Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI4314
2003-09-22 10:42:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC 
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Diana T Fritz 03/20/2007 05:25:15 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM September 22, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 4314 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS 

Captions: None 

Subject: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE UAE 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 04314

SIPDIS
Laser1:
 INFO: FCS 
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: AMB ECON DCM USLO P/M RSO DAO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT; USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI873
OO RUCAACC RUEKJCS RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #4314/01 2651042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221042Z SEP 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1799
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004314 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2
NSC FOR THEROUX
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S
VISIT TO THE UAE

Ref: Abu Dhabi 4206

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004314

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2
NSC FOR THEROUX
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S
VISIT TO THE UAE

Ref: Abu Dhabi 4206


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (C) General Abizaid: I would like to welcome
you back to the UAE for your full introductory
visit. You will be calling on Abu Dhabi Crown
Prince Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and have
an opportunity for fuller discussions with UAE
Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG Sheikh Muhammad bin
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince GEN
Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR).


3. (S) Your September 8 visit to Abu Dhabi was
greatly appreciated, in large part because of your
frank exchange with MbZ on Iraq, Afghanistan, and
terrorism (described in reftel),but also because
we benefited from a first-hand account of
developments on the ground in Iraq. Your expressed
concerns about the Sunnis will no doubt resonate
with your Emirati hosts during your upcoming visit.


4. (C) Your meeting with Crown Prince Khalifa will
take place in a large, open majlis setting. It
will be a general discussion during which the Crown
Prince will want to hear your views on Iraq, Iran,
and Afghanistan. As all major decisions regarding
deployments require his approval, you may wish to
thank him for his support during OEF and OIF and
strong UAEG support for the Governing Council and
Iraq reconstruction. MbZ is the appropriate
interlocutor for the full range of bilateral
issues.

--------------
SUGGESTED THEMES
--------------


5. (C) We propose that you touch on the following
key bilateral military issues, in addition to the
more general themes outlined below in para five:

-- Provide a "look-ahead" on our likely military
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the
region more generally, including the proposed
establishment of CENTAF Forward Headquarters in Abu
Dhabi (MbZ);


-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need,
as part of our commitment to building and
solidifying our strong military ties, to work out a
functioning Defense Cooperation Agreement (MbZ,
MbR);

-- Express our enthusiasm about the validation
course at the Air Warfare Center, now tentatively
scheduled for December 2003. The Center will be a
model for multilateral training in the region
(MbZ);

-- The Dubai Air Show takes place December 7-11,
and will be preceded by a UAE-hosted Air Chiefs'
Conference. The UAE Government regards this as a
major event and expects strong US support and
presence. You can anticipate a request to provide
both static display and demonstration aircraft for
the Air Show, as well as topics and briefings for
the Air Chiefs' Conference (MbZ, MbR). (For your
background: We are concerned by the lack of formal
DOD approval of US participation in Dubai Air Show.
Without this approval, we cannot retain the rooms
we have reserved beyond Oct. 1, nor can we arrange
for the logistical support of aircraft and air
crews.)


6. (S) More broadly, you may also wish to:

-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support
for U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, namely access to bases and logistical
support, including air and sealift of Bulgarian
troops to Iraq, the UAE SOC deployment at Bagram,
as well as extensive intelligence coordination
(Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ);
-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed
Force's establishment of the very successful Sheikh
Zayed hospital in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to
re-supply with equipment and medicine other Iraqi
hospitals and the provision of basic foodstuffs to
the Iraqi people (Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ);

-- Express thanks for the UAE's strong public statement of
support for the Iraqi Governing Council and the newly
formed government of Iraq (Crown Prince Khalifa, MbZ, MbR);
-- Consult and provide assurances on need to
maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize
external influence (Iran) and manage sectarian
rivalries (MbZ, MbR);

-- Convey our concern over Dubai-based Al-Arabiya
Television's occasional sensationalistic
broadcasting, including threats to kill Iraqi
Governing Council members and their supporters
(MbZ, MbR).

--------------
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES
--------------

Regional Footprint:
--------------


7. (C) If appropriate, I would recommend that you
outline with the leadership -- MbZ -- what we see
in terms of our likely regional footprint, and
specifically what we have in mind for the UAE. MbZ
and his Air Force Commander have dropped strong
hints at being open to a more robust presence,
including a CENTAF Forward Headquarters, but we
need to prepare them for the direction in which we
may wish to move here.

Defense Cooperation Agreement
--------------


8. (C) We need to discuss a successor agreement to
the dormant, unimplemented Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA),which comes up for renewal in

2006. This will require heavy lifting on both
sides and the sooner we agree on a strategy and
define our "non-negotiable" items, the easier it
will be to proceed with the Emiratis. Your visit
would provide a good opportunity to resurface this
important bilateral military issue.

Air Warfare Center
--------------


9. (C) The Gulf Air Warfare Center at al-Dhafra
Base is an important initiative. The Center has
tremendous potential to become a resource for
multilateral training, defense cooperation, and
compatibility. The AWC will provide an excellent
opportunity for CENTCOM pilots to hone their skills
in theater. It comes with the added benefit of
offering the perfect setting for our officers to
build long-term relationships with their Arab and
European coalition counterparts. The AWC
represents the UAE leadership's commitment to
increasing inter-operability with U.S. and
coalition forces.

ATACMs/Predator Update -- (If Raised)
--------------


10. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A
deal. The Emiratis have agreed to the principles
outlined in what will be a regional Memorandum of
Understanding governing the use of this system. We
are awaiting the provision of a revised P&A,
following an Emirati visit to the US last July to
discuss their forecast system requirements.


11. (S) Over the past year, MbZ raised his desire
to procure the armed Predator B with just about
every interlocutor in Washington. He believes this
system will provide the UAE the much-needed
capability to survey and defend its long, porous
coasts and inland borders. MbZ has indicated he is
not interested in purchasing the unarmed Predator.
The Joint Staff is currently coordinating a policy
decision with State regarding release of this MCTR
Category I weapon system to the UAE. CENTCOM
recently forwarded an assessment to OSD supporting
sale of an unarmed Predator B to the UAE. We are
awaiting an OSD policy decision on this issue. The
Emiratis will find it difficult to understand that
we can sell them F-16s while denying them an armed
Predator B.

E-2C Hawkeye - (If Raised)
--------------


12. (C) We are making progress on a UAE request to
obtain E-2C Hawkeye Advanced Early Warning
aircraft. Although the original LOA lapsed in July
without a UAE signature, they have signed a Letter
of Intent to study the offer further and deposited
$5 million to continue negotiations. The US Navy
International Programs Office has the lead on this
project. A team arrives on September 26 bringing
with them a restated LOA extending pricing and
availability until the end of the year. The goal
is to obtain a signed LOA in time to announce a
deal at the Dubai Air Show in December 2003. The
five aircraft have been transferred to Northrop
Grumman, which is awaiting UAE acceptance of an LOA
to begin refurbishing.


13. (CS) The AH-64 Apache A-to-D Remanufacture LOA
lapsed in July. UAE officials continue to conduct
discussions with Boeing and US Army officials as
though the LOA were still valid, despite notice to
the contrary. This issue will be a key discussion
item at the upcoming UAE Financial Management
Review in Washington, Sept. 29-Oct. 3. The UAE
needs to provide another formal Letter of Request
and obtain updated Pricing and Availability before
Boeing and USASAC proceed with this project.
Meanwhile, the planned transfer of the AH-64H fleet
from UAEAF to UAE Land Forces has been postponed,
pending a remanufacture decision.

--------------
BROADER ISSUES
--------------

Afghanistan: SOC Deployment
--------------


14. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man
Emirati Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air
Base. As you know, the UAE continues to play a
very helpful role in Afghanistan, particularly in
the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance. The UAE Armed Forces provided the
Afghan National Army with approximately $50 million
in assistance in kind in 2002 and overall
humanitarian assistance has crossed the $50 million
mark. The UAEG also continues to provide
substantial personal financial support to President
Karzai.

Iraq: UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance
--------------


15. (SBU) As you know, the Emiratis were among the
first in the Arab world to step up to the plate in
providing much-needed humanitarian assistance and
medical relief to the Iraqi people. The Embassy,
the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM worked closely with
the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move supplies
into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE
for treatment. This cooperation continues. Thanks
to the system put in place by CENTCOM and the HOC,
the Emiratis are now moving assistance into Iraq on
an almost daily basis using their own
transportation. The Sheikh Zayed hospital in
Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of patients a
day and the Emiratis are now considering adopting
yet another hospital.

Iraq: Timely Public Statements
--------------


16. (U) The Emiratis strongly supported Iraqi
delegations to the IMF/World Bank meetings in
Dubai, and at the Arab League summit in Cairo. In
mid-August, the Emirati leadership hosted six
members of the GC - the first Gulf country to do
so. Strong public statements of support for the GC
and the Iraqi people followed the visit and after
the formation of the new Iraqi Cabinet. The
Emiratis issued a strong public condemnation for
the attacks against the UN's Baghdad headquarters
and against Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim and his
followers in Najaf. Publicly and privately, the
UAEG's message has been consistent, and perhaps
best summed up in the words of Crown Prince
Khalifa: "It is imperative for us to support the
Iraqi people and the Governing Council's efforts
out of a desire to see Iraq overcome the present
state of affairs and build a better future for its
sons."

Al Arabiya TV - Out of bounds
--------------


17. (SBU) Al Arabiya, the Dubai-based Arabic
satellite news station competing with Al Jazeera
for viewers, has stirred up controversy with
sensationalistic broadcasts of Coalition POWs and
dead Iraqis during OIF, and more recently, because
of a broadcast by hooded terrorists threatening to
kill GC members and their supporters. We have
expressed our concern to both the UAE and Saudi
governments and the director of the Dubai Media
City where Al Arabiya is located. (King Fahd's
brother-in-law Walid Al Ibrahim is the principal
owner of Al Arabiya.)

WAHBA