
Nigerians who have troops on the ground in Liberia and stand
to lose if Taylor's influence there upsets the transition
applecart. The GON tells us that they see Taylor's influence
in Liberia continuing to wane, and that reports he maintains
contact with supporters in Liberia, while troubling, are
neither surprising nor an insuperable obstacle. With every
day that passes and with every decision made by Gyude
Bryant's transitional government, the Nigerians believe,
Taylor's ability to influence events in Liberia from Nigeria
decreases.



7. (C) The Nigerians do not doubt that Taylor will continue
to attempt to meddle in Liberian affairs. And they have
signaled that major violations of Taylor's terms of exile
could become a reason to send him to the SCSL. The Nigerians
point out, however, that Taylor can only cause serious
trouble if he goes free, and that the SCSL cannot guarantee
his conviction.


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OUR THINKING
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8. (C) A better alternative than overt pressure to move
Taylor now would be to work out an understanding with the GON
on how and why Taylor would end up at the SCSL. Tactically,
we would start by working our way toward Obasanjo's telling
us what he sees as the appropriate timetable for Taylor's
departure to the SCSL or a Liberian court. This would not be
an abrupt change. We are already in a dialogue with the GON
where we point out Taylor's misbehavior and tell the
Nigerians the SCSL is the appropriate place to send Taylor if
he misbehaves, and the Nigerians respond that Taylor's
misbehavior is within expected bounds and the results of his
misbehavior are less and less over time for reasons on the
ground in Liberia. Packaged with a GOL request that Taylor
be moved somewhere, it would be hard for the Nigerians to
avoid moving the present discussion forward in the direction
it is already going.



9. (C) A threatening approach demanding Taylor's immediate
handover, on the other hand, has costs no matter how it turns
out. If Obasanjo refused such a request, the cost would be
embarrassment for us and a sharp but probably relatively
short downturn in our relations with the GON. And the
shortness of the downturn assumes the SCSL eventually
convicts, sentences and incarcerates Taylor. If Obasanjo on
the other hand caved in, which we believe unlikely at the
moment, the cost would be major embarrassment for him and a
lengthier but softer downturn in our relations with the GON.
MEECE