Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI5095
2003-11-29 12:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV ASEC TC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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Diana T Fritz 03/20/2007 03:45:46 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM November 29, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 5095 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, ASEC 

Captions: None 

Subject: UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
UNCLAS ABU DHABI 05095

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: P/M:SY; RSO:JR; ECON:OJ LEGATT:BM; CG:JD

VZCZCADI120
OO RUEHC RUEHZM
DE RUEHAD #5095/01 3331222
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291222Z NOV 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2513
INFO RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005095 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT EAP, INR/AN/NESA, DS/DSS/ATA, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ASEC TC
SUBJECT: UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 301352

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005095

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT EAP, INR/AN/NESA, DS/DSS/ATA, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ASEC TC
SUBJECT: UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 301352


1. The following information is keyed to reftel
section two. (A separate complementary classified
cable will follow with additional information.)

A) In 2003 the UAE continued to provide outstanding
assistance and cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism.
The UAE played a critical role in assisting the continuing
investigation into the 9/11 attacks. The UAE Central Bank
continued to aggressively enforce UAE anti-money laundering
regulations pursuant to the 2002 comprehensive law
criminalizing money laundering, including terrorist money
laundering. Together with tightened oversight and
reporting requirements for the domestic financial markets,
there is now a stronger legal and regulatory framework to
deter abuse of UAE financial markets. Cooperation across
the board -- from the financial realm through to security
and intelligence -- has been strong and sustained. The
Central Bank has provided training programs to banks and
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist
financing, investigated financial transactions, and frozen
accounts in response to relevant UN resolutions and
internal investigations. Although we do not have a
breakout of information for 2003 specifically, the UAE
Central Bank has provided the following information on its
efforts to combat money laundering over the last two years.
Between August 2001 and May 2003, the Anti Money Laundering
and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the Central Bank
analyzed 429 suspicious transactions reports received from
banks and other financial institutions. In approximately
11 percent of the cases, the Central Bank froze the assets
and referred the cases to the public prosecutor's office.
The AMLSCU has also responded to requests for information
on about 164 cases from other Financial Intelligence Units.
As a result of these requests, the AMLSCU investigated and
froze 23 accounts. In addition, the UAE has frozen 18
accounts totaling more than $3 million in response to UNSC
anti-terrorist financing resolutions. The Central Bank has
also conducted 58 workshops on money laundering and
terrorist financing for banks and other financial
institutions. In September 2003, Dubai police and UAE

armed forces cooperated at the annual IMF/World Bank
meeting to successfully prevent terrorist incidents.

B) The UAE judicial system did not conduct any
trials related to terrorist acts in 2003. There
were no acts of terrorism against or affecting
U.S. citizens or facilities in the UAE during

2003.

C) The Embassy did consult on matters of mutual interest
with the UAEG regarding extradition during 2003. The
Embassy did not make any official requests to extradite
terrorist suspects wanted by the U.S.

D) The lack of a formal extradition treaty between the
U.S. and UAE is the major impediment to the host
government's extradition of suspected terrorists. We are
actively engaged in negotiations with UAEG on a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty. The UAE has demonstrated
repeatedly that it will not allow the absence of an
extradition treaty or an MLAT to impede cooperation with
friendly countries, including the United States, in the
international effort to bring terrorists to justice.

E) The UAE government has spoken out repeatedly and
consistently, both publicly and privately, against acts of
terrorism. In August 2003, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan publicly
criticized a suicide attack against the United Nations
headquarters in Baghdad. Also, in August, the Foreign
Ministry denounced the terrorist attack at the Mosque of
Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib in Najaf. In November 2003, UAE
President Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan publicly
condemned as "criminal and cowardly attacks" a suicide car
bombing believed carried out by Al Qaida against Arab
expatriates and Saudis in a Riyadh residential compound.
The UAE Cabinet issued its own denunciation, calling the
attack a "heinous crime" and supporting any actions the
Saudi government may take to put an end to terrorism. The
UAE has provided outstanding assistance with a number of
ongoing terrorist investigations.

F) The UAE has a framework for cooperation on terrorist
financing issues pursuant to a comprehensive anti-money-
laundering law passed in 2002. In addition to promptly
freezing the accounts of terrorist entities designated
under the relevant U.N. procedures, the UAE has received
anti-terrorist training from the State Department's ATA
program, in addition to anti-money-laundering training and
technical assistance from the USG for bankers, prosecutors,
judges, and police.

G) The UAE extended no support for international
terrorism, terrorists, or terror groups in 2003.

H) The UAE made no public statements in support of a
terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism issue in 2003.

I) The UAE's strong opposition to terrorism continued
unabated in 2003. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation
in the global war on terrorism improved this year, largely
owing to a broadening and deepening of counter-terrorism
relationships.

ALBRIGHT