Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI479
2003-01-29 07:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

A/S BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ PLANNING AND

Tags:  PREL KPAL MARR MOPS PTER IZ TC 
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Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM January 29, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 479 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PTER, KPAL 

Captions: None 

Subject: A/S BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ PLANNING AND 
 PALESTINIAN ISSUE WITH SENIOR EMIRATIS 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 00479

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: AMB P/M ECON RSO DCM 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS

VZCZCADI299
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHDE RHEHNSC RHEFDIA RUEAIIA
RUEKJCS RUCNDT RUEKJCS RUMICEA RUCQSOC RUEOBBA
DE RUEHAD #0479/01 0290736
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290736Z JAN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8130
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1126
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 2747
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/J3//
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5//
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOBBA/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000479 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/IPA, NEA/ARP AND PMAT
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND CLARKE
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
CENTAF FOR GENERAL MOSELEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL MARR MOPS PTER IZ TC
SUBJECT: A/S BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ PLANNING AND
PALESTINIAN ISSUE WITH SENIOR EMIRATIS

REF: 02 Abu Dhabi 6694

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000479

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/IPA, NEA/ARP AND PMAT
NSC FOR ABRAMS AND CLARKE
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMBASSADOR LITT
CENTAF FOR GENERAL MOSELEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL MARR MOPS PTER IZ TC
SUBJECT: A/S BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ PLANNING AND
PALESTINIAN ISSUE WITH SENIOR EMIRATIS

REF: 02 Abu Dhabi 6694


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba,
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


2. (S) In separate meetings on 1/21 and 1/22 with UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MBZ) and
de facto Foreign Minister Hamdan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan, A/S
Burns discussed U.S. policy towards Iraq and the Middle East
peace process. On Iraq, and clearly worried about the
unintended consequences of an armed conflict, the Emiratis
recommended that we continue force deployments and intensify
diplomatic pressure for a month or so to allow time for
possible insurrection/regime overthrow from inside Iraq. If
we do opt for military action, our "day after" actions will
be key to shaping Arab public opinion and U.S.-Arab
relations for years to come. Foremost among the UAE's
concerns is a visible U.S. commitment to Iraq's territorial
integrity, including forcibly resisting Kurdish and/or Shi'a
attempts to establish independent homelands. Although they
are "deeply discouraged" by U.S. policy towards the peace
process, the Emiratis hope to see the U.S. seriously
reengage on the Palestinian issue. In their view, tangible
progress on this front is essential to pursuing a successful
outcome in Iraq. The need to support Jordan figured
prominently in Burns' discussions; his interlocutors
indicated that the UAEG prefers providing Jordan with cash
assistance and concessional loans in lieu of an oil subsidy.
Perhaps anticipating future USG requests for financial
assistance to Iraq, Hamdan explained the budgetary crunch
facing the UAEG as a result of the two-year downturn in
global financial markets. For the first time, he explained,
the UAE is relying solely on its oil income as its return on
its investments is "zero." Hamdan intriguingly inquired

into U.S. plans for Arab military participation in coalition
operations, noting that should Kuwait request assistance to
bolster its self-defense, the UAE and other GCC partners
would be obliged to respond positively. END SUMMARY.


3. (S) Participants: MBZ was attended by his assistant,
Yousef Al-Otaiba. Al-Otaiba also joined for the Hamdan
meeting, along with MFA Undersecretary for Political Affairs
Abdullah Rashid Al-Nuaimi and Hamdan's office director,
Sultan Al-Romaithi. The Ambassador and Polchief (notetaker)
were present at both meetings while Captain George Dom from
JCS attended the Hamdan meeting.

-------------- --------------
MBZ: GIVE "INSURRECTION" A CHANCE
-------------- --------------


4. (S) With regard to Iraq, A/S Burns noted the President's
absolute determination to disarm Saddam Hussein. Although a
final decision has not been made, Burns estimated that we
were moving inexorably closer to the point of using force as
a last resort. He noted the near-term importance of
remaining in close contact and consultation with our friends
and allies. Appreciative of the UAE's support for our
contingency planning, Burns underscored the need to keep the
pressure on Baghdad. Burns expressed appreciation for UAE
support for contingency military requirements, and suggested
that we may need to make further requests. The U.S., he
continued, fully understands the enormous challenges and
complexities posed by the prospect of an Iraq conflict.


5. (S) In response to a question from Burns on how Saddam
reads the U.S., MBZ said "loud and clear." In the Chief of
Staff's view, the U.S. message is being received in Baghdad;
the leadership is scared and he expects that people will
start defecting. He advised that we should provide ample
time (i.e. six weeks) for an insurrection, an option that
would save many lives and stem regional instability. Should
military action prove unavoidable, MBZ predicted that the
north and south would fall easily. In that event, he
recommended that the U.S. focus its efforts on Baghdad but
cautioned against street fighting and hand-to-hand combat
noting that it would be far more prudent to wait Saddam out.
A few days without food and water would sow discord among
Saddam's pampered cronies. In the meantime, ordinary
Baghdadis could be taken care of through the establishment
of humanitarian centers on the city's outskirts.

--------------
BURNS: THREE-PHASE APPROACH TO IRAQ PLANNING
--------------


6. (S) In response to a question on U.S. plans regarding
the future of Iraq, Burns noted that Washington's thinking
had evolved considerably over the last few months and we are
actively planning for the "day after" scenario. The Iraq
operation has been divided into three phases, Burns
explained, with the first phase focused on stabilizing the
security situation and the provision of emergency
humanitarian assistance. Phase two would include a strong
security presence, reconstruction, and the transition to
civilian rule. This period would witness the strengthening
of existing institutions, such as the Iraqi civil service,
and perhaps the formation of an Iraqi advisory council to
begin to prepare for restoration of full sovereignty. We
also recognize the enormous difference between Afghanistan -
- a country stripped bare of its infrastructure and basic
institutions -- and Iraq, with its educated population base
and long history of civil society. In phase three, Iraq
would move towards full sovereignty.

-------------- --------------
DAY AFTER: U.S. COMMITMENT TO IRAQI TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
KEY FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Both MBZ and Hamdan asserted that U.S. handling of
the day after will affect America's standing in the region
for years to come. If the U.S. is seen to be committed to
Iraq's territorial integrity, i.e. actively resisting
Kurdish and/or Shi'a attempts to carve out a homeland, this
will be welcomed in the Arab world. If we allowed a break-
up, it would destroy U.S. credibility and stature in the
region. Burns assured his Emirati interlocutors that our
political and military strategies recognize the need to
avoid a fractured Iraq in the post-Saddam era. MBZ
expressed slight regard for the exiled Iraqi opposition,
acidly noting that if an election were held he would be
surprised if 1 out of 100 of the oppositionists were voted
into office. He predicted that it would be difficult to
contain the political aspirations of these exiles and that
they could easily, and publicly, turn on the U.S. in the
event that they feel their needs are not being met in the
critical transition period.


8. (S) In response to a question from MBZ on U.S. plans to
provide humanitarian assistance, Burns said we are working
closely with international agencies and looking at ways to
use existing mechanisms, such as the oil-for-food program to
meet immediate needs for water, provision of health care and
basic foodstuffs and amenities. We realize, Burns stated,
that the Iraqis have become dependent on the UN distribution
system and the black market, both of which could collapse in
the event of a conflict.

-------------- --------------
IRAQ-PEACE PROCESS LINKAGE: U.S. NEEDS TO REMAIN ENGAGED
WITH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS
-------------- --------------


9. (S) Both Al-Nahyan brothers worried that an Iraq conflict
could trigger massive rioting and instability in the
occupied territories. In that instance, the Emiratis fully
expect Sharon to react forcefully, thus increasing the
chances the situation would spiral out of control. The
Emirati message was clear: active U.S. engagement on the
Palestinian issue is essential to a successful outcome in
Iraq. Hamdan said pointedly that the UAEG, and the Emirati
people as a whole, have all but lost hope for an active
engagement and a more balanced U.S. policy. Nevertheless,
they continue to recognize that the U.S. is an important
partner and critical to achieving a just peace. He hoped
that Washington would pay serious attention to the desperate
situation in Israel and the territories, warning that a
conflagration on two fronts, i.e. Iraq and Palestine, would
be disastrous for the region. Burns emphasized the
President's determination to push ahead toward the two-state
vision he has outlined. Burns thanked the UAEG for its
generosity to the Palestinian people, noting that he had
personally seen how UAE funds are being used in the
rebuilding of Jenin. The U.S. was equally concerned about
containing violence on the Lebanon-Israel border and Burns
noted he had raised the issue earlier in the day in a
meeting with Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad. MBZ
encouraged further U.S. engagement with Syria but said it
would also be helpful if others, including the Europeans and
Arab states, made a point of meeting with Bashar to press
him to "act sensibly."

-------------- --------------
ALL AGREE ON NEED TO SUPPORT JORDAN; UAE PREFERS CASH
ASSISTANCE TO OIL SUBSIDY
-------------- --------------


10. (S) The effect of an Iraq conflict on regional stability
was a major topic in Burns' discussions with both Hamdan and
MBZ. Noting the fact that King Abdullah had just visited
the UAE (where he attended an investors conference in Dubai
and met with Shaykh Zayid in Abu Dhabi),MBZ said he is most
concerned that in the event of U.S. action against Iraq, the
Jordanian street could become the point of ignition for
instability across the region. Inflammatory Al-Jazeera
broadcasts showing Iraqi casualties as a result of a U.S.
air raid or gun battle could spark rioting in Jordan and
Egypt. In MBZ's view, thought should be given to how to
manage the Arab media in the event of war; the first images
from liberated Iraq will be critical in the shaping of Arab
public opinion.


11. (S) Burns expressed U.S. appreciation for Emirati offers
of assistance to Jordan. The U.S. is doing its part to
bring some relief to the hard-hit Jordanian economy via an
immediate $130 million cash transfer, Burns explained.
Hamdan briefed that he is in receipt of a letter from the
Saudis proposing a Saudi-Kuwaiti-UAE offer to supply oil to
Jordan in the event of U.S./coalition action against Iraq.
He noted that the Saudis and the Kuwaitis each appeared
ready to supply 50,000 barrels a day. If this was
sufficient to meet Jordan's oil need, the UAE, Hamdan noted,
preferred providing cash assistance. He briefed that the
Abu Dhabi Development Fund had signed an agreement to
provide $50 million in project aid to Jordan and that the
UAEG had decided in the last several days to provide a
further $25 million in direct cash assistance in order to
meet immediate GOJ needs. (Note: It is not clear whether
this $25 million is in addition to, part of, or instead of
the $45 million in cash assistance which Hamdan briefed to
Ambassador on December 9 -- see reftel. End Note.)


12. (S) Here, Hamdan paused to explain that the dramatic
downturn in the markets post 9/11 had badly hurt the UAEG's
overseas investment portfolio. Where once the Emiratis
relied on their overseas income, for the first time this
year (i.e. 2002) the return on this income was zero and the
government has been been forced to rely solely on the UAE's
oil income. In a conversation earlier in the week with the
Ambassador, Hamdan elaborated that the UAEG lost $30-40
billion in its investment portfolio (estimated at between
$150-175 billion) while at the same time facing an increase
in the federal budget and the UAE's overseas assistance
commitments i.e. to the Palestinians, Afghans, Pakistanis,
Moroccans, Lebanese and Egyptians, to name a few.

-------------- --------------
HAMDAN HINTS AT INVITATION FOR ARAB ALLIED MILITARIES
TO JOIN IN IRAQ CAMPAIGN
-------------- --------------

13. (S) In an unexpected move, Hamdan inquired as to plans
to invite Arab allied militaries to join the coalition. As
if answering his own question, Hamdan offered that were the
Kuwaitis to bring the matter before the GCC in the context
of defending Kuwait, the UAE (and other GCC partners) would
be obligated to participate under the terms of the GCC
mutual defense agreement. Burns replied that the UAE's
interest would be welcomed and promised to follow up.


14. (U) This cable has been been cleared by A/S Burns.

WAHBA