Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1239
2003-07-19 11:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: GON THINKS SAO TOMEAN COUP LEADERS WILL

Tags:  PREL MASS MOPS PINS EPET PGOV TP NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001239 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2013
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PINS EPET PGOV TP NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: GON THINKS SAO TOMEAN COUP LEADERS WILL
NEGOTIATE

REF: ABUJA 1230


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001239

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2013
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PINS EPET PGOV TP NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: GON THINKS SAO TOMEAN COUP LEADERS WILL
NEGOTIATE

REF: ABUJA 1230


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D).



1. (C) MFA Permanent Secretary, Ambassador Daniel Hart and
Nigerian Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe Saidu Pindar
discussed the Sao Tomean coup with A/DCM Brian Browne on
July 18. Hart and Pindar stated that the proximate cause
of the putsch was sustained frustration over de Menezes'
foot dragging in paying these soldiers, many of whom were
tough and battle-tested after having served in Angola as
mercenaries in the employ of the infamous Executive
Outcomes outfit. However, due to the discreet
encouragement and intrigue of some opposition political
figures, their limited agenda quickly expanded to encompass
political demands.



2. (C) Hart explained that the coup leaders called
themselves the "Buffalo soldiers," the collective nom de
guerre earned as mercenaries in Angola. At first, the coup
leaders claimed their sole reason for the take-over was to
recompense their back pay. Apparently, President de
Menezes had stalled and broken promises to these soldiers
for quite some time. Because the amount owed was a
relatively modest USD 70,000, Nigeria first offered to make
the payment. However, by that time, demands had encroached
into the political realm. Members of the political
opposition had gotten in contact with and transformed the
agenda of the coup leaders.



3. (C) Hart stated that many politicians were unhappy with
de Menezes and the public was apathetic. The President did
not command strong loyalty. De Menezes had failed to
implement the proposal of a constitutional review committee
because the recommendation called for a significant
reapportionment of power from the President to the Prime
Minister. This recalcitrance had estranged de Menezes from
much of the political class, Pindar asserted. Moreover,
many politicians were dissatisfied with the outcome of the
2002 parliamentary elections. These politicians have been
angling for new elections, and many saw the coup as an
opening to achieve this aim. Pindar added that the
political opposition is probably divided. While none of
the opposition likes de Menezes, some do not want to broach
the subject of new elections because they are already in
parliament. Thus, the opposition is divided on the role de
Menezes should play. Some favored holding elections for
both Parliament and President, some for only Parliament and
still others would be satisfied with no election provided
Menezes honored the constitutional review committee's
recommendation. Hart said rumors of Sao Tomean troops
threatening the Nigerian Embassy were false. The coup
leaders assured the GON that the soldiers had been posted
to protect the Embassy. More importantly, the coupists had
signaled their desire for Nigeria to be involved in
breaking the impasse. Pindar added that the community of
Lusophone nations might also send envoys to Sao Tome.



4. (C) In any event, the coup leaders have shown
flexibility. They had heard the widespread condemnation of
their action and realized they were surely against the tide
of African and international opinion, asserted Pindar.
They stated that de Menezes could return home to negotiate
with them and without fear for his personal security.
However, he would not be immediately returned to office and
would not, in their eyes, be negotiating as a sitting Head
of State. They are adamant that the status quo ante is
untenable. At the very least, de Menezes must implement
the constitutional changes for them to acquiesce in his
return to power, Pindar stated.



5. (C) Hart emphasized that the GON was exclusively
focused on a negotiated solution, but he also stressed the
importance of achieving one quickly. The longer it takes,
the greater the likelihood that the coup leaders will grow
too accustomed to their new positions and the less willing
they will be to relinquish power. He said Nigeria was
considering sending a delegation headed by Ambassador
Pindar to Sao Tome and Principe to join Ambassador
Moorefield and their Portuguese counterpart in talking to
the coup leaders.
JETER