NIGERIAN RULING PARTY CONVENTION SURPRISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000015

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 01/05/07
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN RULING PARTY CONVENTION SURPRISE


REFS: A. Abuja 0005

B. Telcons Andrews/Arietti 4-5 Jan 03

C. Abuja 0012


CLASSIFIED BY DCM ANDREWS. REASON: 1.5 (D).



1. (C ) Summary: President Obasanjo's renomination is highly
probable but not certain. The 3,349 delegates to the ruling
PDP's national convention began voting around sundown, but
the process could drag into Monday morning. On convention
eve, the President's renomination seemed assured (Ref A).
However, his strategy of alliance with the governors lost
its legs when most Southeastern and South-South Governors
turned on him. Other governors joined in. At one point, 16
of the 21 PDP governors were estimated to have shifted
allegiance, with former Vice President Alex Ekwueme the
beneficiary. By Saturday morning most observers gave
Ekwueme the inside track. That entire day transformed into
an endless stream of meetings in numerous locations, with
key players moving about, facilely proposing deals and
making promises to advance their interests. Alternatively
cajoling and arm-twisting governors and delegates, Obasanjo
slowly recovered ground. VP Atiku Abubakar's decision not
to jump ship stalled the rebellious governors' momentum.
By Sunday morning, relieved Presidential advisors claimed
to have the Governors back in line. While Atiku may have
wanted to abandon Obasanjo, he feared the consequences of
openly challenging his President. The PDP will emerge from
this convention even more profoundly divided than it was
going in. End Summary.



2. (C) Going into the convention, Obasanjo believed his
re-nomination was assured. Despite a strong challenge by
former Vice President Alex Ekwueme (Chairman of the PDP
Board of Trustees and a founding member of the party),
Obasanjo and his advisors were confident. Party apparatus
in ANPP- and AD-controlled states was firmly behind the
President. He had met with PDP Governors (who in most
cases exercise great influence over their delegations)
December 30 and thought he had their support. At that
meeting, Obasanjo distanced himself from reports that he
wanted to disqualify some Governors from contesting in the
general elections despite their having "won" (ref C)
renomination. Obasanjo promised that his "incumbents pact"
with the Governors remained solid. However, the harmony of
that meeting began to dissipate when, soon after returning
home, the governors started receiving reports from inside
the Presidency that Obasanjo had lied to secure their
support: he still intended to push the PDP to jettison some
governors after he secured the nomination. Faced with
Obasanjo's presumed insincerity, South-South governors met
Thursday night, deciding the best way to protect their
seats was to attack Obasanjo's.



3. (C) The South-South Governors' anger was also stoked by
Obasanjo's failure to sign the amended oil dichotomy bill
(septel),the hot button issue in their region. Two of the
leaders of this gubernatorial insurrection were Delta's
James Ibori and Edo's Lucky Igbinedion. Ironically, when
they had thought Obasanjo would sign the bill, this same
duo had proposed during a PDP National Executive Committee
(NEC) meeting in November that Obasanjo be renominated "by
consensus" by the NEC.



4. (C) It was not hard to entice other governors onto the
anti-Obasanjo wagon. Southeastern Governors had their own
grievances. Moreover, there was the long-standing
agitation for an Igbo candidate. With former Vice-President
Ekwueme now the main challenger, these Igbo Governors were
under pressure at home to support this ethnic favorite son.
A special assistant to Abia State Governor Kalu told us
that Kalu's presidential aspirations for 2007 made him
ambivalent about fellow Igbo Ekwueme taking the 2003 PDP
nomination. Ekwueme's ascendance would virtually dash any
hope of Kalu gaining the Presidency as the rotation would
not return to the Southeast for over twenty years. However,
after having been the most vocal advocate for an Igbo
president, Kalu's greatest fear was being branded a crass
hypocrite if he failed to back Ekwueme. By the time the
convention began on Saturday morning, several northern
Governors, including Adamawa's Boni Haruna, Vice President
Atiku's acolyte, had joined the rebel camp.



5. (C) Although the governors had decided to oppose the
President, they had not by early Saturday morning decided
whom to back. Some of them wanted to put two of their own
number against the incumbents (an idea they had reportedly
considered prior to the December 30 meeting). This concept
never took hold because of disagreement over composition of
the ticket. Also, it was clear that a role had to be found
for Ekwueme. The governors then asked the VP to contest
against Obasanjo, according to Atiku's special advisor.
The Advisor said Atiku offered to take the governors'
advice but only if they publicly and unequivocally called
for Atiku's candidacy before he left the President. The
advisor claimed the Governors' rejection of Obasanjo was
driven by the President's unpopularity. They feared he
would not only would lose his general election but would
take them down with him. As of late Saturday, however, the
advisor thought the governors would back Ekwueme and that
he would win the nomination; to restore some party unity in
the wake of a divisive fight, Ekwueme would name Atiku as
the Vice-Presidential candidate and Atiku would accept.


--------------
OBASANJO BATTLES BACK
--------------



6. (C) Jarred by the prospect of humiliating defeat,
Obasanjo began to act more like a politician than a
potentate on Saturday. With Atiku in tow, he made the
rounds to visit state delegations and even to confer with
influential individual delegates. For instance, to the
important South-South delegates, he promised to reverse his
stance and sign the oil dichotomy bill next week. He also
moved decisively to reconcile with the governors, lunching
with them as a group, later visiting individually with
several. There were plausible but unconfirmed reports of
money changing hands. Obasanjo and his minions also used
strong-arm tactics. Part of his not-so-gentle suasion with
the governors was the threat to dedicate the powers of his
office to scuttle the reelection of those who did not
support him.



7. (C) Obasanjo even swallowed his pride by asking to meet
the leadership of the National Assembly, the den of some of
his staunchest opponents. Reportedly, Assembly members were
told the President would open the pork barrel by releasing
funds for "constituency projects" in exchange for support.
By Sunday morning, Obasanjo's overtures seemed to have some
effect. Key Obasanjo allies were smiling, confident most
governors had returned to the fold.


--------------
EKWUEME TRIES TO HOLD ON
--------------



8. (C) Having lost at the last minute to Obasanjo at the
in 1999 convention, Ekwueme was doing his best to repay
Obasanjo in the same coin. Ekwueme actively lobbied
Governors and delegations. He also engaged the other
presidential contestants, Barnabas Gemade and Abubakar
Rimi, reportedly offering each the Vice-Presidency in
exchange for their support. (Rimi probably controls about
200 votes; Gemade might have 50.). However, Ekwueme's most
serious attentions were directed toward Vice President
Atiku, whose influence over the party faithful could swing
several hundred delegates and sway the thinking of the
governors. Ekwueme made several attempts to meet Atiku, who
demurred, fearing Obasanjo's reaction to such a meeting at
such a tense moment. Working through intermediaries,
Ekwueme offered the second slot on his ticket to Atiku.
Media reports allege that Ekwueme offered, should they win
the general election, to resign as President in 2006 so
that Atiku could run as an incumbent in 2007. However, an
Ekwueme insider denied his candidate made such a desperate
proposal. He stated the proposal surfaced from Atiku' side;
but to protect their boss's flank from Obasanjo's anger,
Atiku's men attributed the idea to Ekwueme.


--------------
ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO ATIKU
--------------



9. (C) Because of his influence over individual delegates
and governors in his PDM faction of the party, Atiku may
determine the final direction the convention's wind blows.
In some ways, his is an enviable position; but from another
angle, it is akin to walking a minefield. The pressure on
him not to make a misstep is intense. The ambitious yet
cautious Atiku would like the presidential nomination.
However, Atiku dare not challenge Obasanjo directly,
knowing Obasanjo would use the tools of the Presidency to
destroy Atiku for what Obasanjo would see as a monumental
betrayal. Both prior to the convention and into the early
hours of its second day, Atiku obviously was groping for
some device or pretext that would enable him to separate
from Obasanjo without being accused of having scuttled the
President's re-nomination.



10. (C) The Governor's eleventh hour insurgency momentarily
must have seen like the answer. Publicly, Atiku announced
he stood with Obasanjo but his assistants were busy talking
to the President's opponents. Moreover, the Atiku's public
statement of loyalty was less than ringing, and observers
knew that Adamawa Governor Haruna would never have joined
the rebellion without his mentor's approval. However, what
first seemed like a gift became a millstone around the
Vice-Presidential neck. Obasanjo put Atiku on the spot by
making sure that Atiku joined his efforts to regain
gubernatorial support. The more Atiku was seen helping
Obasanjo, the more Atiku's potential supporters in the
anti-Obasanjo camp pressured him. Some of his followers
threatened to abandon him unless he joined Ekwueme or
challenged Obasanjo outright.



11. (C) Jumping from Obasanjo's ship to Ekwueme's was not
ultimately very attractive to Atiku. First, there was that
little problem of Obasanjo feeling betrayed and then acting
on those feelings; it is generally believed that Obasanjo
has sufficient evidence of Atiku's corrupt practices to
ruin the man. Second, Atiku does not fully trust Ekwueme.
Former Head of State Babangida and probably National
Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed, two of Atiku's political
rivals in the North, are reportedly backing Ekwueme. Atiku
has to be concerned that, at Babangida's urging, Ekwueme
might dump him once the PDP nomination was secured.



12. (C) When not pounding the turf with Obasanjo, Atiku
spent the remainder of Saturday with allies and aides
discussing how to walk his tightrope. By Sunday morning,
Atiku had apparently decided, for better or worse, that he
was married to Obasanjo and that Ekwueme was not a
sufficiently strong suitor to steal him from a jealous
spouse.


--------------
BUYING TIME
--------------



13. (C) Obasanjo used influence over the party machinery,
especially party Chairman Ogbeh, to buy precious additional
hours on Saturday. Delegate accreditation was scheduled for
Saturday afternoon. However, PDP officials in charge of the
process were Obasanjo loyalists. Sensing the momentum had
shifted to Ekwueme, they slowed accreditation of delegates.
While the voting was not set until Sunday in any event, the
accreditation delay pushed the start of balloting from late
morning to early evening, giving the Presidency some extra
time to canvas for support. It also provided the psychic
benefit of regaining control of what had seemed to be a
runaway train, denting Ekwueme supporters psychologically.
Some of them began to lament Obasanjo that had the tools to
orchestrate his victory regardless of the delegate count.


--------------
THE VOTE AND ITS UNCERTAINTY
--------------



14. (C) With Atiku and most governors back in the fold, it
appears Obasanjo has regained the momentum and probably the
lead. However, the vote tonight will be by secret ballot
(sort of -- delegates will vote individually but must place
a thumbprint on the ballot). Since their votes cannot be
definitively attributed without thumbprint analysis,
delegate behavior will be hard to predict. No one has done
an accurate poll of the individual delegates. The working
assumption has been that the delegates will follow their
governor's lead. While that may have been true coming into
the convention, it may not be quite as valid now. The
governors' initial defiance opened the way to delegates to
assert their own independence. With the cork now off, it
will be hard to put all the delegates back in the bottle.
Most of the delegates we talked to favored Ekwueme. It is
uncertain whether the governors can make most of them
change course at this point. The delegates have been
talking to each other, and this has given them a power and
momentum of their own. Also, we cannot gauge how committed
the Governors are to their supposed reconciliation with
Obasanjo. If the reconciliation was just superficial, then
they might not try hard to instill voting discipline among
their delegates. The Obasanjo camp's claim that victory is
certain is based on the false tally that the pro-Obasanjo
governors will carry all their delegates. We think the
actually voting will be more complicated and ambiguous.
Obasanjo will probably win a first-ballot victory, but the
overwhelming 75%-plus first-ballot vote of confidence some
in his camp are predicting may well escape him.



15. (C) Gemade and Rimi, while neither has a chance, also
are wild cards. Between them, they might control up to 300
delegates. If they get the higher figure and Ekwueme holds
onto anti-Obasanjo delegates, Obasanjo might even be denied
a first-round victory. Should that happen, the struggle for
their second-round support would be intense.


--------------
A FRACTURED PARTY?
--------------

16. (C) The winner will face a party riven by factionalism
and the contention of this convention. Large sums are said
to have been spent to cajole delegates (between 20 and 60
million USD, according to most estimates),and the loser's
backers will have to be compensated if they are to return
to the PDP fold and support the winner in April's general
election. Also, Obasanjo reportedly made promises (e.g., to
sign a bill that would give coastal states at least 13% of
the federal revenue derived from oil wells out to 200 NM)
to secure support from one part of the country (South-
South) that will not sit will with those states (all others
except Ondo and Lagos) whose shares of the future revenue
pie will thereby be reduced proportionately. Assuming he
emerges victorious from the convention, Obasanjo will have
to work furiously to ensure that he can legitimately win at
least one-third of the popular vote in not less than 25
states and to prevent mass defections to other parties.
JETER