Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1576
2003-09-09 17:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

MFA PERMSEC ON TAYLOR'S EXILE

Tags:  PGOV PREL LI NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001576 

SIPDIS


FROM CDA ROGER MEECE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL LI NI
SUBJECT: MFA PERMSEC ON TAYLOR'S EXILE


REF: STATE 256461


Classified by CDA Roger Meece. Reason 1.5 (b/d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001576

SIPDIS


FROM CDA ROGER MEECE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL LI NI
SUBJECT: MFA PERMSEC ON TAYLOR'S EXILE


REF: STATE 256461


Classified by CDA Roger Meece. Reason 1.5 (b/d)



1. (C) I took the opportunity of a September 9 courtesy call
on Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Amb.
Daniel Hart to convey USG concerns regarding Taylor's exile
per reftel. I conveyed appreciation for Nigeria's leadership
role to find a solution to the Liberian crisis, but observed
that any Taylor activity to influence developments in Liberia
represents an obstacle to further progress. Hart stressed
that President Obasanjo had incurred political risk with
Taylor's presence in Nigeria, as press and many sectors of
society disapprove. He readily agreed that concern about
Taylor is warranted, asserting that the GON intends to keep a
very close eye on him. Indeed, he added, his reading of the
conditions suggest that Taylor's Calabar exile amounts to de
facto house arrest. He commented that he had personally been
suprised that Taylor had traveled to meet Obasanjo via Lagos
this past weekend, as the trip seemed a bit "excessive" to
him. He acknowledged, however, that the GON is not able
(comment: or likely fully willing) to cut off Taylor's access
to all forms of communication.


2.(C) I asked if the conditions governing Taylor's removal to
Nigeria specifically precluded any activities to influence
political developments in Liberia. Hart said that the
understanding was not that explicit, but that it was fully
understood that Taylor should not do so. Somewhat
cryptically he added that President Blah's turnover of power
to the transitional authority in Liberia should provide an
opportunity to eliminate any residual Taylor role. Hart
affirmed that the GON would view any actions by Taylor to
interfere in Liberia as a serious breach of his commitments,
and he appealed for close collaboration with the U.S. in
sharing any information that might become available in this
regard. I assured Hart that we are commited to close
cooperation to ensure Taylor is contained. Hart volunteered
that he would share the document summarizing Taylor's
restrictions and conditions in Nigeria, and promised he would
send us a copy.



3. (C) I asked if the GON had received any communication from
the Sierra Leone tribunal regarding Taylor. Hart said that
to his knowledge, the GON had not, but that he would not be
suprised by the Tribunal judge taking a "legalistic" view
that they should have jurisdiction over Taylor. He said that
this is an issue for the Head(s) of State.



4. (C) Comment: Hart was not at all hesitant to discuss this
issue, seemed well informed, and fully on board on the need
to keep Taylor reigned in. He only ducked the question of
Sierra Leone Tribunal jurisdiction. His general theme was
that the GON generally and Obasanjo specifically, have
invested a lot in Liberia and do not want Taylor to be the
spoiler. Taylor's presence here is a political liability,
and clearly Hart would like his President to get credit for
taking on the problem. Hart's reference to the opportunity
to eliminate Taylor's influence definitively when Blah
transfers power is intriguing, but may reflect nothing more
than his vision of what the transitional government will be.
We will pursue this issue, and I will follow-up during
anticipated calls on the Foreign Minister and hopefully
President Obasanjo before departure for the UNGA. End
comment.
MEECE