NIGERIA: CHAMBAS SAYS DISCORD AND LETHARGY HINDERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000124

SIPDIS


PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS KPKO NI IV
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CHAMBAS SAYS DISCORD AND LETHARGY HINDERS
ECOWAS EFFORTS ON COTE D'IVOIRE


REF: A. DAKAR 98

B. DAKAR 151

C. LOME 26


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a January 8 conversation with
Ambassador Jeter, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas
acknowledged ECOWAS diplomatic efforts in Cote d'Ivoire had
lost steam due to ECOWAS Chairman Wade's erratic
statesmanship, the lethargy of President Gbagbo and lack of
focus of Togolese leader Eyadema in his role as mediator
between the GOCI and the MPCI. Chambas believed France
originally hoped its call for a Paris Summit would roust
ECOWAS from inaction. When ECOWAS leaders failed to
respond, the French decided to proceed with the Summit.
Chambas noted President Obasanjo had signaled thumbs down
on deploying Nigerian peacekeepers on Iviorien soil;
Chambas hoped Obasanjo would play a more active diplomatic
role now that he had secured his party's renomination.
Chambas did not believe member-states would commit
additional soldiers to allow ECOWAS to increase the size of
the proposed peacekeeping force. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) During a January 8 dinner conversation at the
Ambassador's residence, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed
Ibn Chambas shared his views on the Ivoirien peace process.
According to Chambas, dissonance among ECOWAS Heads of
State was severely impeding the organization's efforts to
forge a diplomatic solution and to get a peacekeeping force
on the ground. Chambas particularly criticized ECOWAS
Chairman Wade. Chambas said the Chairman's penchant for
off-the-cuff statements confused and irritated Wade's
colleagues. Because Wade was the ECOWAS Chairman, his
statements were perceived to be official policy when in
fact they were no more than his private musings. Wade's
most recent transgression was to call for a UN peacekeeping
force. Chambas said that Wade's call for the "blue helmets"
not only came as a surprise but it also complicated ongoing
efforts to coordinate the deployment of an ECOWAS force.



3. (C) Chambas contended Wade's unilateralism had
undermined the Contact Group and Eyadema's efforts as
mediator. At the December 15 summit in Kara, President
Obasanjo took Wade to task for being a lone ranger and not
using his position as ECOWAS Chairman to lead and
coordinate with his colleagues. Obasanjo criticized Wade
for being less than supportive of Eyadema's efforts, noting
that Wade's public statements questioning the utility of
the Lome mediation had humiliated Eyadema needlessly and
that poor relationship between the two leaders most active
in the peace process was impeding progress. Obasanjo also
asserted that Wade had stepped out of line when, at the
beginning of the crisis, he sent his Foreign Minister to
Abidjan with an alternative peace plan almost immediately
after the Contact Group had left. Obasanjo chided Wade for
following this dismal precedent for a relationship with the
Contact Group. When the Heads of State reached Abidjan,
Obasanjo continued his blunt diplomacy. At their airport
meeting, he told Gbagbo, "you have a problem and your
problem is us!"



4. (C) Chambas had hoped that Obasanjo's intervention at
Kara signaled the Nigerian's more active engagement; he
also hoped it would push Wade and Eyadema to mend their
rift. Unfortunately neither has happened. Enmeshed in the
business of his hard-fought presidential re-nomination,
Obasanjo forgot Cote d'Ivoire. Because Obasanjo was not
there to scold them and with no other ECOWAS leader to fill
that void, Wade and Eyadema regressed to their relationship
of cold indifference with occasional antagonism. Now that
Obasanjo has secured his party renomination, Chambas hoped
Obasanjo might devote more time to Cote d'Ivoire. If so,
he expected the Nigerian leader to continue his efforts to
bring peace among the ECOWAS leaders, seeing the end of
their competition as a precursor to ECOWAS playing a
sufficiently constructive role in the peace process.



5. (C) Chambas felt Wade's insistence on having a "global"
peace agreement between the GOCI and the three rebel groups
before deploying a peacekeeping force was handicapping his
efforts. He believed the fighting had to stop before real
negotiations on a political solution could begin. While
Senegal has deployed a 21-man headquarters unit and the
French are transporting Senegal's 170-man combat team to
CDI, it remains to be seen whether Wade will allow
Senegalese soldiers to actively participate in monitoring
operations without a formal agreement.



6. (C) Emphasizing that Wade was not totally responsible
for the sub-region's inertia, Chambas claimed that Eyadema
was ill suited for the role of mediator. Eyadema did not
grasp that time was of the essence and that bringing peace
grew more difficult with each passing day. Instead, Eyadema
was content to keep the talks on the slow track, at one
point forecasting the talks could last months. Eyadema
reveled in the press coverage and attention; meetings were
often replete with protocol and frills but short on
substance. The Togolese leader seemed to be using the
meeting as a vehicle to enhance his domestic image rather
than forge genuine progress toward an Ivoirien peace.



7. (C) Chambas believed Gbagbo suffered from similar
desultoriness. Gbagbo did not understand that delay
advantaged the rebels not Abidjan. The longer the rebels
controlled the North the more they could consolidate power,
the more accustomed to leadership they would become. Their
willingness to cede control would diminish as a function of
time. If the current situation persists, the de facto
partition of Cote d'Ivoire could become an accomplished
fact. For instance, Chambas noted that significant trade
between the rebel-held areas and neighboring states was
occurring. Chambas hoped Gbagbo would not let himself be
captive to regime hard-liners who favored the military
option; according to Chambas, Gbagbo needed to become more
active in talking to the rebels and opposition political
leaders to discuss the issues associated with national
reconciliation and expanding the political space and
participation.



8. (C) Chambas said that neither Malian President Toure nor
Burkina's Campaore have been active players recently.
Wanting to get involved, Toure had hosted the talks between
the Gbagbo and Campaore; hopes that the talks would be the
vehicle to begin a dialogue to resolve bilateral
differences were quickly dashed; the talks rambled and were
inconclusive. Toure blamed Gbagbo for letting a golden
opportunity slip because he was unfocused and vague at the
meeting. At least for now, Toure has decided not to waste
more political capital on Gbagbo until the Ivorien shows
more seriousness. Meanwhile Chambas surmised that Campaore
is relatively comfortable since attention has shifted from
him and accusations of complicity have dwindled.



9. (C) Chambas expressed his hope that the Paris peace
talks would prove fruitful. He believed the only way to
find a political solution to the crisis was to bring all of
the important actors to the table. Specifically, he noted
that former President Bedie, former Prime Minister
Ouattara, and General Guei's political heir, presumably his
son, must be included for the process to be worthwhile.



10. (C) Chambas did not expect member states to increase
their troop contributions at this time. He said the force
commander, Senegalese Brigadier General Papa Khalil Fall,
and his staff were planning for 1,300 troops. Chambas
discounted rumors of a Senegal augmentation, stating that
his latest information was that Senegal would not deploy
more than 250 soldiers.



11. (C) Chambas further noted that Nigerian soldiers would
not be joining the ECOWAS force any time soon. Obasanjo
had decided against sending troops due to domestic
political considerations. His opponents would make it a
campaign issue and opposition in the National Assembly
would try to block his request. (NOTE: The Nigerian
constitution requires that Obasanjo seek Assembly approval
for the deployment. END NOTE.) Chambas said the GON could
not seriously consider deploying troops to Cote d'Ivoire
until after the April elections.


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WHO WILL BE THE NEXT ECOWAS CHAIRMAN
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12. (C) Despite Wade's erratic performance, Chambas thought
Wade would be re-elected as Chairman at the ECOWAS Summit
later this month. The rotation should go to an Anglophone
country and Gambia's Jammeh had been lobbying for the
position. Jammeh visited Obasanjo in December to ask for
his support. Chambas said Obasanjo's response fell far
short of an endorsement with Obasanjo simply telling the
Gambian he was not opposed to Jammeh seeking the
Chairmanship. Chambas did not think Jammeh would garner
much support and felt Presidents Kufuor and Kabbah would be
better choices if Wade's return somehow was blocked.
Liberia's Taylor was out of the question. Chambas said,
however, that Kuofor would not lobby for the position but
would serve if drafted.


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TROUBLE IN TOGO
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13. (C) Finally, the discussion turned to recent events in
Togo. Chambas was troubled by the recent change to Togo's
constitution to allow Eyadema another term in office (REF
C). He commented that over the course of the last year,
Eyadema had been signaling that he had no intention of
leaving office at the end of his term. Chambas worried
that failure to include the Togolese opposition in the
political process would put Togo on the same path as Cote
d'Ivoire.


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COMMENT
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14. (C) Chambas is an old friend of the Ambassador's.
This was a relaxed evening and he was at ease. Chambas
provided an interesting and very candid reading of the
internal frictions plaguing ECOWAS Heads of State and their
efforts in Cote d'Ivoire. Implicit in his analysis was
that he was not in a position to stop the internecine
squabbling. He seemed to think that Obasanjo, if
sufficiently engaged, was best placed to serve this
function. We agree. The upcoming ECOWAS summit will be
important. Without a truce between the ECOWAS leader, they
will continue to squabble and their disaccord will hamper
the Ivoirien process.
JETER