SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004428

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND INR/NESA
SANAA FOR NEA A/S BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF IR IS IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BURNS' VISIT TO
THE UAE, OCTOBER 5

Ref: A) Abu Dhabi 3940, B) Abu Dhabi 3178


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba,
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Burns: I look
forward to welcoming you back to the UAE for your
October 5 visit. Your Emirati interlocutors are
eager to see you. We have requested meetings for you
with MFA Minstate Hamdan Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (the de
facto Foreign Minister),Armed Forces Chief of Staff
LTG Muhammad Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (the de facto
Defense Minister),and Dubai Crown Prince Muhammad
Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum. We had requested a meeting
with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed
Al-Nahyan, however, we learned he will be out of
town. In addition, we are proposing a brief
interview for you with Abu Dhabi TV, time permitting.
We will find out informally if President Zayed will
be able to meet with you.


3. (S/NF) Summary continued: Your discussions with
the Emirati leadership invariably will revolve around
the major topics of the past year -- Iraq, Middle
East peace talks, Afghanistan, and Iran. You will
want to make a point of congratulating each of your
interlocutors on the UAE's successful hosting of the
IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings; while the meetings
were held in Dubai, the event was very much a joint,
UAE-wide affair, with the UAE military in particular
extensively involved in providing security. There
may be some lingering disappointment on the Emiratis'
part over our decision to postpone the Strategic
Partnership meetings, but you can reassure them of
our commitment to this dialogue as soon as our
calendars permit it. I suggested to Sheikh Hamdan
(HBZ) that we hold the meetings in Washington around
the time of his visit in late October, but he has
declined. End Summary.


4. (S/NF) We propose that you touch on the following
key issues:

-- Provide a readout of recent UN deliberations on
Iraq resolution and the timetable for political
transition, as well as a review of efforts to keep
the Middle East peace talks on track;

-- Be prepared to discuss the political and military
situation in Iraq, with all three of your
interlocutors;

-- Thank the Emiratis for their tremendous
humanitarian assistance throughout the Middle East,
their public support and quiet lobbying for
recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council, and their
cooperation with our armed forces;

-- Explain our role in keeping pressure on Iran to
prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons
capability;

-- Reassure the Emiratis of our commitment to hold
the Strategic Partnership and working sessions in the
near future;

-- Reaffirm our desire to finalize a bilateral ICC
Article 98 agreement, a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement, and a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty;

-------------- --
Iraq: Unwavering support ($100 million to date)
-------------- --


5. (S/NF) Iraq will be high on the Emiratis' agenda,
and they will not mince words. They will laud us for
toppling Saddam Hussein, yet criticize us for a de-
Baathification that in their view runs too deep, and
for dismissing the entire military and police force.
They will urge us to work with moderate Sunnis in the
political process, and warn us to remain vigilant
about Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Gulf
region.


6. (C) To their credit, the Emiratis strongly
supported Iraqi delegations to the IMF/World Bank
meetings in Dubai, and at the Arab League summit in
Cairo. In mid-August, the Emirati leadership hosted
six members of the GC - the first Gulf country to do
so. Strong public statements of support for the GC
and the Iraqi people followed the visit and after the
formation of the new Iraqi Cabinet. The Emiratis
were among the first in the Arab world to step up to
the plate in providing much-needed humanitarian
assistance and medical relief to the Iraqi people.
The Sheikh Zayed hospital in Baghdad continues to
receive over a thousand patients a day. The Emiratis
have adopted six hospitals. By the end of the year,
the UAE will have contributed between $80 million to
$100 million of humanitarian aid to Iraq.

--------------
Middle East peace: Support for our engagement
--------------


7. (C) The Arab-Israeli conflict is the other high-
priority agenda item for the Emiratis. The papers
continue to feature graphic photos of the continuing
violence. The Emiratis want us to stay engaged, but
believe the recent U.S. veto of UNSC resolution and
the Israeli cabinet decision to expel or kill Arafat
has hurt USG interests and credibility in the region.
HBZ believes Israelis should be more sensitive to the
current situation in Iraq and help rather than hurt
America's image and credibility. In his view, Arafat
and Sharon seem to be helping each other achieve
their own goals that are not in the interests of
either nation. The Emiratis do not know Ahmed Qurei
and are unsure of his ability to work independently
of Arafat. The Emiratis were just as disappointed as
we were with the loss of Abu Mazen, recognizing the
importance of internal reform and a leadership
independent of Arafat.

--------------
UAE largest Arab donor to Palestinians
--------------


8. (C) The UAEG has maintained a robust assistance
package to the Palestinians. It has channeled nearly
USD 78 million in project assistance to Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since September 2000.
In addition, the UAEG pledged USD 42 million at the
2003 Sharm-Al-Sheikh (USD 21 million) and 2002 Beirut
(USD 21 million) Summits -- making the UAE the
largest Arab donor to the Palestinians since the
Intifada began three years ago (see Ref B). Please
note that the UAE has paid its Beirut and Sharm-Al-
Sheikh pledges in full. These efforts are carefully
monitored and very much support our strategy to
ensure that funds do not fall into the wrong hands.
In addition to the government aid, private donations
of ruling family members to the Palestinians
certainly total tens of millions of dollars.

--------------
Iran: An uneasy co-existence
--------------


9. (C) The UAE and Iran have hit recently another
strained period in their relationship after the slow
improvement we witnessed over the past two years.
The effort to reach some compromise on the Abu Musa
island issue came to a near halt in late spring/early
summer of this year. The Emiratis have made clear to
us that they are deeply suspicious of Iran's
territorial/military ambitions in the Gulf,
particularly with respect to Tehran's nuclear and WMD
acquisition policy. As you heard during your
meetings with Sheikh Muhammad Bin Zayed (MBZ) in
Washington last July, the Emiratis are worried about
Iranian designs in Iraq. The Emiratis believe that
the Iranians are actively seeking a foothold in the
Sunni Iraqi community as well as with the Shi'a. In
their view, the Iranians are gaining ground within
the Sunni community given their current sense of
being left out of the new US-backed political
process.

--------------
Afghanistan: UAE aid exceeds $150 million
--------------


10. (C) The UAE continues to play a very helpful role
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The UAEG
also continues to provide substantial personal
financial support to President Karzai. The UAE Armed
Forces has deployed a 35-man Emirati Special
Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base to work
side-by-side with U.S. forces. UAE humanitarian and
military programs in Afghanistan are ongoing, and we
expect the final price tag to far exceed the $150
million already spent (see Ref A).

--------------
Article 98, TIFA, and MLAT
--------------


11. (C) On Article 98, we are very close, but not
quite there yet. Some differences continue to plague
us on one or two minor issues. The UAEG owes us
information on our latest text that we provided to
them. There has been good progress on a TIFA. The
UAE gave us back the text and their changes are being
considered in Washington. We are aiming for a
November TIFA agreement signing and council meeting
in Washington with Minister of State for Financial
and Industrial Affairs Mohammed Khalfan Bin Kharbash
leading the UAE side. The MLAT text is with the UAE
side and there is still work to be done. A team from
DoJ (OPDAT and OIA) is expected here later this month
to hold discussions on MLAT with the UAE.

--------------
Domestic considerations: Sheikh Zayed
--------------


12. (S) Since your last visit to the UAE, the
domestic political situation has stayed about the
same, with the exception of President Zayed, whose
role in the day-to-day affairs of the state continues
to diminish. Sheikh Zayed returned to Abu Dhabi in
mid-September after spending the summer in Europe,
where he underwent minor surgery for a hernia.
Despite his age and his many health problems, he
continues to see local and regional leaders,
including President Mubarak on September 29. We
believe his wife, Sheikha Fatima, and his sons shield
him from situations where he may be embarrassed by a
failure of memory or loss of train of thought. We
note he mostly accepts calls with people he is
familiar with and/or are more courtesy than
substance. During his meeting with General Franks in
June 2003, he did not address any substantive issues,
but presented him with the UAE medal. His sons have
taken over the substantive day-to-day operation of
all the major portfolios of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi
and the Federal level ministries. That said, we
continue to hear evidence that he is "consulted" on
major issues that are likely to come to his attention
or require his approval to gain support from other
quarters.

-------------- --------------
UAE Mission: No longer a quiet post with 30% growth
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Our two governments continue to broaden and
deepen bilateral ties in all domains, including
military cooperation, law enforcement coordination,
counter-terrorism training, trade and investment
promotion, human rights monitoring, and educational
and cultural programming. This expanded relationship
has been accompanied by a 30 percent increase in
mission staff over the last three years, and other
federal agencies are looking to Abu Dhabi for their
regional offices. When we move into our new Embassy
next January, our space already will be at a premium.
Time permitting, we will give you a brief windshield
tour of the construction site.

--------------
Dubai Crown Prince
--------------


14. (C) You will want to open your meeting with
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Rashid (MBR) by congratulating
him on Dubai's successful hosting of the IMF/World
Bank Annual Meetings two weeks ago. The UAE at the
Federal level was heavily involved in the IMF/World
Bank event, but Dubai and MBR clearly viewed it as
their opportunity to showcase the uniqueness of Dubai
as a regional hub for business, tourism, and travel.
Both Secretary Snow and Fed Chairman Greenspan came
away very impressed with what they saw here. You
might also wish to express appreciation for the
relatively large, high-ranking delegations that Dubai
sent to represent the UAE at the US-Arab Economic
Forum in Detroit (a women's delegation headed by
Sheikha Lubna Al-Qassimi and a men's delegation
headed by Sheikh Ahmad Bin Saeed Al-Maktoum).


15. (C) When the conversation turns to politics, you
can expect to hear -- in addition to pleasure at the
fact that Saddam is now out of the picture -- deep
concern at our handling of the occupation in Iraq, in
particular what MBR views as our ill-advised decision
to dismiss Iraq's 500,000 man strong army. MBR is
likely to argue that US soldiers and tanks should not
be patrolling the streets of Iraqi cities but should
rather be deployed to bases outside the cities; from
there US commanders could work discreetly with local
leaders and police to establish order inside the
cities. MBR will likely tell you that the US needs
to work harder to employ Iraqi workers and businesses
in the reconstruction of Iraq (two of his favorite
anecdotes in this regard are a bridge in Baghdad that
the US allegedly paid a US company "millions" to
reconstruct when there was an Iraqi company willing
to do it for a fraction of that, and an alleged US
decision to send a huge order for printing new Iraqi
textbooks to a US company, leaving Iraq's normal
textbook printing companies standing idle.)


16. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmConsul
Dubai.


17. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
WAHBA