Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
03ABUJA1560 | 2003-09-05 16:54:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abuja |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001560 |
1. (S) Responses to specific reftel questions are below. They are based on the assumption that the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) remains the ruling party after the various legal challenges to the 2003 elections. BACKGROUND 2. (C) The PDP was founded in the wake of Abacha's death in 1998, and originally included many long-time politicians from around the country. During the 1999 Party convention, some supported the presidential ambition of former Vice President Alex Ekwueme, and others coalesced around former President and retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, recently released from prison. Obasanjo's supporters included both leading opponents of Abacha and many pro-Abacha holdovers. Obasanjo won the nomination and sought the support of the political machine headed by his former deputy, the late Shehu Yar'Adua, by bringing Atiku Abubakar onto the ticket as the vice-presidential candidate. The first Obasanjo administration brought a shifting of those alliances and an exodus of many of the PDP's founders. The executive council has been remade in Obasanjo's image, and the organization that originally sought his participation has since become dependent on him for its continued existence. 3. (S) Responses keyed to reftel. A. The political situation in the Southwest remains unsettled since the April 19 elections and the loss by the historically Yoruba party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), of virtually all of its elected representatives. Many senior Yoruba politicians are not members of the PDP. Those within the PDP are directly beholden to President Obasanjo. These loyalists will likely remain or bolt depending on the access to government contracts that they expect from the winners; future election victories will be a secondary consideration. While the Yoruba are the least likely to support a candidate from another ethnic group, the current level of disaffection with the President has produced alliances among elements of the dominant Afenifere/AD political grouping and other opposition parties. Among others, Ibrahim Babangida has apparently begun his 2007 campaign, but it is unclear whether he will seek the PDP nomination, some other party's nomination or come up with a new alignment of supporters to back him. B. Lagos Governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu's interest in promoting his own political ambitions leads him to work both sides of the political fence. He is striving to establish himself as the leader of a "reborn" AD, while working Vice-President Atiku Abubakar for a shot at the Vice-presidency on the chance that Atiku emerges as the PDP presidential candidate in 2007. Tinubu has access to the Presidency, the Vice-Presidency and to Governors throughout the political spectrum, although the authorities in Abuja do not trust him. The recent crisis in Anambra state has pushed all of the governors closer together in the interest of self-preservation, and even PDP governors have been reaching out to their ANPP and AD counterparts. C. No governor of any party has established national prominence by effectively administering his state. D. There are no major national power brokers left in the PDP. Obasanjo has taken control of the national party structure and shows no sign of loosening his grip. The local and regional power brokers are numerous, but their influence is limited to their respective geographic regions. Even Vice President Atiku Abubakar is canvassing for support outside of the party structure. Obasanjo has a stong hold on the PDP machinery at the national and local levels through the dependency on him of GON Ministers, Special Advisers, Ambassadors and most state Governors. Many of Atiku's appointees were rejected, several of them at Obasanjo's personal request. The pre-existing Yar'Adua political machine now is on the outside of the PDP, and is less than thrilled with the prospect of Atiku's candidacy in 2007 anyway. E. The de facto political power wielded by state governors is the ability to distribute money, through appointments, contracts or direct cash disbursements downward in the system. The state governors have little influence on the national party structure and Obasanjo has gone to great lengths to ensure that they remain docile. Many governors owe their election to the security services and INEC, both of which are controlled by the President. F. The PDP has not made, and is not expected to make, efforts to develop a comprehensive policy platform, or even substantive policy planks on many important issues. Public statements often outline policy goals but without substance or action to implement them. The party's policies are whatever Obasanjo's policies are, with an added layer of catering to regional power brokers' pursuit of self-enrichment. Since party cohesion depends almost entirely on patronage, for the PDP and the opposition parties as well, their constituencies are defined in terms of clients and rent-seekers. The PDP claims a presence in every district in Nigeria, but it depends on the loyalty of government officials and security operatives in most places. G. Many of the original founders of the PDP criticize Obasanjo and the party, and have either left or been rendered powerless within the party system. Unification of the PDP's factions, and the continued existence of the party, will depend on the distribution of favors to various players. The only political force that the PDP can count on in future elections is the tendency among voters to choose the party in power when they know a vote against it would be wasted, as shown in the drop in turnout for the Presidential elections after Obasanjo seemed sure to win, and the even lower turnout (less than ten percent in some areas and approaching 20 percent nationwide) for the state assembly elections after the April 12 National Assembly election results were announced. H. While many PDP politicians remain indebted to Obasanjo, he also carries a heavy debt to regional power brokers and other influential politicians from the 2003 elections. Those debts are more likely to be paid through GON expenditures than through policy or administrative perks. Obasanjo has intervened, for example, to keep PDP National Assembly members from freely choosing their own chamber leaders, committee chairmen or even their own staff. While they are expected to act as a rubber stamp, enabling Obasanjo to pursue his own goals without impediment, some cracks are already appearing in the monolith. I. Given Obasanjo's lame duck status, having been elected to two terms, many Embassy contacts say they expect a constitutional amendment within the year. Two scenarios which affect term limits would be: a) eliminating term limits entirely, and b) extending the Presidential term to six years and limiting all future elected officials to one term. Many re-elected governors would rather the first option if asked, since most are unlikely to graduate to the national scene, while Obasanjo is said to favor the second option. By giving him an extra two years, the story goes, he might buy some support now from incumbents who would otherwise be hard pressed to engineer victories again in 2007 without his (i.e. the PDP's and GON's) active participation in their elections. Others point to the six-year term limit ensuring that Obasanjo would remain the "longest serving elected leader" in Nigeria's history. Obasanjo has not mentioned any such constitutional changes, and an open endorsement would damage his image. J. Babangida would like nothing more than to be accepted as a candidate for the 2007 elections. His popularity at the grassroots level is diminished and no longer enjoys the "Maradona" reputation. Given Nigerian elections, grassroots support may be less relevant to his ambitions anyway. Babangida is more likely to look to the liberal use of money and some agreement with Obasanjo on a manner to remove Atiku, either from office or at least from the PDP nomination. Abia State Governor Kalu, while enjoying a reasonable reputation, is ambitious and would accept the number two position on any ticket in order to ensure a chance at an Igbo presidency. It is too early to assess the likelihood of this scenario. K. The results of the 2003 elections point to a realignment of political forces along ethnic lines. The ANPP had strong showings throughout Nigeria, with the exception of the South-West, but the manipulated outcomes of the National Assembly elections of 2003 is driving it back to its ethnic roots to become the de facto northern (i.e., Hausa/Fulani and Kanuri) party. The APGA likewise is heading toward becoming the Igbo party. The dust has yet to clear, but an AD rising from its own ashes, or a disintegrating PDP driven apart by competing interests, or some combination thereof, is likely to emerge as the Yoruba party. This alignment leaves little room for the numerous South-South and Middle Belt minorities, but they are unlikely to come together as a fourth force. Instead they will probably seek accommodation within or along the margins of the three main groups. MEECE |