NIGERIA - RECENT EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE UNDERMINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001047

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2008
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA - RECENT EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE UNDERMINE
LAST MONTH'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY PRESIDENT OBASANJO
AND MBEKI

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS:
1.5 (B & D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent surge in political tension
in Zimbabwe seems to have erased the progress
President Obasanjo believed was achieved by his May
visit to Harare. Obasanjo thought he and President
Mbeki made headway moving the GOZ and MDC toward
resuming their political negotiations. However, the
crackdown against the MDC and the MDC's call for mass
action have eclipsed last month's Obasanjo-Mbeki
intervention. Curiously, the GON and other visiting
African leaders reportedly gave President Mugabe the
cold shoulder during his visit to Nigeria for
President Obasanjo's May 29 inauguration. While we
should not read too much into this apparent brush-off,
it could signal a possible lessening of Nigeria's
patience with the recalcitrant Zimbabwean. END
SUMMARY.



2. (C) During a May 16 meeting with Ambassador Jeter,
President Obasanjo stated that his visit to Zimbabwe
earlier that month was partially successful in drawing
the GOZ and MDC back to the negotiation table.
Obasanjo recounted that he and Mbeki had made progress
shuffling between meetings with Mugabe and Tsvangirai.
In the first meeting with Mugabe, the Zimbabwean
expressed willingness for his officials to resume
talks with the MDC. However, Mugabe complained the
MDC's claim that his election and subsequent
inauguration were illegitimate was a major stumbling
block. Eventually, the MDC had to talk to him
directly or he would have to give his lieutenants
instructions on how to represent him in talks with the
MDC, Mugabe posited. There was no other way the
process could move forward. Thus, it was a non
sequitur for the MDC to characterize him as
illegitimate since he was the essential cog in the
machinery of the desired negotiations, Mugabe
reasoned.



3. (C) Obasanjo said he relayed Mugabe's observation
to Tsvangirai who, surprisingly, was accommodating.
The MDC leader stated the MDC understood Mugabe was
the de facto Head of State. However, the MDC's
position was that Mugabe's election was occasioned by
serious irregularities, that Mugabe should honestly
acknowledge. The MDC could not simply concede
victory when it was achieved through electoral fraud.
The use of the term "illegitimate" was thus the MDC's
rhetorical tool to galvanize its supporters and to
remind the GOZ that redress and concessions were in
order. However, Tsvangirai promised that the MDC
would delete the word illegitimate from its vocabulary
should Mugabe agree to talks.



4. (C) Obasanjo and Mbeki returned to Mugabe with the
MDC position. Mugabe seemed pleased, but advanced
another condition. This time, he insisted that the
MDC should drop its court case. Mbeki and Obasanjo
returned to Tsvangirai with Mugabe's request, and the
MDC was partially accommodating. Tsvangirai stated
that the court case was more a symbolic than a real
threat to Mugabe. Given the pliancy of the Zimbabwean
judiciary and the dilatory tools in the GOZ legal
arsenal, Tsvangirai was not sanguine about a favorable
or an early decision. Although the MDC leader
insisted on the insuperability of the legal merits of
his complaint, he also realized that the case could be
bogged down in the courts well after Mugabe's term
expired. While Tsvangirai did not agree to formally
dismiss the case, he indicated the MDC would be
willing to let the case recede into inactivity should
the talks resume and progress be achieved.



5. (C) Obasanjo said he had to leave Zimbabwe before a
third session could be arranged with Mugabe; however,
Mbeki talked to Mugabe who did not reject the MDC idea
of informally letting the case run a long course.
Yet, the Zimbabwean leader seemed to prefer a more
formal and final disposition of the case.



6. (C) Also, Mbeki and Mugabe talked about possible
inclusion of the MDC in a government of national
unity. Mugabe signaled that he was not opposed to the
idea but asserted the MDC had less than a handful of
members competent enough for Ministerial or senior
level appointments. Mbeki urged him to offer the MDC
a chance to join as a junior partner in a government
of national unity and to extend positions to these
competent MDC representatives.



7. (C) Stating that a government of national unity was
as far as Mugabe could go, Obasanjo recalled a
conversation with a ZANU-PF leader who told him the
party would not let Mugabe step down right now. The
party was adamant that he should remain until the 2005
legislative elections. If he left now, the party
could fragment because of leadership struggles; this
would jeopardize ZANU's political future. Once the
party's legislative base was reaffirmed in 2005, then
Mugabe would become expendable, an increasingly
negative factor as the country again approached its
Presidential election.



8. (C) Comment: Obasanjo believed he had achieved
headway in Zimbabwe; events in late May and early June
seem to belie that contradiction. Confrontation and
crackdown, with Mugabe in his accustomed role as prime
culprit, have re-emerged as the dominant themes in
Zimbabwe. This gives the joint Obasanjo-Mbeki
initiative the appearance of a wasted effort.
However, while Obasanjo put a positive spin on his
visit, he probably was not as pleased as he wanted us
to believe. The scenario he painted shows a Mugabe
who seemed intent on making one demand after another
in order to delay real negotiations.



9. (C) Mugabe's treatment in Nigeria during President
Obasanjo's inaugural ceremonies are telling. The news
circulating among Nigerian officials was that Mugabe
was asked to stay home. However, Mugabe insisted on
attending. That may have been a mistake. According
to the Canadian Deputy High Commission who said his
information came from a very reliable source,no other
Head of State would sit with Mugabe on the bus ride to
the actual inaugural ceremony.



10. (C) Comment Continued: Whatever progress Obasanjo
and Mbeki made in early May appears to have been
undone by the events of late May/early June. From our
reading of Obasanjo's account of his visit, Mugabe
seemed more interested in making serial demands that
would retard progress than in actually moving forward
to an accommodation with the MDC. Perhaps, Mugabe's
less than familial reception in Abuja may also signal
that Nigeria is losing patience with him. During the
Ambassador's next meeting with the President, we will
seek his views on the recent turn of events in
Zimbabwe and what he sees as next steps. END COMMENT.
JETER