Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI4612
2003-10-15 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ TC 
pdf how-to read a cable
null
Diana T Fritz 03/20/2007 04:13:29 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM October 15, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4612 - ROUTINE) 

TAGS: PREL, PGOV 

Captions: None 

Subject: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING 
 COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04612

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA: RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: ECON: OBJOHN
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI685
RR RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHMFISS RUCAACC RUEKJCS RHEHNSC
RUEAIIA RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #4612 2881358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151358Z OCT 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2086
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 004612 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
DOD FOR OSD/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING
COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY


(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 004612

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
DOD FOR OSD/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: UAE OFFICIAL ADVISES USG TO ALLOW IRAQ GOVERNING
COUNCIL TO EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY


(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA Assistant Undersecretary for Political
Affairs Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi stressed to Charge that it was
in the best interests of the USG if the Iraq Governing Council
(IGC) was allowed to assume more authority. He expressed his
concern that the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) was being viewed
as a puppet regime, and that its inability to make decisions
undercut its legitimacy with the Iraqi people. End Summary.


2. (C) On October 14, Charge and econchief met with MFA
Assistant Undersecretary for Political Affairs Abdullah Rashid
Al-Noaimi. During the course of the meeting, Al-Noaimi said
that he wanted to convey UAEG concern on the need for the Iraqis
to assume more authority. He said that he thought that the USG
and the UAEG agreed on the principle that the Iraqis needed to
be encouraged to lead themselves, but added this did not appear
to be the case in fact. He saw a contradiction between our
desire to have the Iraqis "in charge" and the widespread
perception that we were not giving them any authority.


3. (C) Al-Noaimi noted that the longer it took the IGC to be
seen as playing the leading role in governing Iraq, the harder
it became for the coalition and for the IGC itself. He said
that the UAE did not want to see an internal conflict in Iraq or
worse, a military conflict, and urged that the USG give the IGC
more visible authority. The bottom line was that the Iraqis
needed to be seen to be in charge.


4. (C) The Charge asked whether Al-Noaimi had specific examples
to illustrate his concern. Al-Noaimi answered that Ambassador
Bremer's statement that it was up to him and not the IGC to
determine whether Turkish troops would deploy was not helpful.
He added that he didn't think that countries in the region
(specifically listing the GCC, Jordan, Syria, and Iran) would
welcome Turkish troop deployments. A Turkish troop deployment
would exacerbate the internal Iraqi situation and Iraqi -
Turkish relations. He stated that while the GCC had not
formally discussed the matter of Turkish troop deployments, GCC
member states have been expressing concerns about the matter.


5. (C) In general, Al Noaimi expressed his concern that the IGC
was not being seen as in charge, which helped reinforce the
public's perception that it was a puppet organization. He
admitted that this might be, in part, a problem of public
perception. In other words, the Iraqis were exercising
authority, but not communicating this well. For example, he
noted that he had not seen much press reporting about Iraqi
Governing Council deliberations and decisions. He speculated,
however, that the Iraqis might not believe that they were
allowed to exercise authority and were thus not taking the
initiative.


6. (C) He stressed that the Iraqi people needed to feel that
they were having some say over their lives. The security
situation combined with the (perceived or actual) inability of
the government to exercise authority undercut Iraqi support for
the government and denied it legitimacy. The danger was that
such a situation would encourage troublemakers such as Maqtada
Sadr to attempt to fill the void. He stated that it was in the
USG's interest to have the Iraqis exercise some authority in
order to increase their legitimacy. He also said that he was
concerned that the current situation attracted opponents of the
U.S. (including possibly UAE nationals) to Iraq to fight U.S.
troops. He said "we don't want to be in the situation where
some of our citizens are fighting your citizens in Iraq" and
added it would be far better if the Iraqis handle more of their
own security.


7. (C) Comment: The UAEG views a secure and stabile Iraq (one
that can counterbalance Iran) as a national security priority.
To that end, they have striven to support the IGC politically
and poured $80 to $100 million into humanitarian relief and
support for coalition deployments. At the same time, however,
they want to see the U.S. do more to enhance the IGC's
credibility. In recent meetings with Assistant Secretary Burns,
de facto Foreign Minister Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Chief
of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces Mohamed bin Zayed raised
similar concerns about the lack of IGC credibility. End
Comment.

ALBRIGHT