NIGERIA -- PRESIDENT OBASANJO CONFIRMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001202

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: 07/01/2013
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV MASS MOPS LI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA -- PRESIDENT OBASANJO CONFIRMS
TAYLOR'S ASYLUM OFFER AND NIGERIA'S COMMITMENT TO
DEPLOY


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS:
1.5 (B & D)





1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 5 afternoon meeting
with Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo stated that,
despite the concerns of his security staff, he was
committed to travelling to Monrovia to confer with
Charles Taylor. He saw Taylor's extraction from
Monrovia as an essential cog in the evolving peace
machinery. However, Obasanjo noted that the situation
was extremely complex and that Taylor's military
machine, the LURD's and MODEL's, also needed to be
dismantled for peace to stand a chance. Obasanjo
claimed he would face domestic criticism for his
active involvement in Liberia but that he could
withstand the flak. He would move forward with
offering Taylor asylum and with planning to deploy two
battalions to Liberia if sufficient logistical
assistance was provided by the international
community. Discussion of the fuel price strike and
other domestic political issues will be reported
septel. END SUMMARY


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OBASANJO ON HIS WAY TO MONROVIA
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2. 2. (C) During a lengthy July 5 conversation with
Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo revealed his
plans to visit Liberia to confer with Charles Taylor
at Robertsfield. Relaxed and unusually affable,
Obasanjo said he had overridden his security officer's
concerns that Taylor could not guarantee his security
or that Taylor might somehow manufacture an incident
for which he would blame the LURD. Ambassador Jeter
told Obasanjo Embassy Monrovia had reported that
Monrovia had been peaceful the past few days and that
commercial flights were landing at Robertsfield. With
that information, Obasanjo reconfirmed that he would
proceed to Monrovia. (NOTE: Ambassador Jeter
subsequently called the Department again to ask that
Embassy Monrovia approach the GOL on the need for
beefed up security to cover the Obasanjo-Taylor
meeting. END NOTE)



3. (C) The purpose of the visit to Monrovia was
two-fold, Obasanjo said. First he would renew his
offer of exile to the Liberian leader. Obasanjo
elaborated that he was willing to give Taylor an exit
in order to stave off catastrophe in Monrovia. If
Taylor were left without any option save the War Crime
Tribunal, Obasanjo feared Taylor would prolong the
fighting, dragging the country further down the path
toward chaos. However, Obasanjo was emphatic that a
mechanism should be found to render the Tribunal's
indictment "inactive." He did not want to offer
Taylor exile, only to find himself hounded by the
international community to relinquish the Liberian
President.



4. (C) Second, he was going to Liberia because he
wanted to know exactly what Taylor wanted. Through
Taylor's emissaries who had visited Abuja and his
previous conversations with Taylor, Obasanjo noted
that Taylor's position had been that departure prior
to deployment of an international force would be
premature and dangerous. It would create a power
vacuum. Also, Taylor envisioned leaving Liberia with
more than his immediate family. He apparently wanted
to take much of his inner circle as well.


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WHAT OF TAYLOR'S INNER CIRCLE?
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5. (C) Ambassador Jeter emphasized the importance of
not solely focusing on Taylor's exit as the solution
to Liberia's violent conundrum. Taylor's removal was
essential but did not constitute the entire machinery
of peace. Prior to Taylor's departure, there must be
an agreement on disarmament and demobilization;
moreover, Taylor must lend his active imprimatur for
his men to yield their weapons. Second, consideration
must be given to the problem of Taylor insiders and
notorious henchmen Benjamin Yeaten, J.T. Richardson
and the like. These men have been with Taylor for
years; they bear his mark and many have committed
atrocities in his and in their own names; they too
could be brought before the Special Court.



6. (C) To extract Taylor, yet leave them behind could
simply invite continued fighting. The situation could
become even more chaotic because of the possibility of
Taylor's machine dividing into smaller, even rival
groups, each controlled by one of Taylor's lieutenants
who would have assumed the status of an independent
petty warlord.



7. (C) In addition to providing for Taylor's exit, any
tenable peace arrangement had to ensure that his chief
lieutenants did not remain negative factors in the
Liberia equation. For instance, if Nigeria choose to
grant asylum to a larger number of people, they would
have to actively push their forces to begin
disarmament and demobilization before they would be
granted exile along with Taylor.


-------------- ---
LURD AND MODEL - BAD OLD WINE IN BAD NEW BOTTLES
-------------- ---



8. (C) Ambassador Jeter continued that LURD and MODEL
disarmament required as much attention as the GOL's.
Disarming them would have to be simultaneous, since it
was unlikely that Taylor partisans would disarm if
their enemies still retained their weapons. Both the
LURD and MODEL were headed by known miscreants, who
wanted power, preferably by the force of arms. Their
hope remained that they could sneak through the back
door of the presidential mansion while everyone's
attention was focused on escorting Taylor out the
front. The LURD need to be pressured to disarm and its
benefactors needed to turn off their support. Both
rebel forces should be converted into political
parties if their officials want to hold office. Any
peace plan should avoid their inclusion in an interim
or transitional government if at all possible, Jeter
posited.


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THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
--------------



9. (C) Regarding a transitional government, Obasanjo
felt that Liberia should follow a constitutionally-
scripted succession, leaving Vice President Moses Blah
as the transitional Head of State. Ambassador Jeter
agreed but cautioned that Blah's appointment must be
worked delicately, given the ethnic dynamics of
Liberia. He explained that Blah was an ethnic Gio for
Nimba Country, the bedrock of Taylor's political and
military support. Krahn personalities in LURD and
MODEL, and to a certain extent, Mandingos in LURD,
would be wary of Blah. With a Gio as Head of State,
no Krahn and few Mandingos would be eager to disarm
unless they were given adequate assurances regarding
their personal security. Additionally, this could
exacerbate tension along the common border between
Nimba (Gio/Mano) and Grand Gedeh (Krahn) countries,
possible spilling over to Cote d' Ivoire.



10. (C) Last, Blah has the reputation of a cipher. An
interim government under his leadership would not
command much respect or confidence; despite the uneasy
relationship between Taylor and Blah, many Liberians
would suspect that Taylor still would be pulling the
strings, albeit from a distance. Obasanjo said that he
appreciated the advice and would consider these
admonitions.


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NIGERIA: COMMITTED TO DEPLOY
--------------



11. (C) Obasanjo confirmed that he was prepared to
send two Nigerian battalions to Liberia. He also made
a strong pitch for American boots on the ground,
stating that this would be of tremendous military and
psychological value in making all armed groups behave.
Obasanjo added, however, that Nigeria would only
deploy if provided the needed logistical support.



12. (C) Obasanjo added that Libyan leader Quadhafi had
written him, asking that Nigeria oppose deployment of
U.S. troops in Liberia. Obasanjo sardonically
remarked that he told the Libyan to communicate
directly with President Bush and not use him as an
intermediary. In a more serious vein, Obasanjo
observed that Taylor had been talking with Tripoli.
Obasanjo thought Quadhafi would provide some financial
support to help smooth Taylor's asylum but that
Tripoli would not assist in prolonging Taylor in
power.


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ASYLUM REVISITED
--------------



13. (C) Returning to the issue of Taylor's exile,
Obasanjo said he had spent a lot of time thinking
where to situate Taylor in Nigeria. At one point, he
considered Katsina but thought the Moslem North would
be too uncomfortable for Taylor and his cabal.
Obasanjo finally decided on Calabar, Cross Rivers
State. There was sufficient land for Taylor to pursue
his farming and the climate and culture would be more
akin to Liberia than any place in Northern Nigeria.
Whatever location was selected, Nigeria had to make
sure Taylor was safe but also sufficiently isolated
and contained so that he could not interfere in
Liberia, Jeter stressed. Obasanjo responded that
Lagos was not an option because of this fear.
Obasanjo added that Cross Rivers Governor Donald Duke
was sufficiently adept to keep Taylor within
acceptable bounds of behavior.


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COMMENT
--------------



14. (C) While many Nigerians do not favor active re-
engagement in Liberia, President Obasanjo sees the
need and clearly recognizes that Nigeria is an
essential actor to ending the slide in Liberia. He
has taken a forward leaning stance on troop
contributions. Moreover, beyond the establishment of
a peacekeeping force, Obasanjo's exile offer to Taylor
may be the most important single step in injecting the
peace process with some momentum and giving the
Liberian people some hope that change is imminent.
While the War Crimes Tribunal indictment is
unassailable and should not be ignored or dismissed,
Obasanjo's asylum offer may be helpful to reaching a
solution in Liberia. We should do all that we can to
encourage Obasanjo to continue the leading role he
seems willing to play.


JETER