Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUJA1025
2003-06-11 14:03:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: FORMER MOD DANJUMA ON ART. 98, BENUE AND

Tags:  MASS PREL KTIA PGOV MARR MOPS NI KICC 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001025 

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: MASS PREL KTIA PGOV MARR MOPS NI KICC
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER MOD DANJUMA ON ART. 98, BENUE AND
REFORM

REF: A. ABUJA 205

B. ABUJA 743

C. ABUJA 989


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D)


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001025

SIPDIS


CAIRO FOR POL - MAXSTADT


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: MASS PREL KTIA PGOV MARR MOPS NI KICC
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER MOD DANJUMA ON ART. 98, BENUE AND
REFORM

REF: A. ABUJA 205

B. ABUJA 743

C. ABUJA 989


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (B)
AND (D)



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: June 7 DCM paid a farewell call on
former Minister of Defense LTG (ret.) T.Y. Danjuma.
Danjuma did not expect the GON to conclude an Article 98
agreement and doubted the Commission of Inquiry's report on
the October 2001 Benue massacre would satisfy the U.S.
Congress since the report failed to identify culpable
individuals. Danjuma also expressed frustration with
endemic corruption in the GON. END SUMMARY.


--------------
Article 98
--------------



2. (S/NF) Former Defense Minister Danjuma (strictly
protect) strongly doubted Nigeria would sign an Article 98
agreement. Reiterating what he had told us in prior
meetings, Danjuma said that Nigeria would likely mirror
South Africa's decision - a refusal to conclude an
agreement. An inter-ministerial committee had met to
develop a recommendation for President Obasanjo; the
members were Danjuma, (former) Foreign Minister Sule
Lamido, (former) Attorney General Kanu Agabi and another
Minister who Danjuma could not recall. On the date of the
meeting, Danjuma had been ill, so Agabi (chair) called to
seek his views. Danjuma advised that Nigeria should stay
in step with South Africa; he personally thought Article 98
agreements "would weaken the UN" and thus had reservations.
He counseled again that the committee should learn why
South Africa had declined to sign before making a final
recommendation to President Obasanjo. Danjuma said Agabi
voiced surprise since he expected Danjuma to be more
positive about Article 98. He stated that the other three
members had reached the same conclusion. Danjuma said that
he believed a recommendation along these lines had already
gone to Obasanjo.



3. (S/NF) COMMENT: During a May 12 meeting with Ambassador
Jeter (REF C),Danjuma made similar comments regarding
Article 98. During that meeting, however, Danjuma said he
would "try" to persuade Obasanjo to sign the agreement. By
his own account, he did not make the effort. There remains
a possibility that Nigeria could be encouraged to sign an
Article 98, possibly as a "deliverable" should President
Bush visit in the near future. However, (assuming
Danjuma's account is accurate) in doing so, Obasanjo would
have to disregard the advice of the committee he
established on the subject, a move not unprecedented if
Obasanjo holds his own strong counsel on an issue (e.g. The
2001 Racism Resolution). Obasanjo indicated he might do
just that in a June 11 meeting with Ambassador (reported
SEPTEL). END COMMENT.


--------------
Benue
--------------



4. (C/NF) Turning to the October 2001 Benue incident,
Danjuma said he doubted that Senator Feingold would be
satisfied with the Commission of Inquiry's report (REF A).
Danjuma had read the report cover-to-cover, and the
Commission had not tried to identify responsible
individuals. He commented that the military could convene
a Board of Inquiry and easily determine those within the
units who were responsible; the commander certainly knew
which elements had gone into the area.


--------------
Defense Minister
--------------



5. (C) Danjuma said Salihu Ibrahim would not/not be the
next Defense Minister; his successor would be a civilian,
Danjuma predicted. Danjuma also offered that during his
second Administration, President Obasanjo would assume much
of the MOD's portfolio himself, possibly to the extent of
becoming the de facto Minister. (COMMENT: Previous DAO
reporting had indicated Salihu Ibrahim would be the next
MOD (REF B). If a civilian, we predict that Lawal
Batagarawa, former Minister of State for Defense (Army),
would be the likely candidate. A northerner, Batagarawa
has Obasanjo's confidence and worked ardently for the
President's re-election. END COMMENT.)


--------------
Frustration with Corruption
--------------



6. (C) Danjuma said, "The last four years have been the
most frustrating years of my life; there was no money." He
opined that money was leaking from the system at every
joint in the plumbing, most particularly from the Ministry
of Finance and the CBN. His Ministry had caught three
instances of double payment, and he thought the double
payments were intentional and contrived with the support of
Finance Ministry officials. If the same sort of thing was
replicated elsewhere, the impact could be substantial. He
said that corruption was particularly bad at the state
level. He noted that roughly half the road-building
projects in Nigeria were stalled and that a third or more
of the local construction firms were either bankrupt or
nearly so because they had taken high-interest loans to
start projects for which they were not being paid.


--------------
Political Reform
--------------



7. (C) Danjuma said he had tried to present some thoughts,
particularly on corruption and political reform, during his
final meeting with Obasanjo as Defense Minister. But, he
commented wryly, "the President is not a very good
listener." Danjuma had, he said, broached several topics -
- the most important of which he thought was improving
relations with the National Assembly -- but Obasanjo had
not let him say very much before offering his own opinions.
Danjuma said he hoped to get some more of his points across
in the coming days.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



8. (C) Danjuma is a close confidant of the President. His
negative assessment of Article 98 and that of the others on
the inter-ministerial committee tasked with examining the
issue will influence Obasanjo's ultimate decision.
However, in the past, Obasanjo has overruled his advisors
on issues about which he felt strongly and, possibly, this
could be one. Indications from the Ambassador's June 11
meeting with Obasanjo (SEPTEL) imply that Obasanjo may have
already come to a different conclusion from his advisors.
END COMMENT.
JETER